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INTRODUCTION 
Law is both a reflection and a creator of the social 
milieu. The whole process of human interaction is predicated 
on the rights, obligations, powers and duties within a given 
system, which a human possesses, owes or is owed. The only 
constant factor within this milieu and a fortiori the legal 
system from which it is inseparable, is the fact of change. 
Consider the following quotation from Pollock and Maitland's 
History of the English Law: 
"Of the divers sorts and conditions of men our law 
of the thirteenth century has much to say; there 
are many classes of persons which must be regarded 
as legally constituted classes. Among laymen the 
time has indeed already come when men of one sort, 
free and lawful men (liberi et legales homines) can 
be treated as men of the common, the ordinary, we 
may perhaps say the normal sort, while men of all 
other sorts enjoy priv~leges or are subject to 
disabilities which can be called exceptional. The 
lay Englishman, free but not noble, who is of full 
age and who has forfeited none o~ his rights by 
crime or ·sin, is the law's t:ypical man, typical 
person. But besides such men, there are within the 
secular order noble men and unfree men; then there 
are monks and nuns who are dead to the world, then 
there is the clergy constituting a separate "estate"; 
there are Jews and there are aliens; there are 
ex-communicates, outlaws and convicted felons who 
have lost some or all of their civil rights, also 
we may make here mention of infants of women, both 
married and unmarried, even though the condition 
be better discussed in connection with family 
later, and a word should perhaps be said of lunatics, 
idiots, and lepers. Lastly, there are "juristic 
persons" to be considered, for the law is beginn.j..ng 
to know the corporation". 1 
1. Pollock F, Maitland F w, The History of the English Law 
Vol. 1 (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1898) 407. 
rAW USRtHY 
001,RlA UNIVtlEi iY Of Wf.i.. • 1,:,·. ' i .. 
2. 
In such a hierarchir.21 structure it becomes iITmediately 
apparent that there were diverse statuses. Only a minority 
of the citizenry were, what Pollock and Maitland depicted 
as "free men". Most were under some umbrella of authority. 
Priests and nuns were not persons under the law but were 
under the spiritual umbrella of the Church. Women and 
children were under that of the father and husband. Some 
were in amarginal position with less than full rights, for 
example Jews. 
What has happened over the centuries is that one by 
one these statuses and rights differences have been erased 
and changed with only marginal traces of the hierarchy left. 
Manhood and eventually universal suffrage, equal pay 2 
and so on have tended to negate differences between me~, 
on the one hand, and between sexes on the other. Anti-
discrimination legislation 3 is a means of enforcing the 
equal rights or women and minority groups. One group however, 
namely children, find themselves in the same status as their 
mediaeval counterparts, though even here there are elements 
of change, for example, the Minor's Contracts Act 1969. 
2. Equal Pay Act 1972. 
3. E.g. Race Relations Act 1971, Human Rights Commission 
Act 1977. 
3 . 
But then there is that last sentence in the quotation, 
that " ... the law is beginning to know the corporation". A 
4 definition of a "corporation" provided by Street and approved 
in Abrahamse v Co~nocks Pension Fund 5 is: 
"[A] corporation is commonly styled a 'legal 
person' but the appellation 'person' _is 
applicable to it only by analogy; and the 
analogy fails when it is thus clearly stated 
that this legal person is wanting in much that 
belongs to a natural person - that its course 
of existence is marked out from the birth; 
that it has been called into being for certain 
special purposes; that it has all the powers 
and capacities, and only those, which are 
expressly given it, or are absolutely 
requisite for the due carrying out of those 
purposes; and that all the obligations it 
affects to assume which do not arise from or 
out of the pursuit of such purposes, are null 
and void." 
This. and other definitions 6 provide only a cursory 
insight·into the creature known as a "corporation". This 
paper will be involved in investigating what a corporation is, 
how the law treats it, and for what reasons, and what are 
some of the implications of such a treatment. 
4. The Doctrine of Ultra Vires (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1930) 4. 
5. (1963) 2 S.A. 76, 79. 
6. Some other definitions of "corporation" are: 
(i) Coke CJ in Tipling v Pexhall (1614) 2 Bulst 233, cbserved: 
"Touching corporations, these are invisible, immortal and 
have no soul; and therefore no subpoena lies against them, 
because they have no conscience or soul. A corporation is 
a body aggregate. None creates souls but God, the King 
creates them and therefore they have no souls; they cannot 
appear in person, but by attorney." 
(ii) In 1691 by Holt CJ, as "ens civile, a corpus politicum 
an universitas, a jus habendi et agendi. 
(iii) R v London Corporation (1692) 5 Kin 310, where it was said 
to be an artificial body composed of "divers constituent 
members like the human body and the ligaments of this bodyc 
political or artificial, are the franchises and liberties 
thereof which bind and unite all its members together, and the whole frame and essence of ·a corporation consists therein!' 
4. 
To analyse these general questions, the paper will focus 
on how the law has treated a very special type of corporation -
the trade union. Chapter I of this paper will, however, first 
lay the conceptual groundwork for how a body is endowed with 
"corporate personality''. Chapter II introduces, defines, 
and attempts to describe a model of the "trade 1:lnion". Chapter 
III examines the various means by which the Trade Union has 
been treated in law, and Chapter IV examines reasons for 
such treatment. Chapter Vis an attempt to synthesize the 
previous four chapters by creating a socio-juridical construct 
of the trade union in contemporary New Zealand. Chapter 
VI concludes, one may say, at the beginning. It looks at 
the individual: in some ways at the specific case of the 
individual trade unionist, but also in general terms of . 
the society in which we live. 
5. 
CHAPTER I CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
PERSONS 
A "social system" is usuall.y typified by social 
scientists as a construct created and inhabited by persons. 
It is generally agreed, however, that such a classification 
is different from the aggregate of psyches of those who 
inhabit it. One can only turn attention to the fall of once-
great civilizations, for example, the Incan civilization that 
capitulated to European conquest some 400 years ago. Here, 
a complex social system, based on a delicate structure linking 
geographically dispersed settlements, suddenly collapsed, 
leaving in its place a set of "primitive" villages with their 
inhabitants scraping out a mundane subsistence-level 
existence. What had changed was not the people but the social 
structure they inhabited. 
But a social system is more than a mere man-made construct. 
It is a structure of which persons themselves are component 
parts. It is this reflexive character of the system that makes 
it critical to specify the elements upon which the system is 
constructed. 7 So, what do we mean by "person"? 
There is no doubt that the word "person" is derived from 
the Latin "persona" and the Greek "proposon". Originally, 
the words meant a theatrical mask, familiar to students of 
Greek and Roman theatre as an integral device in the theatre 
7. See generally Hallis W. Corporate Personality (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1930) 
6 . 
life of the two cultures. From this, the meaning of "role" 
was derived, and, through the passage of history, by what can 
be seen as an inevitable metaphor, the dramatic role became 
that which any "person" plays in the "drama of life". 
,.... _ 
J.V 
this was added the terminology of Christian theology in which 
the word "person" had a special meaning as one ofthe three 
hypostases (substantiae) of the Divine Nature, and in which, 
further, the most important aspect of human existence was the 
membership in the Church, which itself was made a definite 
persona, mystically understood as a single and indivisible 
8 body. 
One of course can get lost in this "sea of semantic 
exercises". For instance, Radin 9 has argued that the word 
"persona", from a very early tim~, and quite separate from the 
"role" sense was -used much as we use the word "person" in 
modern parlance. That is, referring to a flesh and blood 
human being. But then, if the immortal bard was correct and 
all the world is a stage and all the men and women in it are 
merely players, then the lawyer, the philosopher, and the 
linguist are as one seemingly entangled in contradictory 
positions. 
--------------------------------- -···------ - -
8. Webb God and Personality (Gifford Lectures 1918 ) 41. 
Quoted in Radin M. "The Endless Problem of Corporate 
Personality" 0932) 32 Col. L.R. 643, 646 n. 
9. Radin M., ibid, 645-647. 
7. 
The lawyer is, however, able to ignore such etymological 
inconclusiveness. He or she is aware that within any legal 
system, a basic unit must be provided before legal relationships 
can be devised which will serve the primary purpose of 
organizing the facts of the overlaying social system. The 
legal person is the union or entity adopted. 
says: 
As Korourek 
"The factual basis of social phenomena is legally 
organized through the device of personateness -
centers of legal force or of attraction of legal 
force - having a capacity for claims, duties, 
powers, liabilities, or for some of these. 
Personateness'beingrecognized, it remains a 
constant center of legal force or attraction." 
10 
The legal person is the constant by reference to which 
claims, duties, powers are organized by means of general rules. 
In essence, the notion is grounded in abstr·action: the 
intangibility of its reality; its being composed of a physical 
being through which it materializes its capacities and powers; 
but distinct from which it has a separate identity. 
Pitfalls await those who indulge in "transcendental 
11 nonsense". In failing to distinguish, on the one hand, 
"between roles played by certain legal terms with the consequent 
search for the 'essence' of a non-existent thing", and on the 
10. Jural Relations (2nd ed, Bobbs-Merrill, 
1928) 4. 
Indianapolis, 
11. Some of which are discussed in Cohen F.S. "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" (.1935) 35 COL L.R. 
804. 
8 • 
other, "between the function of the term 'legal person' in 
the logic of the law and the 'things' to which the term is 
validly applied. 11 12 We will attempt to avoid such pitfalls 
as we indulge ourse 1.ves in the esoterica of legal per$onali t;/. 
PERSONALITY 
It would be accepted that the law, as in the case of all 
human institutions, develops from the concrete to the 
abstract: that is to say, that it has laid down specific 
rules to produce, if possible, some coherent principle on 
which said rules are eventually subsumed and in accordance 
with which they may be modified or developed. 
Legal. personality provides a dilemma. Prima facie, one 
can accept a flesh and blood being as a unit capable of 
bearing rights and duties. However, the lawyer is aware of 
another type of ~·person"·; a sort of in tangible construct that 
nevertheless exists within a legal system - 11 corporations". 
It has always been the case, ever since our neolithic ancestors 
ba·nded together to sleep, eat and hunt that men have acted 
collectively toward a common goal. But, such actions, until 
the development of the corporate concept, were easily 
resolvable into the component natural persons of which they 
were composed; or were at least easily identified with a 
particular natural person. 
12. Webb op cit at pp. 7-8. 
9 • 
Lubasz 13 has · · 1 d d h h E 1· h convincing y emonstrate ow t e ng is 
common law by the late Year Book period (cl482) had evolved 
rudimentary principles of corporate personality in its 
treatment of the borough. The characteristics of that theory 
appear to have been: 
(1) A concept of the borough corporation as somehow 
tripartite, mayor, sheriffs and commonalty each being 
a "member" of the whole; 
(2) the virtual identification of corporate capacity 
with the name of the corporation; 
(3) the view that the corporation was not so much an 
entity somehow distinct from and parallel to the political 
community as it was the community itself in its corporate 
capacity; 
(4) the ascription to the mayor, as both head of the 
corporation and chief governor of the body politic~ of 
a crucial, peculiar and distinct role; and 
(5) the general tendency to allow legal concepts and 
rules to reflect, and thus to be adequate to, the 
. . 
politic al reality with which they were intended to deal. 
Similarly, the Universities, from their very earliest 
days held property, used a common seal and appeared in c8urt 
both as plaintiff and defendant. Not, however, till the 
13. "The Corporate Borough in the Common Law of the Late Year Book Period" (1964) 80 LQR 228. This paper was in part 
an answer to an earlier paper by Ke Chin Wang H. "The 
Corporate Entity Concept (or Fiction Theory) in the Year 
Book Period" (1942) 58 LQR, 498; (1943) 59 LQR 72. 
10 • 
thirteenth year of Elizabeth I were they formally incorporated 
by an Act of Parliament, for by that time it was well-established 
doctrine that no corporation could exist without an authorisation 
of the State. Indeed bodies presuming to act as corporations 
without the authority of the legislature (or the Crown) were 
"guilty of a contempt of the King by usurping his prerogative". 
This requirement of an act on the part of the State to confer 
independent juristic personality upon an association, has 
ostensibly virtually excluded the express creation of corporate 
entities by judicial decision. 14 
THEORIES OF PERSONALITY 
At no time has English thoughtabout the ~ature of legal 
personality assumed the posture of generally accepted doctrine. 
Given the traditional reluctance of English jurisprudence 
to investigate its own conceptual underpinnings this is 
of itself not surprising. The important fact is the fact 
that no system of law, including the English, recognizes the 
corporate character of every group of people, so that large 
;-iumbers of "unincorporated associations" exist without 
specific legal personality. As will be seen jn tr~ absence of 
some statutory provision the unincorporated group cannot as 
such, incur contractual or tortious liability, or be injured, 
or hold property. The name of the group or association is 
used only as a "convenient means of referring in conversation 
14. Quo Warranto ll681-3} 8 St. Tr 1039;Duvergier v ~ellows 
(1828) 5 Bing 248, 266. 
11. 
to the persons composing the society." 15 Yet despite this 
non-existence in the eyes of the law it is ' true to say that 
neither practical lawyers nor legal theorists have been wholly 
able to ignore the phenomenon of group life. The so-called 
'Realist' theory of corporate personality professed to find 
a solution by holding these factual entities to have moral 
personality distinct from that of the aggregate of members. 
The most oft-quoted encapsulation of the idea has been that 
of Dicey who said: 
"When a body of 20, or 2,000 or 200,000 men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose they create a body which by no fiction of law but from the very nature of things differs from the individuals of whom it is constituted." 16 
The most famous exponent of the theory was the German, 
17 · Otto von Gierke who postulated that the subject of rights 
need not be human beings, that every being which possesses 
a will and a life of its own may be the subject of rights, 
and that States, corporations, foundations are beings just 
as alive and just as capable of having a w{ll as are human beings. 
15. Bloom v Nat. Fed. of Demobilised and Disabled Soldiers and Sailors (_1918) 35 TLR 50, 51 per Warrington L.J. 
16. "The Combination Laws as Illustrating the Relation between Law and Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century" (1907) 17 Harv L.R. 511, 513. 
17. Political Theories of the Middle Age (transl. F. W. Maitland) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1900). In his classic ''Introduction", Maitland made Gierke's work familiar to the English public. 
A 
12 • 
"universitas ~. [or corporate body] ... is a living 
organism and a real person, with body and 
members and a will of its own. Itself can will, 
itself can act ... it is a group person, and its 
will is a group will." 18 
19 Gierke pruned some of the excessive analogies with "organisms" 
that characterized earlier Realist incarnations , but a will 
he certainly thinks is presupposed for being a legal person. 
In Gierke's view such groups had a status in law which was 
not derived from State recognition as such. An incorporating 
statute demands of a body "more than the mere fact of its 
20 birth, it demands also its legitimate birth." Thus the 
statute does not create, it declares. 
The source of corporate unity is, according to Gierke, 
not in terms of contracts between members but on the basis of 
a constitution (Verfassung). · True, the original agreements 
between the members of the corporate body belong 'on one side 
of their being' to the law of contract. They are, however, 
at the same time elements of the creative act (elemente des 
schopferischen aktes) which calls into being the bearer of a 
general or social will (sozialer willenstrager). The 
individuals in giving up some of their freedom gain the status 
of the group of which they declare themselves members. Their 
18. Maitland ibid. xxvi. 
19. This theory evolved in a period when the terminology of 
sociology was applied to politics and jurisprudence and 
the phenomena of the social sciences were interpreted in 
terms of the Darwinian struggle for existence and evolution. 
Unfortunately, there was a tendency to carry on an anthro-
pomorphic organismic terminology to an extreme. See Pound 
R. "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" 
(1912) 23 Harv. L.R. 489, 495-400, 502-503. 
20. Hallis op cit p. 142. 
13. 
wills and acts become the group's will and acts: 
"(The group] is not a fictitious person, it 
is a Gesalllltlptperson, and its will is a 
Gesammtwille; it is a group-person, and its 
will is a group will." 21 
As Barker richly elaborated it was 
" the pulsation of a common purpose which 
surged, as it were from above, into the mind 
and behaviour of the members of any group" 22 
and this effectiveness in action could only be secured by 
cloaking the group - national, local, regional or professional -
with an aura of legality. 
The Realist theory was enthusiastically adopted in the 
twentieth cen.tury by the French Institutionalists. For 
instance to Hauriou 23 the social group or institution was 
"an idea of an undertaking or of an 
enterprise which is realized and which 
persists juridically in a social environment; 
for the rea:ization of this idea an authority 
is constituted which procures organs to 
itself; and in addition, among the rulers of 
the social group interested in the realization 
of the idea there are produced manifestations 
of communion directed by the organs of 
authority and regulated by procedural rules." 
The phrase "persists juridically" implied for Hauriou, the 
fact that the determination by the State of the status of a 
group is of a declaratory and not constitutive nature. 
21. Maitland, op cit p. x.xvi. 
22. In his "Introduction" to Gierke O Natural Law and the 
Theory of Societ~ 1500-1800 ttrans E. Barkerl (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1934) lxi. 
23. See Broderick A. "Hauriou' s Institutional Theory: an 
Inv i tat ion to Co mm on Law Ju r i s prudence " C 196 5 ) 4 So 1 Q 2 8 1 . 
14 • 
Hauriou does not contradict the obvious political and 
sociological fact that the State can deny this recognition by 
the exercise of crude power. Hauriou's suggestion - and this 
is his central tenet - is that if you are looking for _objective 
criteria to guide the State and the courts, there is 
sociological force in recognizing a rationalised body as a 
legal person. And there is also a moral force pushing in this 
direction - a certain compulsion of equal justice. What is 
being described is a normative proposition~ "Given such an 
organization, as I describe, it 'ought' to be recognized as a 
'legal personality" 24 Provided there are compelling public 
reasons which dictate contrariwise, an "institution" is 
objectively "entitled" to recognitwn as a legal personality . 
The basic legal problem according to Hauriou~ . is thus thrown 
into the sociological arena to identify whether an organised 
group bears the substance of rational organization. 
The major effect of Institutionalist t~ought was the 
emphasis on the plurality and vitality of the groups making up 
the social system. They included in this list the family, 
church, trade unions, and the State. These groups had a certain 
life of their own, a life deriving, as it were, from the 
natural order of things. Around this way of life, they argued, 
there inevitably had to develop rules of procedure and action 
which were inh.erent in the purposes of the particular group. 
2 4. Idem. 
15. 
It was the role of the law to legitimate these purposes by 
giving recognition to such rules. 
Clearly, what is being proposed by Hauriou, and of 
Realists generally is, the exercise of a value judgrnent - be 
it by the State or the courts. They concede that ultimately 
it is these authoritative bodies that decide recognition or 
not of a corporate body but sociological data provides what 
law craves - an objective standard, to ensure "justice". 
Of course, as Duff points out: 
"this leaves completely open the attitude 
, which the legislature or the Courts may 
take up towards it. They may refuse it all 
rights and duties, exactly as most legal 
systems in the past have refused them to 
some human beings .... [a Realist] need not 
deny the power of the State either to 
destroy a group and forbid it to meet, or 
to treat it a~ a creat~re whose acts, like 
an animal's can create rights and duties only 
for others, or to give it rights and duties 
differing from those of the human being in any 25 respects that may be deemed socially expedient." 
The Realist theory is contrasted with two other theories 
which usually are treated as complementary,namely the Fiction 
and Concession Theories. According to the Fiction Theory, 
only human beings can be persons, and therefore the subject 
of rights. Corporations are not persons, but they are treated 
as if they were. In contrast to natural persons, who are 
considered capable of having 'natural' rights, corporations 
are endowed with this capacity by law. This theory has been 
25. "The Personality of an Idol" (1927) 3 Carob. L.J. 42, 48. 
16 . 
traced to Pope Innocent IV (1245) though it is doubtful if 
he accepted the full implications of the Fiction Theory 
as now understood. 26 It owes more to the work of van 
. 27 d Savigny an latterly in English jurisprudence tc t~at of 
Salmond. 28 
Its corollary, the "Concession" theory, has a different 
theoretical background to the Fiction theory, and lays down 
that the legal personality of a group can come into being only 
by concession of the State. It may be noted that the 
Concession theory is not an inevitable deduction from its 
"Fiction" cognate, for it can well be imagined that a 
corporation can be determined as fictitious in character, 
29 yet with no legitimating act of State. 
For our purposes, it will be assumed that the Fiction 
Theory leads as a matter of practicability to the notion 
of State imposition of corporate status. However, it must be 
noted that methodologically the Fiction theory is ultimately 
a philosophical theory that a corporate body is but a name, 
26. See Smith H.A. Law of Associations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1914) pp. 152-152. 
27. "Jural Relations" (trans W. H. Rattigan}, Savigny's 
System of Modern Roman Law Bk II (Wil Py and Sons, 1884) 
pp 175 et seq. 
28. Juris p rudence (7th ed) (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1924) 
pp 339-342. The 7th edition was the last b y Salmond himself. 
29. For a discussion of the historical divergence between the 
theories see Dewey J "Historical Background to Corporate 
Legal Personality" (1935) 35 Yale LJ 654. 
17 • 
a thing of the intellect; the Concession theory although 
indifferent to the reality or otherwise of a corporate body; 
what it insists is that its legal power must be derived. 30 
It is therefore an overtly political theory linked with the 
modern notion of the monistic state. 31 
30. Some writers, notably Jhering, Brinz, Schwabe, and H::>hfeld, 
have rejected all the foregoing views. They argue that 
the "subject of rights" in cases of corporate ownership 
of property is simply the natural persons who compose 
the entity. They concur with advocates of the Fiction 
Theory in maintaining that the personality of a corporation, 
or even its existence as an entity, is a p u re fiction or 
metaphor; but they maintain that the fictitious personality 
is not 'created' by the State, because it does not exist. 
To them, a corporation is merely an abbreviated way of 
writing the names of the several members. 
But none of these writers have actually denied the 
phenomenon of group action or of g~oup personality ·on 
the moral pla~e. Hohfela, for instance, concedes that 
the action of individuals when acting as members of a 
corporation is different from their action as natural 
persons but "when all is said and done, a corporation is 
just an association of natural persons conducting . business 
under legal forms, methods and procedure that are sui 
generis." All propositions which have corporation as 
their subject or object are ultimately reducible to 
singular propositions in terms of the legal relationships 
between natural person~ " ... When we say that the so-ca l led 
legal or juristic person has rights or that it has con-
tracted, we mean nothing more than what must ultimately 
be explained by describing the capacities, powers, rights, 
privileges (or liberties) disabilities, duties and 
liabilities, etc, of the natural persons concerned as 
persons" - Cook (ed) Fundamental Legal Conceptions As 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Humprey Milford, London , 
1923) pp 198-199. 
For a comprehensive overview of these theories of corporate 
personality see Pound R. Jurisprudence IV (West Publishing 
Co., St Paul, 1959) 191-261; 384-405. 
31. The conception of a sovereign power was unknown to classical 
antiquity; even in the Roman idea of imperium it is onl y 
embryonically contained. Similarly the Middle Ages, marked 
by the battles between church and State, had no notion of 
the monistic conce p tion. It was onl y till the writings o f 
Bodin, d obbes, Heg e l, and Austin began to appear, outlining 
the pattern of domination reflecting co-ordinated, unified, 
supreme power controlled by a definite person or group of 
persons, that a theory of the monistic State took form. 
18. 
Such a state possesses (or should possess) a single source 
of authority that is theoretically comprehensive and unlimited 
in its power. This unitary and absolute power is ''Sovereignty". 
THE STATE 
In its simplest and most typical form this sovereignty 
is exercised by a single instrument and flows from a single 
person, as in a monarchial state in which the will of one 
ruler is supreme. But it may also take the form of democracies 
and federal states where the exercise of sovereignty is more 
or less divided between different instruments, in so far as the 
source of sovereign power itself is still regarded as residing 
in the body politic acting through the ''General Will". In 
some countries this is embodied in a written conptitution. 
New Zealand as an heir to the legal history of Great 
Britain is a monistic state. During the last decades of the 
seventeenth century, the judicial powers of the judge were 
brought under the complete rule of the British Parliament. 
All judges acknowledged the binding force of all parliamentary 
Acts, while Parliament was sufficiently powerful to coerce 
any recalcitrant court into submission. With the rise of the 
cabinet form of government, the supremacy of the legislative 
function over the executive function was also assumed. In 
this way the British Parliament became the supreme law making 
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organ of the kingdom the central seat of all political 
authority, from which all other powers are derived. As 
Blackstone put it: "[W] hat the Parliament doth, no authority 
32 on earth can undo." The tendency of group action to rival 
the political power of the State was counteracted by treating 
all organizations as "configurations" and conspiracies "except 
that as they derived all their powers from an express grant 
of a supreme power." 
. p· . 33 It was against such a state that Gierke, 1gg1s, 
Laski 34 and others raised their voice of protest. In the 
first place they rejected any idea of a moral sovereign. There 
is no person or body of persons within a country whose commands, 
whatever the content, are absolutely binding on the citi2enry. 
Laski denied that the State as such, had any prima facie claim 
b d . . h . d f . 35 h h S too e ience, accepting t e 1 ea o Duguit tat t e tate 
is distinguished from other groups simply by possession of a 
greater degree of force. A law is morally obliging 
32. Comme~taries on the Laws of England (13 ed., P. Byrne, 
Dublin, 1796) 163. 
33. Churches in the Modern State (2nd ed, Longmans , Green 
and Co. London 1913). 
34. Laski's literary output was prodigious, though during his 
long career he resiled from many of his previously-held 
views. For a representation of two of these periods see 
"The Personality of Associations" (1915-1915) 29 Harv LR 
404, and The State in Theory and Practice (Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1935). For a general biographical sketch of the 
man and his ideas see Zylstra B. From Pluralism to 
Collectivism; the Development of Harold Laski's Political 
Thought (Van Gorcam, Assen, 1968). 
3 5. Duguit L Law in the Modern State 
transl) (Allen and Unwin, London, 
(Laski F. and H. J. 
1921) 
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according to its content rather than according to who issues 
it. It was for the individual who, when faced by a particular 
situation, to decide his course of actions and for any 
decision made, moral responsibility lay squarely on his 
shoulders. 
Most English Realists also rejected the notion of a 
political sovereign - that is, a person or body of persons whose 
commands are actually obeyed in all circumstances. The State 
may be the body which possesses most of the instruments of 
physical force, but there are things in every country which 
the State is powerless to prevent or to impose. As A. D. 
Lindsay put it: 
"Whenever, theref~r e , men's loyalty · to 
a non-political association, a class, or 
a church, or a trade union is greater than 
their loyalty to the State, the State's 
power over the trade unions or churches or 36 classes within it is thereby diminished." 
This strain of thought has been termed "Political 
Pluralism" and contains within its parameters a wide spectrum 
of shades and nuances; from a laissez-faire model mirroring 
those social and economic theories that suggest that . the optimum 
public good will flow from each individual and interest group 
within society pursuing its ow~ goals as rigorously as possible
37 
36. Quoted in Pollock F. Historv of the Modern Science of 
Politics (MacMillan, London, 1898) 81. 
37. Wright Mills C. The Power Elite (Oxford University Press, Galaxy edition, New York 1959). Termed 'negative liberalism' by Nicholls Din The Pluralist State (MacMillan, London, 1965) 3. 
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throughto a more egalitarian strand that believes the State 
should both protect the individual from coercion by the group 
and also create a balance of power between competing groups. 
Note however, that while pluralism involved an attack 
on the sovereignty of the State, it did not necessarily attack 
the State as such. According to Figgis the State is a collection 
of groups forming a single political entity, rather than a 
collection of individuals. These individuals are seen as 
belonging to the State through their membership of other 
groups. Figgis also referred to the State in terms of the 
formal organs of government by which this collectivity acts 
as a single entity. The State for Figgis is only bound 
together by a civil or political bond, and existed inorder to 
maintain a situation of order in which its member groups are 
enabled to pursue such purposes. 
It is therefore an essential job of the State to regulate 
and to control the activities of groups in such a way that 
they are able to achieve those ends for which they exist. 
In order to resolve conflicts between groups, a framework of 
legal institutions was necessary. The State exists to 
control and limit with.in the bounds of justice, the activities 
of all minor associations whatsoever. The point at issue 
is not whether churches can do anything they choose, but 
whether human law is to regard them as having inherent powers, 
rights, and wills of their own - in a word, a "personality"·. 
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If they have, their activity might be restrained in so far 
as it interferes with others - thus, they would not be 
allowed to persecute, and ought not to be allowed. 
Figgis was particularly concerned that the law should 
recognize the right of the group to grow and to modify its 
original purpose. The group whether formally incorporated or 
not, should be able to determine what its purposes, directions, 
motiviations and so on were; it should not be tied down for 
instance by rigorous interpretations of the concept of ultra 
vires, or by narrow constructions of trust deeds. Such 
fundamental issues were raised in the Free Church of Scotland 38 
case when the House of Lords decided that the proposal of 
the constituted authority of this church, backed by the vast 
majority of its members, to combine with the United Presby-
terian Church was against the strict interpretation of the 
trust deeds. All the property of the Free Church was to go 
to a small section of the Church which refused to join with 
the United Presbyterians. The dead hand of the law ,,'fell 
with a resounding slap upon the living body 1~39 and a special 
Act of Parliament was passed in order to rectify the "absurd 11• 
consequences of the decision. 
3 8 . Fr e e C h u r c h o f S c o t 1 an d v O v e rt o u n ., [ 1 9 0 4 J A . C . 5 1 5 . 
3 9 . Mai t 1 and F Co 11 e c t e d Papers {_Fisher H . A • L . e d ) 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911) 31~. 
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A problem that troubled Figgis however stems from the 
argument that;,,t he State is ultimately concerned about the 
conscience and character of its citizens, then would it not 
be justified in suppressing or at least interferring with 
groups that denigrated the character of its members? ' He 
would have to admit the possibility of State intervention 
but would probably insist that such intervention will often 
fail to achieve the desired objective. 
THE FIC'lION-CONCESSION TEEORIES ASCENDANT 
Such ideas have great appeal to those imbued with 
an individualist philosophy: one that invokes the dignity 
of man and the liberalist notion of free association - it is 
the claim that the Fiction theory is incompatible with such 
t'enets. 
But even greater appeal is engendered by the perceived 
theoretical inadequacies of the Fiction Theory. For instance 
Gierke held, and quite rightly, that law can protect the rights 
of natu~al persons only, and that the object of its protection 
is always ultimately a social reality. But he makes the 
mistake of overlooking that if this is a necessary assumption 
for the purposes of juridical organization of the social 
system, it does not necessarily prove their real existence 
as social facts. In the words of Pallis 
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"[he] assumed that what has a substantial 
reality in the eyes of the law is also 
real from the point of view of philosophy; 
that is, from the point of view of what is 
co n ere t e , 1 iv in g re a 1 i t y . He has s ub s t i tut e d 
an abstraction for a concrete reality." 40 
Gierke's dogmatism arose because it was believed that · to 
apply the term "fictitious" meant to deny that something 
existed. So, if a corporation is a fiction, then all forms 
of legal categorization such as contract have no existence in 
reality. 
The fundamental error was to be persuaded that "fiction" 
entails "fdlsity". This is understandable when even proponents 
of the Fiction Theory are unsure of the word "fiction''s" 
etymological derivation • It has generally assumed to derive 
. from the Latin "fingere" which means to ••invent"· or "'create" 
or "fashion", yet in Roman law as i;n·English_ the te.rm fi'ction 
as applied to a corporate entity assumed that something was 
not what it was described as. In this sense, the corporate 
entity was to be treated as a person though this was 
unas·hamedly make-believe. The same confusi'on was also 
attributed to the appellation "'artificial". 
However, this present century has thrown up a convincing 
array of theoretical objections to tfie previous analysis. 
40. Op cit pp. 162-163. 
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W ·t h V 'h' 
41 ~uller 42 d d T t 1 43 ri ers sue as ai inger,  , an e our ou on 
have weaved the notion of "fiction" into an abstract algebra 
of law. "Fictions" for them, are nothing more than hypothetical 
reasoning; a device which "forces upon our attention the 
relation between theory and fact, between concept and .reality, 
and reminds us of the complexity of that relation." They 
are the "white lies" of the law, but with the important 
corollary that the fiction is not intended to deceive. Nor 
are they the opposite of reality: 
"[E]very theoretic fiction may be resolved 
into a series of concrete dispositions of 
which it is simply the clothing." 44 
Of course a "fiction" · can represent a state propounded with a 
complete or at least a partial consciousness of its falsity, 
and thus give credence to the Realist objections. However, 
this is not a true criticism of the Fiction Theory so much 
45 · as distinguishing good law from bad. Thus Gray as·sumed 
only a being with a will could have legal rights and so was 
forced to record corporate personality as a fiction derived to 
escape this premise. But this ignores the fact thcrt-the 
subjective existence of the corporation lies in the existent 
41. The Philosophy of "As If" (Ogden CK transll (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1924). 
42. Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 
1967). 
43. Philosophy in the Development of the Law tMcRead M. transl) 
(Augustus Kelly, New York, 19691 pp. 385-402. 
44. Fuller, op cit ix. 
45. "Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence" (18921 6 
Harv LR 21. But note Cohen's warning: ~Theoretically we 
may be free to decide to use a wurd like personality in any 
sense we choose, but practically we must recognise that 
intellectual resolution cannot rob words of their old 
flavour or of the penumbra of meanings which they carry along 
with them in ordinary intercourse"'- "Community Ghosts and 
Other Perils in Social Philosophy" (1919) 16 Jo. of. Phil. 673. 
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collectivity. 46 Bulow , in an article on procedural fictions 
of German law said that a proper understanding of fictions 
ought to bring us to realize 
"that the incorporeal centre of legal interests 
which we designate as a 'legal person' possesses 
a substantiality which cannot, and need not, 
be created for it, by an act of imagination. 
This substantiality, however, need not include such 
supernatural elementsas a common will." 
The use of the fiction though is even more fundamental ..... 
I 
than that for it gives to the very core of the legal process -
of how law devel0Ds. The common law grows by analogy from 
previously decided legal situations. It builds on facts and 
nuances till a corpus of law is seen as embracing certain 
social phenomena until substance is derived in ultimate 
reference to the Law. For in·s tance, take Fuller' s analogy 
with the physical sciences. We say sugar (the thing)_ has the 
properties of being sweet, white, soluble and so on. But 
when we come to define the thing (.sugar} we simply enumerate 
its most important properties. The properties' are the things, 
yet we regard them as appurtenances to the thing, as · if the 
thing was something more than the sum total of its properties. 
Now by the same reasoning, how do we define. a "human being"? 
In fact, any definition is inadequate - human beings do not 
form a unique or homogenous class. For instance, they may be 
46. "Civi]prozessuali-s:che Fiktionen und Wahrhe.iten" (1879)_ 62 
Archiv f. d. civilistisch.e Praxis 1, 10. Dealt with in Fuller, 
op cit, 13 n 
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male or female, black or white (or any shade in between) 
young or old, and so on. In other words we find it impossible 
to know what a person is. However, we can formulate a 
definition according to the analytical needs facing us. 
Therefore, economic science has devised a notion of "rational 
economic man" as a construct to aid understanding in that 
particular science. Yet ethically such a construct is 
nonsensical. Similarly, the construct H has no existence 
outside the realms of mathematical praxis where, for certain 
purposes, it provides a service. 
And so it is in law, as in other sciences that the 
~etaphorical element plays its role. In legal theory a 
person is considered to ·be any unit upon which the law attri-
butes legal rights and duties. Any unit which is not so 
endowed is not treated in law as a "person" even though it 
may be a natural human being - indeed in Roman Law, slaves 
were not considered persons. Human beings may not even be in 
existence - for instance unborn generations have rights 
attributed to them through the law of trusts. They may not even 
have any connection to biological humanity, as when the Privy 
Council held that according to Hindu Law, an idol had 
47 personality. The same holds true for a corporate person. 
There is the common link of legal recognition running through 
all classes of "persons"; yet this does not necessarily mean 
47. Pramatha Nath Mullick v Pradyunna Kumar Mullick (1925) LR 
52, Ind. App. 245; 87 Ind. Cas. 205. fee Note on case by 
Duff, supra footnote 25. 
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that all rights and duties are equivalent for all categories. 
Moreover, legal rights andduties, by definition may exist 
even if it appears nonsensical to the observer; a corpse has 
certain rights, inter alia, looking after its remains, the 
rights to have its testamentary wishes observed, and so for 
these certain circumstances a biologically dead person is 
still a "person" in the legal sense. Thus, there is no meth-
odological objection in saying that for "some purposes" a 
corporate person may exist whilst in others it has ceased to 
exist. 
48 
ENTIFICATION 
Law is not static. Like nature it abhors a vacuum. . It 
is only to be expected that as new fact situations arise, 
and new relationships are explored that a process of 
"entification" may occur. In fact it is a natural process 
and ·one in which the growth_ and richness of the law is ensured. 
48 . "I can't believe that" said Alice. 
"Can't you?" the Queen said, in a pitying tone. "Try 
again; draw a long line and shut your eyes." 
Alice laughed, ,-there's no use trying", she said, "one 
can't believe impossible things". 
"I dare say you haven't had much practice," said the Queen, 
"Whsn I was your age I always did it for half an hour a day. 
Why, sometimes I've Believed as many as si.x impossible things 
before breakfast.~ - Lewis Carroll Through the Looking Glass 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1971) 177. Lawyers, by 
virtue of their trade will accept belief in devices which 
"Ic]ognitively worthless, ... may nevertheless be very efficient 
as devices of norm-derivation, having a faculty of normative 
expansion or irradiation providing or prompting answers where 
th_e law otherwise might be silent or incomplete. They may 
be, in certain cultural situations, the shortest and easiest 
ways of representing a great number and complexity of 
detailed provisions"._ Tammelo I. mimeographed letter of 
8/10/63 (distriButed by the Australian Society of Legal 
Philosophy quoted in Stone J Legal System and Lawyers 
Reasoning (Stevens & Sons, London, 19641 49 n 
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A "thing" may have rights and duties added onto by process 
of law to achieve a specific legal or social goal. As 
Savigny described the process: 
"If a new juridical form is produced, it 
is as one connected with a previous form and 
49 thus shares in its improvement and development." 
It is here that we reach a crucial point in the trans-
muting process. The law may construct a thing and attribute 
to it properties. But the fiction - the thing must drop 
out of the final reckoning. We must not suppose that the 
thing is greater than the sum total of its properties. As 
Vaihinger terms it "the correction of a previous intentional 
error", is for example to extract from "person" all those 
attributes not legally appropriate .to the "corporate" person. 
If not, the legal construct is contaminated by the process 
of metaphor, and leaves it prone to reification by wh.ich is 
meant the existence of a legal concept even when all its legal 
rights and duties are taken away. The Fiction theory is 
founded really on analogy and as such is a device to fill a 
vacuum in the law by the shortest and easiest way. It can be 
thus seen as simply an abbreviatory device. As Wolf describes it; SO 
"An author wh.o has written five volumes on the 
law of physical persons and then wishes to discuss 
legal persons, need not :wr i te another five vo 1 ume s 
- or rather four, as he would in any case be 
omitting marriage, divorce and parents and children 
- but he need only write a single sentence saying; 
all I have said about human Beings applies by way 
of analogy to the following entities etc." 
49. Vom Beruf unserer Zeit f~Gesetzgebung und Rechtswis~enschaft 
t2nd ed, 1828) pp 34. Quoted in Fuller op cit 59. 
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This "crutch of thinking" is then discarded when its purpose 
has been fulfilled. 
Proporents of the Fiction and Realist theories 
frequently clash because they fail to appreciate that they 
are dealing on two different analytical planes; the former 
being a methodological approach, whilst the latter has a 
more metaphysical function. 
Even Hohfeld 51 does not expressly discount the suggestion 
that "group personality" may exist as a fact, but his theory 
is not phrased in terms of phenomenological description 
but rather in terms of legal relations. In legal discourse 
the use of a group name is a convenient label even though 
the entity it represents is a fact, indeed a fact which the 
law must recognize. But in law, it is an entity "that· in 
the last analysis consists of nothing more than a name by 
which a complex can be dealt with in discourse." 52 
The moment we speak of a group as an entity having 
personality we invoke a metaphor borrowed from the language 
of individual behaviour and which as such may lead us to 
attribute inappropriate characteristics to thegrou8 So, the 
postulation of a "group will" is a result of this thinking. 
51. Fundamental Legal Conceptions tYale University Press , New 
Haven, 1923) pp 198 
52. Radin M. "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality" 
(1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 643, 667. 
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But, if we can attribute legal responsibility to a group this 
does not constitute that a group has a "will". It is because 
the law permits certain activities, which by analogy can be 
likened to the behaviour of individuals that, in limited 
circumstances we can talk of a "group will". This does not 
purport to say anything about the nature of the entity but 
merely to indicate the role played by the term "person" in 
53 the logic of the law. 
THE TWO STEP TEST 
Most legal concepts, and corporate (or legal) personality 
is a pertinent example, bears at least two aspects; one formal, 
concerned with the logic of law, and the other substantial and 
affected by variables such as politics, economics, morals, 
and history. Both aspects need to be examined, studied and 
understood before conclusions can be reached. Obviously, 
the lawyer will feel more at ease and will be more capable 
of answering the formal legal questions. That is his training. 
But, the law evolved to answer questions of politics, of 
inter-human relationships, of quaint philosophical dilemmas. 
For a lawyer to ignore such aspects would reduce him· to an 
unquestioning mechanic, and the law would truly become merely 
words and phrases accumulated in books on dusty shelves. 
53. Hart HLA "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (1954) 
70 LQR 37. 
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The actual word "person" should drop out of all 
reckoning. Arguably it has been abandoned since 1833 
when it was extended to "a Body Politic; Corporate or 
collegiurn, as well as an individual." 54 The work is ' now 
done by specific statutes and judicial bearing upon specific 
matters. 
It follows that when one speaks of corporate personality 
there is a two-fold question that must be addressed. Firstly, 
one must identify a concession of personality. "Normally" 
says Barker "the regular process will be that of legislation, 
accompanied and applied by judicial interpretation." But 
the judge will not necessarily stop at an exact interpretation 
of the mere letter of existing law. He may recognize legal 
personality ·(at any rate when he is dealing with the matter 
of grou? personality) on the ground of analogy assigni?g per-
sonality to bodies which are in an analagous position to 
those already recognized under existing law. 
The second limb which naturally follows, is to determine 
the quantum and personality so conferred. That is, what 
specifically are the rights, duties, obligations and powers 
of the "entity". The question involves some difficulty. 
Individuals may act as individuals within a group situation 
or otherwise. But their acts, and their rights, duties etc., 
54. (1833) 3 & 4 WM IV C74. Its New Zealand descendant 
is found in S. 2 Acts Interpretation Act 1924. 
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only exist in relation to their legal status as individuals, 
unless they can be construed as within the corporate group 
purpose. If, however, a group of individuals acts outside 
the group's conceded rights and duties, this does not deny 
that such acts do not exist in law - they may; nor does it 
mean that such acts will have no real consequences - again, 
they may. It simply means that such acts are not within the 
contemplation of the corporate group personality. As in the 
first limb, legislative pronouncement is the main but not 
the only means of determining this question. Unless the 
legislative language is unambiguous and all-embracing, there is 
necessarily room for judicial interpretation so far as social 
policy allows. 
These degrees of "corporateness" are separate from 
notions of the concesston. As will b~ seen later the degrees 
possessed by various bodies may be little different from 
each other and, factually they are treated in the same way. 
Conceptually, such bodies however, are of different categories 
CONCLUSION 
It is important to remember, the State does not necessarily 
give life or birth to a corporation. Just as a Registrar of 
Births reco=ds the arrival of newly-borns the concession of 
personality means nothing more than the legal creation of a 
corporate entity. Such a process is no more essential to the 
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existence of the entity than the Registrar of Births is 
essential to the conception or birth of a child. In other 
words, an entity is no different in fact, five seconds after 
formal recognition, than five seconds before. It is the 
eyes of the law, however, that discern the difference between 
the creatures, and which attribute by its gaze different 
legal consequences. 
But the mere fact of being treated as different in law 
cannot but help to alter the 'factual' personality of the new 
t . Th S 1 56 sai'd·. corpora ion. us, peng er 
"For every organism we know that the tempo, the 
form, and the duration of its life, and of each 
individual phase of its life, are determined by 
the characteristics of the species to which it 
belongs. No one would suppose, of a thousand-
rear oak tree, that the main phase of its 
development is now just about to begin." 
This is strictly correct. But just as we may transplant 
the oak into new soil, introduce it to exotic nutrients and 
sunshine, graft on new branches, it may just be said that it 
is entering its main phase of development. At the least it is 
embarking on a new period in its growth or ultimately to its 
demise. It will never be the same again. 
56. (Trans) Quoted in Belloch B. State and Society In a 
Developing World (Watts, London, 1969) 25. 
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CH.A.PTFR I I 
THE TRADE UNION 
I~ t~e previous chapter a normative conceptual basis for 
the legal treatment of groups in society was laid. This 
paper will now consider how one particular group, commonly 
known as a ''Trade Uniort, is treated by the New Zealand legal 
system. However, before we embark on this stage, it is 
strictly necessary both for the sake of clarity of definition 
as well as to be able to better appreciate the "law-state'', 
to conceptualize the entity under study. 
DEFINITION 
The term trade union is a generic one that encompasses 
three distinct categories: 
(a) Craft Unions: Historically the oldest type of union, 
they organise workers in the same craft or trade, 
regardless of the industry. Examples are carpenters 
engineers, printers. These are skilled trades which 
require lengthy apprenticeships, and in the days 
before Poly technics the committee of the union would 
test an applicant's craftsmanship before admitting 
him to membership. In this way standards were 
guaranteed to employers, and a "craft" tradition 
built upon and maintained. 
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(b) Industrial Unions: These aim to organize workers 
in an industry regardless of skill. 
( C) General Unions: This type of organization covers 
workers regardless of skill or industry. 
For purposes of simplicity this paper will not different-
iate between the categories. 
as: 
So the generic "trade union 11 has been variously described 
11 a continuous association of wage-earners for 
the purpose of maintaining or improving the 
conditions of their working lives 11 57 
11 all organizations of employees - including 
those of salaried and professional workers, 
as well as those of manual wage earners - which 
are known to include among their functions that 
of negotiating with employers with the object 
of regulating conditions of employment. 11 58 
11 
••• [a group comprised of] labouring people. 
Its purpose is to improve the social, economic 
or political lot of the individual through 
improving the position of the working group." 59 
These statements define the entity in terms of its 
inherent objectives or purposes. These appear to conceive of 
the union as a two-fold entity. Firstly, it protects the 
57. Webb S. and B. _History of Trade Unionism {_New ed., Longmans 
Green and Co, London, 1911} 1 
58. Ministry of Labour Gazette (UK) Nov 1952 p. 375. 
59. Suffrin s. C. Unions in Emerging Societies {_Syracuse 
University Press, New York, 1964) 7. 
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workers within an employment relationship by defending the 
socio-economic base from erosion and the individual worker 
from job insecurity and victimization. This objective 
Szakats describes as "defensive, passive, and political". 60 
Secondly, there isthe assertive body, that achieves a better 
living out of the steadily increasing real wealth available 
from technological and capital growth within the economy. 
61 Szakats dubs this the "acquisitive, active, and economic" 
aspect of the union personality. 
Such categorizations areincomplete and simplistic. 
For instance, protection can be achieved through active and 
aggressive means. Moreover, if we accept the aforementioned 
purposes as valid, the question is left open - why a trade 
union? It is possible for some other body, for example, a 
political party, to embrace, by extension workers' needs. 
/ 
This is perhaps part of a fundamental question of what 
makes a collection of persons a human "group". To investigate 
specific aspects of this question it is proposed to delineate 
a model of union development. 
60. Trade Unions and the Law· lSweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 
1968) 10. 
61. Idem. 
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PURE THEORY OF A TRADE UNION 
(a) Assumptions 
For reasons that will become obvious further on, · it 
is necessary to lay down certain conditions in our scenario. 
(b) 
(a) The existence of a class of permanent workers 
sufficiently numerous and concentrated to combine in 
force. 
(b) No overt interference by the State or by management 
to inhibit contact and association between workers. 
(c) Wages which are sufficient and regular to ensure 
a surplus after normal expenditure. 
(d) Existence of workers who have experience in adminis-
tration, or sufficient ability to undertake such tasks. 
(e) No previously constituted combinations of workers. 
Primary Groups 
Carl Jung once observed that 
"[t]he great decisions of human life have as a rule far more to do with the instincts and other mysterious unconcious. factors than with 
reasonableness." 62 
62. Modern Man in Search of a Soul (Harcourt Bruce, New York, 19BOL 69. 
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A typical wage earnerin ~ur scenario works to maintain himself 
and his family in a relatively comfortable standard of living, 
occasionally indulging himself on 'luxuries' such as a car, 
or a television set, which he nevertheless perceives as 
social necessities. There are other needs to be satisfied, 
most important to 
"feel that as well as earning [his] bread 
in a factory [he is] somehow living as well, 
growing in [his] work, developing [his] 
character [his] mind". 63 
Workers are eventually drawn together not only by 
environment and factory layout, but also by a social process 
where people with similar ideals, hopes, fears and aspirations 
cluster into associations. Such informal organizations 
are called "work groups", a genus of what Cooley termed 
"primary groups" characterized by ''intimate face-to-face 
association and co-operation." They are primary in several 
senses but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming 
the social nature and ideals of the individual. 
64 It is 
the direct or indirect interaction of each member with every 
other members that marks out the primary group. 
Such groups are common because they represent virtual 
though not altogether conscious attempts on the part of workers 
63. Lord Citrine, former General Secretary of the Trade 
Union Congress tUKl in interview reported in The 
Observer 17/9/61. 
64. Honore AM "What is a Group" (1975) 61 Archiv fur Rechts und 
sozialphilosophie 161. 
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to gratify root-needs, whilst at the same time serving an 
economic purpose. In fact the latter obscured the other 
functions of a primary group. It has only been relatively 
recently that the controlling power and other functions of 
the primary work group have been gradually understood. In 
a study of non-union workers in the U.S.A., Mathewson 65 
discovered that restriction of output was widespread: in 
105 enterprises embracing 39 industries. In the workers' 
eyes there were compelling economic reasons for informal 
work-group arrangements to restrict output; basically to 
avoid working oneself out of a job. All the same the 
researcher judged that these justifications were in part 
rationalizations, and that restriction had much more to do 
with maintaining the solidarity of the group rather than 
economic calculation. 
The most famous investigation of shop floor organization 
was carried out by a team of Harvard research workers at the 
non-union Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company 
in Chicago during'the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
Part of the work was to observe a group of men in the 
"bank wiring room". These men had their own notion of a fair 
days work, lower than the firms "oogey·", which. they enforced 
by ridicule, mild physical violence, and os·tracism. They 
65. Restriction of Output Among Unorganized Workers (Viking 
Press , New York, 19 3 1 ) . . 
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protected themselves from outside interference by manipulating 
their bonus system. They were allowed considerable discretion 
in submitting claims for "daywork allowances" to compensate 
for delays in production. The researchers stated that 
"[t]he men had elaborated, spontaneously and 
quite unconsciously, an intricate social 
organization which cut across the formal 
organization laid down in the rules and 
policies of the company." 66 
Such a work place culture provides the reality 
for a worker. It means, to an extent, suppressing one's 
personal thoughts in favour of what would be expected by 
the group. But such a decision, made by the individual worker, 
would be made with a view to his perceived benefits of such 
an association; primarily to avoid ostracism, but inherently 
as a means of benefit· and social enrichment: 
"[T]he prim~ry group in effect loosens the 
straitjacket in which the individual is 
placed by the factory organization. Seeing 
a worker in the round, accepting his quirks 
and shibboleths, the primary group in effect 
takes the formal rules and procedures and bends 
them to meet individual cases. It puts, in 
short, a p~otective shield around its indiv~dual 
members. " 6 7 
Little research has been done to test this hypothesis 
68 within the New Zealand context. However a recent study 
66. Roethlisberger F.J, Dickson WJ Manage~ent and the Worker: 
An Account of a Research Programme Conducted by the Western 
Electric Co. Hawthorn Works, Chicago lWiley, New York, 1~64) 
67. Wootton G. Workers, Unions and the State (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 19671 65. 
68. Kerr Inkson Hand Inslow J "Waterfront Workers as Traditional 
:Proletarians: A New Zealand Study" ll981L 17 ANZ Jo. of 
Sociology (1981) 10. The study was primarily designed to 
investigate whetherNewZealand Waterfront workers followed 
the ideal type definition of the "traditional proletarian 
worker ." 
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In a primary group, within a given period of time A 
(of a group of individuals A,B,C,D,E) will interact more 
often with B, C, D, Ethan he would with outsiders, and like-
wise B interacts more with A, C, D, E . . 69 The results 
tabulated give no indication of interaction with outsiders, as 
a proportion of contacts nor does it take into account 
( 
environmental factors (e.g. noisy factories, widely spaced 
work areas, though these may be inferred from the nature 
of the work) . In only the Freezing Worker category was there 
a significant degree of non-communication, though this was 
only eleven percent of the sample. Workmates who indicated 
having at least one close friend working nearby numbered from 
a high of eighty-eight percent for the Watersiders, to a 
low of fifty-six percent for the Carpenters. Semi-casual 
meetings to visiting at the home of these "close friends" 
ranged from ninety percent in the Watersiders case, to seventy-
five percent for Assemblers. Thus, the results· are 
indicative of close personal affiliation outside of merely 
work related interaction, between people in the same work 
environment. 
(c) Sec?ndary Groups 
As discrete primary groups become aware of similar 
groups within their environment an ideology of "strength in 
69. Homans G The Human Group CHarcourt Brace, New York, 
1951)_. 
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unity" evolves, and the primary group "dresses up in formal 
clothes" to become a "secondary group", an agglomeration 
with its cognate groups. Between the informal and formal 
probably lies a transitional stage in which quasi-formal 
leaders speak in the name of the group. Small local branches 
are established and finally a "trade union" is formed. 
It may be noted that it is possible to have a direct 
translation of "workers with certain attitudes" into an 
external association without any intervening primary-group 
state. However, the process of secondary group formation is 
a simpler, more unstructured one than that for primary group 
conversions. Convergence of norms and values will occur later 
than those inherent in the growth of primary groups. The 
difference is one of degree and procedure, rather than of any 
substance. 
(d) Th.us, The Union 
The nature of a union is profoundly affected by the 
nature of the work-group culture, which is itself shaped by 
processes both internal and external to the organization. Each 
work group is unique, governed by the particular environment 
in which it finds itself, with the relevance and i mportance. 
of different levels· of collective organization tending to 
fluctuate according to which goals are most immed iately pressing . 
4 s. 
It is the active rank and file in such work-groups which 
ensure a union's existence by assimilating a collective union 
ideology, perform unpaid services and uphold union norms and 
values (known colloquially as "union solidarity"). Maximum 
co-operation amongst the various work-groups, the "union in 
action" usually only occurs when the survival of one or more 
of the work-groups is threatened, by legal, economic or managerial 
attack. 
Moreover, primary group norms are not subordinated to 
those of the secondary group. Harmonious relations within 
the union do not arise by some mysterious entropic process. 
A union consciousness is not formed by the totality of 
sentiments common to all group members but by the totality 
of the sentiments approved by them. For instance, a union 
ballot which. results in a unanimous decision to 'down tools' 
is the result of the acts of will of th.e individuals in the 
union, it is not an act of the union itself. It is true 
to say that many of those would have been influenced by the 
speeches of others, by mass suggestion, and by the herd 
instinct. The union in action is thus in reality, the action 
of mutually influenced individual wills. 
Necessarily, the habits, rules both written and unwritten 
tend to redefine the individual attitudes of its members. 
46. 
"Since attitudes are a central element in character", 
Wootton says, "the union might almost be said to make members 
70 
in its own image. " But even Wootton admits the process 
is reciprocal: attitudes arise out of a workers needs, they 
cannot be handed to him on a platter. 
All this, of course, is not readily apparent to the trade 
unionist. For a profound transformation has taken place, as 
71 sketched by Frank Tannenbaum. The union becomes not simply 
a vehicle for mundane purposes; with its normative structure 
it rather becomes a 'symbolic universe'. The trade union 
represents an attempt, albeit unconscious, to recreate in 
itself a sort of pre-Industrial Revolution society in which 
the worker had, despite all else! a recognizable and accepted 
place, and . in which his life had meaning because he sh~red 
with others a common code. The union itself embodies the old 
symbolic universe; it is a social and ethical system, not 
merely an economic one: it is concerned with the whole man; 
its ends are 'the good life'. 
However, this conception is more complicated becaus·e 
72 a union operates on at least two moral levels. Tlie creation 
of a union does not destroy the inf,ormal structure from which 
it sprang: what happens is the s.uperiropos·ition of the formal 
70. 
71. 
72. 
Op cit p. 91 
Ph~losophy of Labour (Knopf, New York, 195ll. 
Wootton, op cit p. 92. 
47. 
upon the informal. Conrespondingly, there may simultaneously 
exist two moral domains; a union is by no means a homo-
genous moral entity and for instance, when a strike occurs 
the moral justification may be on a plurality of planes -
a struggle for power, or indignation both at management and 
their own union. 
Both individual goals of members and of the union as an 
entity have to be maintained in some sort of harmonious 
relationship to each other. 73 Psychologists such as Aronson 
believe that all human interaction constitutes an influence 
situation. That is, in any relationship between people 
each is trying to influence the behaviour of some or all of 
the others by using many ·different ·methods and techniques, 
and each is subject to the.influence attempts of others. 
If this is true, then the fact that a union operates at the 
moral levels will not rent it asunder. Rather, it is a 
natural process that will only lead to an unstable state if 
divergent ~Q_i;..1,Y§.Land objects are of such a nature as to be 
mutually incompatible with the continued survival of the 
entity. In fact there may be an almost total lack of recog-
nitfon that any such situation exists·. Organizational 
Development analysis often reveals dis·parate groups in one 
organization operating in counter-p·roductive. ways while 
73. The Social Animal (2nd ed, Freeman, San Franc~sco, 
1976). 
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implicitly believing that they are working to achieve 
the same ends. While this conflict is often inevitable 
and obviously reduces the efficiency with which an entity 
pursues its daily course, it does not necessarily in any way 
impair the entity as a functioning unit. 
(e) Post-Transformation Development 
Unions, like other large-scale organizations, are 
constrained by both internal and external sources to develop 
bureaucratic structures. In dealing with their members, 
unions must set up administrative systems with defined 
patterns of responsibility and authority. Subordinate 
administrators must operate within given rules for dealing 
with repetitive situations; apart from keeping basic records, 
handling . workers'· grievances, and other · tusual' union tasks, 
administrators also act as quasi-referral agencies in handling 
accident compensation matters for instance. 
The extent of bureaucratic centralization is also 
influenced by the extent of centralization in the structure 
of outside groups with which the union must deal. 
. 74 Lips·e.t 
suggests that a union which must have face to face dealings-
with a giant corpora ti·on must set up an authority structure 
paralleling tfiat of the corporation. 
74. The Political Process in Trade Unions: A Theoretical 
Statement" in Berger M. Abert Page CA leds) FI"e.edorn and 
Con tro 1 in Modern Society (.Octagon Books, New· York, 
1961) 85. 
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As this bureaucratization develops, control of the 
union passes into a small cadre who, motivated by 
ideology, altruism, or career advancement, for all intents 
and purposes determine the policy and direction of the group. 
Although the work group culture may, at points of crisis 
enervate itself, apathy and disinterest permeate the union. 
Gradually, what Fuller 75 termed the "legal principle"· tends 
to dominate the association where it is held together and 
enabled to function by formal rules of duty and entitlement. 
This shows itself in three ways: (1) A greater reliance 
on rules to define members' duties and entitleme~t,,, (2) a 
concordant shift in accountability based on tangible harms 
or benefits which flow from specific acts rather than on .mere 
judgmental assessments of character and motive, and (3) the 
articulation of strict procedural requirements for distributing 
benefits and burdens. 
When the bonds holding such an association together 
consist of such formal structural elements, members· are given 
greater leeway to pursue individual aims. The union at this 
point, though actually having no interests that are not tfle 
interests of some or all of its members, does take on a 
character peculiar to itself as an entity distinct from its 
constituents. It may own property which is not simply an 
aggregation of individual properties; it may own funds which 
75. "Two Principles of Human Association" in Winston K. L.Ledl_ 
The Principlesof Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller (Duke University Press, Durham N.C., 1981) 67 
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the members cannot at pleasure distribute among themselves; 
it possesses rights and obligations, powers and liabilities 
as a unity, not as a surrunation of individuals. It is in 
this sense, corresponding to its peculiar methods, that 
the union attains a corporate character. 
The union's dealings, whether to its members or outside 
bodies, thus have palpable legal, social and economic 
consequences. It is at this stage that the body is regulated 
by and subject to the law of the land so far as applicable 
to its general circumstances, or as befitting its unique 
status. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion is obviously a highly re~ined 
abstraction, heir to all the weaknesses that such analytical 
models are prone to. In surrunary, it emphasizes a sequential 
development from an informal body of persons through to 
agglomeration into a larger secondary group, through to a 
highly developed bureaucracy that is the quintessential union. 
Of course, the stages of transformation are not so neatly 
as defined in this discussion. No attempt has, or can be 
made as· to predict how long each. stage should take. What 
is important, in the context of this paper is to consider the 
"pure union" and the union in the eyes of the law (presented 
in th.e next chapter); their comparability and the implications 
of such a comparison. 
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CHAPTER ITI 
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS; QUASI-CORPORATIONS; CORPORATIONS -
MANIFFSTF.TIONS OF THE "CORPORATE ENTITY" 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
To analyse propositions concerning the legal personality 
of trade unions we now turn to statute and common law, 
keeping in mind the two-stage theory propounded in Chapter I. 
It must be admitted however, that the first limb of that test, 
namely the "concession" has, at least in English legal history, 
not been crucial. Various associations have been admitted 
to the status of legal persons without the traditional royal 
charter, or by the reigns of Edward III' and IV, an Act of 
Parliament. This was made possible by the principle of corporate 
capacity by prescription, by the doctrine of implied grant, 
and by recognition for certain purposes, notably the 
Mediaeval Church. Nevertheless it required the declaration 
of a court of law before implied incorporation could be 
affirmatively established. 
Gradually however, the State perceived it to be in their 
best interests to assert some control over these bodies. The 
general attitude may be gleaned from the Attorney General, 
Sir Robert Sawyer in a 1682 case involving quo warranto 
52. 
proceedings against the city of London. If proceedings of 
this nature could not be taken against corporations, 
"it were to set up independent commonwealths within 
the Kingdom and (this) ... would certainly tend to 
the utter overthrow of the common law, and the 
Crown too, in which all sovereign power to do 
right both to itself and the subjects is only 
lodged by the common law of this realm." 76 
This policy of control was aided by the insistence that 
the category of juristic persons was closed. Flexibility 
in the system, was provided by the use of a device, originally 
an invention of Lombardy - the trust. 
77 
Such a device never 
constituted a great threat to the State because, as Holdsworth 
points out, 
"the capacity for action of a group of men, who 
depend for their life upon a body of trustees 
acting under a trust deed which defines and 
sterotyp'es their powers, is for more limited, 
both for good and evil, than the capacity for 
action of an incorporate person." 78 
. . f . 79 d . th With the passing o the Companies Acts uring e 
nineteenth century incorporation became a formal pro~~ss .___ 
The necessary controls over corporations were effected not 
only by this general legislation but also by legislation relating 
to particular activities. It would seem that, if not before 
76. 8 St. 1039. Quoted in Holdsworth W.S. A History of 
English Law (Vol. lx) (Methuen, London, 1926) 46. 
77. Maitland F. w. Introduction to Gierke 0 . Political 
Theories of the Middle Aqes, op cit. xxx. 
78. Op cit. 148. 
79. See Gower D. The Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed. 
Stevens and Sons, London, 1979) Chapt. 2 for an historical 
analysis of the period. 
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this time, then certainly after it, the atttibution of legal 
personality is dependent upon declaration by statute (or 
by an administrative body vested with power to declare) that 
a specific person or body of persons has legal personality. 
The courts have no such power except insofar as they have 
power to construe and interpret questions of legal personality. 
ASPECTS OF CORPORATENESS 
Thus, in contradistinction to the Realist dogma, the 
distinction between a corporate body and an unincorporated 
association is no-t necessarily derived from "the nature of 
things" but is merely dependent on the fact that the law has 
chosen to confer a different status on the bodies. 
But how does the law do this - does it simply say that 
a "X is a legal person", or does it annex to a body of 
persons certain incidents that fulfill the acce.pted criteria 
of being a legal person? 
stated five incidents:-
If so, what are they? 80 Blackstone 
80. 
(.1) Perpetual succession; 
C2 )_ Possession of a common seal; 
(31 The power to make byelaws; binding on themselves 
unless contrary to the laws of the land; 
Commentaries I 475, Quoted in Lloyd D. Law Relating to 
Unincorporated Associations (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1937) 
15. 
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(4) The power to sue or be sued, to grant or receive 
by the corporate name, and to do all other acts as 
natural persons may; 
(5) The power to purchase lands and hold them for the 
benefit of themselves and their successors. 
If a body possesses all these attributes one can call 
it, according to Blackstone, a legal person. But what if 
only four, or only one of these attributes are possessed? 
Such questions pertain more to the second limb of the test, 
that is, the degree of corporateness of an entity. It has 
confounded the judiciary when the first stage, the actual 
concession, is unclear. 
The case of the Trade Union provides a focus for these 
issues because in law, it can take on three different aspects. 
Thes·e can be demonstrated in the form of a continuum: 
(I) Unincorporated Association: Not a legal entity. It has 
none of Blackstone's incidents (in la~l. 
(II) Quasi-Corporation: Able to hold property by trustees·, 
to act by agents and to sue and be sued in its own name. 
Although Dot a corporation it is an en~ity separate 
...,. from its members, implying perpetual succession. 
(III) Corporation: Has all of Blackstone's incidents. 
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THE TRADE UNION IN LAW 
(1) unincorporated Association 
English law has traditionally regarded the trade union 
as a voluntary association. In its purest form, a union 
falling into this category is not a legal entity. It can 
neither hold property nor contract in its own name. It 
cannot sue or be sued in its own name and it cannot commit, 
or be injured by torts, as a body. The name of the group or 
association is used only as a "convenient means of referring 
in conversation to the persons composing the society." 81 
In order to determine the subject of legal rights and duties, 
the factual entity must be dissolved into "its constituent 
parts. In sum, it has no existence separate from its members, 
its property belongs to its members and it can exist so long 
as there are members. The law only sees "them", not "it"·. 
In essence, an unincorporated association is a common 
fund comprised of the following elements: 
1. Contract An association may be regarded essentially as 
a contract between its members. The terms of the contract 
will be found in the rules of an association by which a 
member on entering agrees expressly or impliedly to be bound. 
81. Bloom v Nat. Fed. of Demobilised and Disabled Soldiers and 
Sailors (1918) 35 T.L.R., SO, 51 per Warrington L.J. 
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2. Agency Agents are persons whose acts operate to confer 
rights on the members of the society as against strangers, 
and rights upon strangers as against the members of the 
society. Their acts are in law theaccs of the members. 
3. .Trusts Equitable ownership of the members) property is, 
in a sense, co-ownership for the purposes and subject 
to the rules of the society. The member has a right to 
participate in the benefits and control of the property 
as "social property". 
4. Combination There must be an ascertainable moment of 
history when a number of persons combined or banded 
together to form the association. 82 
Underlying the unincorporated association is the 
essential notion of voluntariness or more particularly, the 
absence of any legal compulsion to join. Of course there may 
be strong extra-legal motivations to associate, for instance 
to mix with the "right people", or the passing-on of craft 
traditions, but there is no force of law to so command it. 
Problems occur, however, as to when and to what extent 
ought the activities of unincorporated associations be subjected 
to judicial review. Generally, since many unincorporated 
82. See Conservative and Unions·t Central Offi.ce. v Burrell . 
I1980] 3 All E.R. 42. 
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associations exist as factual entities, a degree of 
sophistication has been attained in terms of functions, 
activities and policies which are independent of those of 
individual members. Separate bank accounts may stand in 
their name. They may town'property, and have an independent 
income and expenditure. An outside person may 'contract' 
with them and be injured by 'their' servants and agents. 
Clearly, then, the law notwithstanding, groups of people 
who come together for cultural, artistic, social, religious 
or other purposes (other than gain) can andhave acted as 
entities in the furtherance of their activities and have not 
been impeded by the lack of corporate personality. 
Partnerships are a particular type of unincorporated 
association but it was found necessary to enable partners to 
incur unlimited liability for the acts of each partner, -within 
limits, in contract and tort, contrary to the rule that those 
who take action against members of association cannot establish 
personal liability against those members who neither committed 
nor authorised the "act in law". 83 Nevertheless, the courts 
expressed a reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs 
of associations unless some right of a proprietary nature 
existed 
84 
and it is now accepted that partnerships, because of 
their peculiar business quality have adopted principles of law 
unique to themselves. 
83. s. 12 Partnership Act 1908. 
84. R. v The Benchers of Lincoln's Inn (1825) 4 B & C 
855, 107, E.R. 
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It is in the nature of our adversary system of law that 
when problems do arise, such as when a member of a group 
is aggrieved (e.g. being expelled), or if a contract 
entered into by the association is not performed, a dispute 
can only be resolved by recourse to established principles 
of law. Ore can only say that, in law, a voluntary unincorporated 
association has no existence, and that the most likely answer 
is that an individual member of a group who made the various 
arrangements, or caused a breach etc. is alone liable, -and 
not the group as an entity. 
In dealing with problems the English, Australian, and 
New Zealand courts have invariably used a conceptual approach. 
That is, should a person wish to sue an association, he is 
85 required by the Australian case of Cameron v Hogan to 
demonstrate an existing legal relationship before the Courts 
will interfere. 
plaintiff. 
Several alternatives are open to the 
(i) A Proprietary Interest 
Originally, the only basis on which a plaintiff could 
frame his action was to show a right of property in the 
association. 86 This can be explained historically as a 
vestige of the limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court of 
85. (.1934) 51 C.L.R. 358. 
86. Holden A.C. "Judicial Control of Voluntary Associations" 
(1971) N.Z.U.L.R. 343 
59. 
Equity in its power to grant injunctive relief though most 
common law jurisdictions (except Australia) have rejected 
this narrow approach. The problem with such an approach is 
"that a legal analysis which concerns itself 
with the discovery of a property relation as 
a precondition to adjudication cannot encompass 
the greater and more complex problem of the 
nature and importance of the particular 
association." 87 
Australian case law has bordered on the fantastic in terms 
of demonstrating (or more correctly manufacturing) property 
interests. Few clear guidelines are established and often 
the particular injury sustained by a plaintiff is often 
neglected within the legal word games. 
(ii) Contractual Rights 
This has been the main context in which these cases 
have been argued. The law of contract provides a conceptual 
mould into which to fit the legal problems of associations. 
Where contracts are not apparent the courts "have sometimes 
gone out of their way to find one." 
88 
Associations are generally established on a consensual 
basis and provided that the members contemplate the creation 
of legal relations the rules of the association become the 
87. 
88. 
89. 
See O'Connor D. "Actions Against Voluntary Associations 
and the Legal System" (1977) 4 Monash L.R. 87, 93. 
Kolden, op cit, 347. 
Rose and Frank Co. v J. R. Crompton and Bros. Ltd [1923] 
2 K.B., 261. 
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terms of an enforceable contract. 
belongs to the court. 
Supervision of contracts 
But do the members so intend? The conceptual fiction 
is stretched to its widest limits in, an unincorporated 
association with, say 1,000 members. If there is a contract 
between each member, and every other member thetotalcontracts 
would number 499,500. Each time a new member joins the 
contracts undergo a series of implied novations to regulate 
the new relationships involved. 90 
It has other weaknesses. It is not easy to decide whom 
one should sue or whether there is privity of contract 
between the person injured and the body responsible for the 
91 injury. Theoretically, the rules of natural justice 
or good faith can only be evoked if provision is made for them 
in the association ';s rules, or by implying terms. Difficulties 
may be also increased by the lack of a written constitution. 
The most pressing problem is that contract does not 
cover an increasing number of cases. Nagle v Fielden 92 and 
Davis v carem-Pole 93 were cases where there was no contract 
94 while in Faramus v Film Artistes Association the plain-
tiff was trying to establish that he was entitled to make one. 
90. Chaffee z. "Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit" 
(1930) 43 Harv L.R. 993, 1007. 
91. Blackler v N.Z. Rugby Football League Inc. [1968] N.Z.L.R. 547. 
92. [1966] 2 Q.B., 633. 
93. [1956] 1 W.L.R. 833. 
94. [1964] A.C. 925. 
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(iii) The Right to Work 
I L Sh ' G 'ld f G t B 't · 95 · n ee v owman s ui o rea ri ain it was 
suggested that though the rights and reciprocal duties of 
members of voluntary associations are dependent on either 
property rights or contractual rights, the courts must always 
be prepared to intervene to protect the "right to work'', 
which Lord Denning, in that case, considered to be just as, 
if not mor~ important, than rights of property. Lord Denning 
96 has championed this idea in a couple of other cases , yet 
few other judges have supported his views. 
(iv) Remedy Sought 
Locus standi requirements may vary according to the 
remedy sought. Generally damages are only available for 
breach of contract or as a result of a tortious act. This makes 
it difficult for a litigant to recover damages against an 
association. If the plaintiff alleges a breach of contract, 
the court may construe the relationship between himself and 
the association as one not intended to create legal rights 
d "b"l" . 97 an responsi 1 1t1es. 
With respect to the remedy of injunction, traditionally 
the courts will not entertain proceedings against an association 
95. [1952] 2 Q.B. 329. 
96. Nagle v Fielden op cit, Edwards v S.O.G.A.T. 
377. See Hepple B. "A Right to Work?" (.1981) 
97. l>_bbot v Sullivan [1952J l K.B. 189. 
[1971J Ch. 354, 
10 Ind. L.J. 65. 
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unless a proprietary right or contractual basis for relief can 
be shown with respect to the latter conceptual basis . Four 
categories of case were set out in Lee v Showman's Guild of 
Great Britain (supra) where the courts would interfere with 
wrongful expulsion from an association: 
(1) When action taken is contrary to natural justice. 
(2) When a person, who has not condoned a departure 
from the rules, has been acted against contrary to 
the rules of the club. 
(3) When the bona fides of the decision are in doubt. 
(4) When the rules of the association have been 
misapplied albeit honestly. 
With respect to declaratory relief sought against an 
association, a plaintiff need not show a cause of action 
based on a legal right like contractual or proprietary 
rights, yet he must show an "interest" in the action so as to 
justify his seeking relief. A discretion attached to the 
remedy is used to avoid involvement where it is judicially 
undesirable. 
The common law difficulties are partially met by equity 
' f f ' ' 98 in the orm o a Representative action But resort to 
this procedure is only available subject to compliance with a 
number of ill-defined conditions, and the law is obscure. 
98. R. 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
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There are a number of difficulties associated with the action 
with the main one being related to the very nature of an 
unincorporated association in that membership is constantly 
99 changing so that persons who were members at the time the 
cause of action arose may no longer be members, while new 
members may have joined. In tort a difficulty would arise 
upon finding that some of the members had voted against the 
action complained of as in these circumstances each defendant 
could raise a separate defense. Indeed, it is not markedly 
clear on whether or not the representative action is available 
at all in tort. Furthermore there is authority lOO that the 
action is not available when the sole remedy sought is damages. 
The. final avenue open is for the legislature to pro~ide 
procedural devices which enable an unincorporated association 
to be sued. Generally such devices attach aspects of 
corporateness onto unincorporated associations with the common 
feature that judgment for damages is obtained against the 
common property of the association and can only be executed 
against that association. The fact that membership is not 
constant is irrelevant since the plaintiff does not have 
to establish the personal responsibility of the individual 
members. 
A general example is provided by the Ohio Revised Code 
31715.42 which provides, inter alia, that: 
99. Bonsor v Musicians Union [1956J A.C. 104. 
100. Barker v Allanson fl937J 1 K.B. 463. 
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"Such an association or society may sue or 
be sued or be answered unto, plead or be 
irnpleaded in any Court in this State" 101. 
In the specific case of trade unions, consider the following 
two examples: 
(a) Belgium 
Belgian trade unions have, in general, neither formal 
legal status nor corporate capacity. This means that unions 
cannot be sued if they do not fulfill their "peace 
obligations" even when these are explicitly stated in the 
collective agreement, as laid down in Article 4 of the Act 
of 5 December 1968. Nor may the union sue the employer or 
the employers' association in its own name for failure to 
perform obligations. under the collective agreement. It is· 
for this reason that employers - seeking some guarante~s 
as to the execution and administration of collective 
agreements - have directly linked the payment of "benefits " 
reserved for union members, to the faithful performance of the 
collective agreement and the maintenance of social peace during 
the lifetime of the agreement. 
101. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. p 1964. Such provisions however do not identify associations as legal entities and thus do not change the common law relationship between an unincorporated association and its individual members. For an overview of the Ohio provision see Bur 1 in g t on R . M . " Un in c o r po rat e d As s- o c i at i ons" ( 1 9 7 6 ) 9 Akron L.R. 602. 
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However, pursuant to the Act of 5 December 1968 on 
collective agreements, representative unions - and the 
(representative) employers associations - can conclude collective 
agreements. These are legally enforceable. The same Act 
grants the representative organiz.ations the capacity to sue 
and to be sued in all litigation arising from the application 
of the...Act, and to defend their members' rights concluded by 
them. The individual union has standing to sue in two 
situations: 
(1) Litigation arising from the application of the 
Act, and 
(2) In order to defend their members' rights arising 
from the individual and collective normative 
102 stipulations in collective agreements. 
(b) Ontario and Saskatchewan 
In Canada, the provinces of Ontario101 and Saskatchewan 104 
reacting to the common law situation and wishing to put trade 
unions in a position where they could use concerted conduct 
to bargain effectively, enacted legislation which defined trade 
unions as unincorporated associations. That is, they were 
still groups which could neither sue nor be sued as entities. 
102. See Blanpain R. "Belgium" in Blanpain R. (ed) International 
Encyclopaedia of Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. II 
(Kluwer, Netherlands, 1979). 
103. The Rights of Labour Act R.S.O. 1970, C. 416. 
104. The Trade Union Act R.S.S. 1978, CT-17. 
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But, for the purposes of collective bargaining only,they 
are to be treated as entities, capable of enforcing collective 
agreements, enforcing arbitrators' awards, being subjected 
to prosecution, forcing the labour relations' board to carry 
out its functions etc. Thus, although trade unions are 
not entities for all purposes, they are for very significant 
ones. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Such devices however, do not create collective legal 
entities. They are merely procedural means by which 
voluntary organizations who either cannot, or will not become 
incorporated, are able to give efficacy to their corporate 
character. It is a recognition that, as illustrated in the 
"Pure Theory of Unions", a union goes through various graduations 
- from an informal club-like group, to ultimately a sophisticated 
organization whose activities ought not be hampered by ' lack 
of legal personality whilst, at the same time, should not 
be able to cloak itself from any responsibility for its 
actions by relying on its non-existence in law. 
(II) Quasi Corporation 
In the years 1871 and 1876 the English Parliament 
passed, respectively, the Trade Union Act and Trade Union 
Amendment Act, with the avowed intention, broadly speaking, 
to protect trade union funds by enabling them to hold property 
for the furtherance of their objects, and to protect them 
67. 
against fraudulent officials and third parties. lOS In 
1878 New Zealand passed the substantially similar Trade Union 
Act, which in 1908 became the Trade Unions Act and 
remains as such on the statute books. 
"Trade Union"is defined in the 1908 Act as: 
"any combination, whether temporary or 
permanent, for regulating the relations 
between workers and employers, or between 
workers and workers, or between employers and 
employers, or for imposing restrictive . conditions 
on the conduct of any trade or business, whether 
such combination would or would not, if this 
Act had not come into operation, have been 
deemed to have been an unlawful combination 
by reason of some one or more of its purposes 
being in restraint of trade." 106 
Unions can, if they so wisb, register under the · Act 
though they are not thereby incorporated. Registered as 
well as unregistered unions are accorded a privilege not 
possessed by any other type of unincorporated association: 
the disabilities caused by the fact that most trade unions 
operate in unlawful restraint of trade (at common law) a~e 
removed 107 Section A expressly provided that, although 
legalize? some of the most important agreements contained 
union rules are not legally enforceable. 
105. Rigby v Connel, (1880) 14 Ch. D, 482, 489-490 
in the 
per Jessel M.R. As Mr George Jessel he took part in the 
Debates on the 1871 Bill - 204 Parl. Deb. (3rd Series) 
2032 (14 Feb. 1871) and later became Solicitor-General. 
See also Wolfe v Mathews (1882) L.R. 21 Ch. D 194, 196 
per Fry J. 
106. s. 2(1). In the 1878 Act the archaic terms "master" 
and "workmen" were used. 
107. Ss. 3-4. Trade Unions Act 1908. 
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A registry of trade unions is established by Section 
8. This section closely :!followed section 6 of the Companies 
Act 1862 CU.K.) whichprovidedthat: 
"Any seven or more persons associated for any 
lawful purpose may, by subscribing their names 
to a memorandum of association and otherwise 
complying with the requisitions of this Act, 
form an incorporated company." 
The first part of the section is repeated in the Trade 
Unions Act but the references to incorporation are omitted, 
and "memorandum of association" is replaced by "rules of 
the union". Although it might be suggested that similarity 
to registering under the Companies Act showed an intention 
to create similar legal results, the fact that section 6(1) 
forbids registration under the Companies Act (now) 1955, 
the Industrial and Provident Societies and Credit Unions 
Act 1982, and the Life Insurance Act 1961, the first two 
which incorporate the association, argues strongly against 
h
. . 108 t is suggestion. 
The Act provided that no union should be registered 
under a name identical with that of an existing registered 
108. Until 1936 if a company qualified under the definition 
of "trade union", it fell under this section, so that 
its incorporation under the Companies Act was void 
and that fact could be raised as a defence to an action 
based upon a contract that that company had entered into: 
Goldfinch and Co. v Rangitikei Sawmillers' Co-operative 
Association Ltd (1914) 33 N.Z.L.R. 666. Since the 
amendment in 1936, however this section applies only 
to trade unions which have registered under this Act. 
See Hickling M. "Trade Unions in Disguise" (1964) 27 
M.L.R. 625. 
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union or so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive 
members of the public. 109 There is nothing in the Act 
to prevent an unregistered union from relying on its common 
law right to use its name to the exclusion even of a registered 
union. 
As mentioned, one object of the Act was to enable the 
union to hold property. Section 9(1) says: 
"Any trade union registered under this Act 
may purchase or take on lease ... " 
Now, if a union was a legal entity there would be no apparent 
reason why the property should not be vested in the union 
as such. But Parliament resorted to the trust - as Maitland 
has so vividly described, this was the device to avoid the 
creation of a legal entity and for filling the gap in English 
legal theory caused by the absence of any general theory of 
associations. The property is vested in trustees "for the 
use and benefit of such trade union and the members thereof". llO 
Said Lord Davey in Yorkshire Miners Association· v Howden 111 
"The association not being of an incorporated body, 
the appointment of trustees and the powers given to 
them are the machinery provided by the Act for 
carrying out its purposes." 
The vesting of property in trustees suggests that there is no 
essential difference in the legal nature of registered and 
unregistered unions. As Lord Davey continued: "The beneficiaries 
are its members severally and collectively." 
112 
109. S.17(b) Trade Unions Act 1908. 
110. s. 9(1) ibid. 
111. [1905] A.C. 256, 269. 
112. Idem. 
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The reference to the union in Section 10 implies simply 
a recognition of the factual entity, that is, the members 
collectively. Section 12 points in a similar direction. By 
that section trustees or an appointed officer of a registered 
union are thereby authorised to bring and defend actions 
relating to property. There is no ostensible reason why 
this procedure should be adopted if the registered union is 
a legal entity. As legal owners, the trustees of an 
unregistered union can sue and be sued in respect of the 
property. However, the unregistered union cannot sue or be 
sued through an officer who is not legal owner of the 
property. 
Section 14 confer~ another special privilege on 
registered unions. Their officers and treasurers are 
rendered liable to account for moneys received by them and 
other property in their hands. The trustees are empowered to 
enforce the provisions of this section and in doing so they 
are entitled to "recover their full costs of suit, to be taxed 
as between attorney and client". 
The rest of the 1908 Act (insofar as it is relevant) 
provides for the machinery of registration. Annual returns 
must be made to the Registrar of the assets, liabilities, 
receipts, and expenditures of the society. 113 It must 
113. s. 28 Trade Unions Act 1908. 
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1 h . h t . . . f . 114 possess rues w ic con ain provision or certain matters. 
It t h . t d ff' 115 mus ave a regis ere o ice. 
It was not until some th1rty years after the enactment 
of the 1871 English Act that the first civil action necess-
itating a decision on the effect of registration of a union 
under the Act was brought. Although it may be unreasonable 
for this first leading case The Taff Vale Railway Coy.v The 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 116 to be seen as 
solving the question, subsequent cases have done little to 
clarify the uncertainties thrown up by it. 
The facts of the case are disarmingly simple. Employees 
of the Taff Vale ·Railway Company were involved in a strike 
and the company brought an action in tort against the ASRS, 
a society registered under the Trade Union Acts 1871 and 1876 
(U.K.), and against two trade union officials seeking 
injunctive relief and any further relief that the court might 
direct. The defendant society sought to have its name struck 
out on the ground that it was not being a corporation or an 
individual it was not a body capable of suing or being sued. 
At first instance, Farwell J. agreed that a trade 
union was not a corporation, but examining the 
Acts of the 1871 and 1876 as a whole he was of the opinion that 
114 . S . 18 i bid . 
11 5 . S . 1 9 ib i d . · 
116. (1901] A.C. 426. 
72. 
" ... although a corporation and an individual 
or individuals may be the only entity known 
to the common law who can sue or be sued, it 
is competent to the Legislature to give an 
association of individuals which is neither 
a corporation nor a partnership nor an individual 
a cap~city for owning property and acting by 
agents, and such capacity in the absence of 
express enactment to the contrary involves the 
necessary correlative of liability to the extent 
of such property for the acts and defaults of 
such agents .... The Legislature has legalized it, 
and it must be dealt with by the Courts according 
to the iintention of the Legislature." 117 
The real issue then, was one of whether the legislature 
had made legal an association capable of owning property and 
acting by agents but which could not incur tortious liability 
for its acts. Farwell J. reasoned: 
"It would require very clear and express words 
of enactment to induce me to hold that the · 
Legislature had in fact legalised the existence 
of such i~responsible bodies with such wide 
capacity for evil ... " 118 
without them taking responsibility for their wrongs. He held 
that the society could be liable in tort for the acts of 
its agents and it was appropriate to bring the action against 
the society in its registered name. An interim injunction 
was granted against the society. 
The Court of Appeal however, set aside Farwell J's 
orders considering that a trade union could not be sued in 
its registered name. The Taff Vale Railway Company appealed 
successfully to the House of Lords which held that the union 
117. 
118. 
Ibid. 429. 
Ibid. 43. 
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could be made liable in tort in its own name. 
The Lord Chancellor, Earl of Halsbury concurred with 
Farwell J's reasoning. The latter judge did not seem to 
view the union as being separa,te from its members - he referred 
to it as being "an 119 association of individuals" although 
not a corporation, and so it would appear that some sort of 
notional entity was envisaged. Such an approach was more 
explicitly accepted by Lord Lindley who saw trade unions as 
unincorporated societies which could be sued in their own 
names merely as a convenient way of proceeding against unions. 
He added the qualification that if an order for payment of 
money was sought, it could only be enforced against the 
union's property and to reach union property, the trustees 
must be sued. Lord Halsbury himself referred briefly to the 
registered union as the "thing" 120 which the legislat?re 
created. 
Lord Brampton made the point explicitly that a registered 
union could be sued its name, not because it was a corporation, 
but that nevertheless as a full legal person it was a 
"newly created corporate body created by statute, 
distinct from the unincorporated trade union, 
consisting of many thousands of separate individuals, 
which no longer exists under any other name." 121 
119. Supra, footnote 118. 
120. Ibid., 436. 
121. Ibid., 442. 
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Thus, one indicia of incorporation, the ability to sue 
and be sued was conferred on the union. A further extension 
122 was made in Osborne v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 
where Osborne who was secretary of a branch of the Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants and was almost certainly financed 
by other interests, brought an action against his union to 
enjoin payment of political contributions to the Labour Party, 
alleging that the rule authorizing such contributions was 
Ultra Vi·res and i'llegal. 123 Th 1 L d · 1 h ld e aw ors unanimous y e 
that a registered union could not apply its funds to political 
' objects. The majority reasoned that such expenditure was 
ultra vires the 1871 Act on the ground that the statutory 
definition of a trade union was limiting and restrictive, 
and that therefore a union was not competent to include among 
its objects one so wholly distinct from that definition, as 
a provision to secure and maintain parliamentary representation. 
Lord Atkinson described registered unions as 11 • , 11 12 L quasi-corporations 
which were more like the railway companies incorporated by 
statute earlier in the nineteenth century, than voluntary 
associations. So, a principle of company law, the doctrine of 
ultra vires was applied to a registered union. 
125 In Kelly V N.A.T.S.O.P.A. , the plaintiff, Kelly, 
had been suspended and later expelled by a branch ccmmittee 
122. 1191 0 ] A.C. 8 7. 
123. At this time English Ministers of Parliament were unpaid 
for their services. 
124. 
125. 
Supra footnote 123, p. 102. 
[1915] 84 L.J., 2236. 
7 5· 
of the National Society of Operative Printers' Assistants. 
He found it almost impossible to obtain subsequent employment 
as most printing offices maintained a closed shop. After 
about a year, he sought a declaration by the court that the 
Act of expulsion was ultra vires and that therefore he was 
still a member of the society . In addition he claimed an 
injunction against the union officers and damages for unlawful 
expulsion. 
Relief was granted in all respects but damages. The 
Court of Appeal unanimously held that the officers of the 
s~ciety were the agents of all the members, including the 
plaintiff and by suing the union the plaintiff was also suing 
himself. No limitation was sought to be placed on the 
relationship of agency and in view of the holding that the 
act of expulsion was ultra vires, it would seem that the 
agency was deemed to extend even to illegal acts. 
1 d . . 1 k · 11 · 12 6 . In Genera an Municipa Wor ers v Gi ian it was 
held that a registered union could bring an action for 
defamation affecting its business and functioning as a union, 
upholding the opinion of the lower court that a registered 
union was a legal en~ity distinct from its membership. This 
I view was endorsed by two Lords, MacDermott and Somervell6 LJJ 
. . . . 127 h b f . d in Bonsor v Musicians Union were a mem er o a registere 
126. (1945] 2 All E.R., 593. 
127. [1956] A.C. 104. 
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union had been wrongly expelled and the question posed was 
whether the union as such could be sued by the member for 
damages for breach of the membership contract. Two of the 
'A( 
other Lords, Morton and Porter LJJ, however, maintained that 
"the legislature has conferred on such unions some of the 
characteristics of a juridical person" but they did not go 
the length of saying that the effect of the relevant legislation 
had been to give those unions a new status amounting to a 
legal personality distinct from their membership. 
Morton and Porter LJJ said, in effect, that the categories 
of legal personality known to the law were not closed. Although 
corporations and individuals must at one time have been 
the only bodies known to the law possessing an independent 
existence as legal entities, it was open to Parliament to 
create other categories for other purposes. This Parliament 
was taken to have done by the Trade Union Act. 
Lord MacDermott with whom Lord Somervelle concurred 
took t~.e opposite view. Carefully analysing the Act he 
reasoned that 
"when, as here, [Parliament] studiously avoids 
a familiar and appropriate method without 
purporting to adopt another in its stead, its 
intention to reach that result may well be 
open to doubt . " 12 8 
The fact that Parliament had not given the union power to 
hold property except by vesting it in trustees and could have 
128. Ibid., 144. 
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its registration cancelled upon its own request implied that 
Parliament did not intend it to be a legal person. 
The fifth Lord, Lord Keith did not appear t.o throw 
full weight behind either of the two views. Apparently he 
regarded Bonsor's contract of membership as a contract 
between himself and the other members of the union and at the 
same time a contract with the trade union as representative 
of all its members. Thus, though he said that the "registered 
union remains a voluntary association" he thought it wrong 
to call it a legal entity. His judgrnent has given rise to 
a great deal of judicial and academic heat. Professor Lloyd129 
has described Lord Keith's opinion to mean: 
" ..• a registered union is to be regarded 
both as a le~al entity and as an unincorporated 
association in relation to the same 
transaction." 
On the other hand it has been submitted that Lord Keith 
J,,/ 
decisively supported McDermott and Somervelle _LJJ 130 
The practical result of Bonsor's case was that the 
plaintiff did receive damages for the unlawful expulsion, but 
at least three judges based that conclusion upon a ground which 
was independent of the question of whether the union had a 
legal personality. 
129. "Damages for Wrongful Expulsion From a Trade Union" (1955) 
19 MLR 121. 
130. Pittard M.J. "A Personality Crisis: The Trade Union Acts, 
State Registered Unions and their Legal Status" (1980) 6 
Monash L.R. 49, 66. 
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Non Trade Union cases dealing with these issues are 
rare though as early as 1936, the New Zealand Supreme Court 
held that a body registered under the Friendly Societies 
Act 1908 (which had similar registration provisions to the 
Trade Union Act 1908) could be sued in its own name for the 
131 negligence of one of its employees. 
In Knight and Searle v Dove 132 it has held that a 
trustee savings bank could be sued in tl)rt in its own name 
by virtue of the Trustee Savings Bank Acts 1954 to 1964. 133 
Mocatta J. said that a right to sue or be sued might be 
conferred by statute either expressly or by implication or 
by the common law upon legal personae, including "quasi-
co:tporations" constituted by acts of Parliament, such as · the 
C . . 134 War Damage omm1ss1on. . He was inclined to imply quasi-
corporate status into the relevant statute because the 
trustee savings banks were 
"institution[s] operating pursuant to statutes, 
owning considerable property and with numerous 
staff, possessing a protected name, and 
carrying on activities which from time to time 
would, in the nature ·ofthings, involve it, were 
it a natural person or a corporation expressly 
created by statute, in action for tort, whether 
as plaintiff or defendant." 135 
131. Fussell v Amos [1936] N.Z.L.R. 254. 
132. [1964] 2 All E.R., 307. 
) 
133. Note that Trustee Savings Banks in New Zealand have 
corporate status. 
134. Inland Revenue Commissioner v Bew Estates Ltd [1956] Ch. 
407. 
135. Supra, footnote 134, at 315. 
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More recently, in re Edis's Trust 136 it was found that 
the proceeds of sale of a freehold property belonged to a 
disbanded territorial regiment as a separate entity and not 
to its members, (at the time of disbandment) , beneficially. 
The property had been held by trustees "as property belonging 
to [the unit] as the [commanding officer and his successor] 
shall or may from time to time in that capacity direct." The 
relevant legislation, section 25 of the Military Law Act 
1863 (U.K.) stated that "all lands acquired by (a] corps or 
regiment vested in the unit's Commanding Officer [and his 
successors]", and Part V of the Act permitted a corps to 
acquire land for certain purposes subject to war office 
approval. Section 1(2) of the Military Act 1892 permitted 
corps to purchase land for military purposes. Goulding J. 
likened the volunteer corps to a registered Trade Union, 
saying that the land was given to the body simpliciter for 
the "purposes, defined by its objects and constitution". 
However, the case which has caused the most interest ------
has been Willis v Association of Universities of the British 
137 Commonwealth . In that case the defendant, a corporation, 
was the landlord of a particular building. The corporation 
wished to recover certain premises from its tenant and the 
ground given in support of the notice to quit was that the 
landlord intended to occupy the premises to carry on business. 
136. (1972] 2 All E.R. 769. 
137. (1964] 2 All E.R., 39. 
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The plaintiff alleged that, in fact, the premises were 
to be taken up by a branch of the landlord viz, the Univer-
sities Central Council on Admissions (U.C.C.A.) which was 
an unincorporated body, and that even if it could be argued 
that the premises were needed for this Council, "it" could 
not carry on business as it was an unincorporated association. 
Both arguments were rejected by Lord Denning. As to the 
substantive argument about status, he pointed out that the 
U.C.C.A. did important work, operated a bank account, employed 
staff and carried on other activities which were normally 
associated with a commercial enterprise. 
Lord Denning relying on the notion that a "trade union 
(which is a body corporate) is a separate entity " 
138 
held 
that it would be right to recognize the council as a separate 
entity. However, he based his opinion on the trade union 
position by reference to Bonsor's case (supra), which, as has 
been shown, did not definitively establish that a trade union 
139 
was a separate entity. More importantly , as Wedderburn points 
out, Lord Denning's conclusion does not derive directly from 
any statutory source. The sole provision relied on by Lord 
Denning spoke of a "business" as "any activity carried on by 
140 a body of persons whether corporate or unincorporate." 
138. Ibid. at p. 42. 
139. "Corporate Personality and Social Polic y : the Problem 
of the Quasi-Corporati o n" ( 1965) MLR 28. 
140. S. 23(2) LandlordandTenant Act 1954 (U.K.) 
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To that extent the Act does provide some ground for !:'eqarding 
the Council as a separate "body" for its purposes. In any 
case, the equivalent of section 2(1) of the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1924 would seem to include unincorporated bodies within 
the term "person". So the Act of 1954 scarcely compelled 
the court to ,regard the U.C.C.A. as a separate entity. Never-
theless, this aspect of Denning's reasoning has been followd 
141 in the Australian case of Bailey v Victorian Soccer Federation 
where the Victoria Soccer Federation, an unincorporated 
association of sixty soccer clubs, was held to be an employer 
for the purposes of the Workers Compensation Act 1958 (Viet). 
The court recognized the common law difficulties in establishing 
an employment relationship between an individual and an 
unincorporated body, but held tha·t the def i.ni tion of "employer" 
as including "any body of persons corporate or unincorpcrate" 
clearly envisaged the existence of unincorporated asso~iations 
which in their collective names could employ individuals. Gillard 
J. reasoned that it was intended that for the purposes of 
Workers' Compensation, that an unincorporated body had a juridical 
personality upon which could be imposed a liability to pay 
compensation for any injury suffered by an employee. 
The salient feature of these two cases is that the C8urts 
did not rely on some form of special le9islation that specific-
ally granted certain bodies attributes of legal personality 
141. [ 1976] V. R. 13. 
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(such as ability to sue or be sued etc). Rather, it inferred 
a parliamentary intention to treat a body as a separate 
legal entity. In Bailey, Gillard J. said that the verbiage 
of the legislation facing him was more pointed that Willis 
in ascribing legal personality, and that for the purposes 
of the Act it was intended that an unincorporated body 
had a juridical personality upon which could be imposed a 
liability to pay compensation to an employee. 
If this chronological survey of cases does not give a 
decisive answer to trade union status a further dilemma was 
created when in 1974, after a brief flirtation with corporate 
status (Industrial Relations Act 1971 (U.K.)) the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations Act (U.K.) (T.U.L.R.A.) stated, 
in abolishing the "corporate" regime, that a "trade union 
142 shall not be, or treated as if it were, a body corporate." 
(emphasis added). Note the underlined language - it implies 
that the union is neither a corporation nor even a quasi-
corporation. Yet upon further analysis it appears that the 
Act confers four attributes of corporateness: 
( 1) 
( 2) 
143 The union as such can make a contract 
The property of a trade union is vested in trustees 
144 on trust for the union. 
142. S. 2(1) and S.2(4) disembodies any that were bodies 
corporate. 
143. S. 2(1) (a) Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974. 
144. s. 2 (1) (b), ibid. 
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(3) A trade union is given power to take or defend 
civil proceedings in its own name without the 
necessity of adopting a procedural device like 
th t f . . 145 a o a representative action. 
(4) Judgments are enforceable against the property of 
the union in the same way as if the union was a 
146 body corporate. That is, it is the property 
of the union taken to the exclusion of the members 
own separate property. 
The one case that has dealt with these provisions, 
147 
E.E.T.P.U. v Times Newspapers Ltd held that a trade union 
does not have a separate personality capable of being defamed. 
O'Connor J. when reviewing the aforementioned sections said148 
"[t) he fact ·that it can sue in tort does not mean 
that it can complain of the tort of libel. That 
is procedural. The tort of libel, .... must be 
founded on possession of a personality which 
can be libelled and section 2(1) has removed that 
personality from trade unions." 
The reasoning is orthodox though demonstrates how the 
judiciary have been mesmerized by the mere name "quasi-
corporation". 149 O'Connor J. said that 
"Parliament has deprived trade unions of 
the necessary personality on which an action 
for defamation depends" 
- this, with respect, is untrue. Parliament cannot deprive a 
147. [1980) 1 All. E.R. 1087. 
148. Ibid., at p. 1104. 
149. Idem. 
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body of something which it never had. Even those cases 
which take the quasi-corporation doctrine to its limits 
never claimed that a wholly separate legal entity was 
"J"• 
created. Lord Pearson in Willis said that 
"[t]he council is in some respects a separate 
entity. When the members of the Council meet 
... they are performing their own functions 
and not the functions of the landlords." 150 
In Bonsor's case Lords Morton and Porter opined that the 
union was an entity to the extent recognized by the Trade 
Union Acts and remained a voluntary association for all other 
purposes. The implication is that quasi-corporate status 
is simply the result of judicial creativeness to open a door 
to forms of relief, which other actions are ill-suited 
to achieve. The bodies concerned still remained unincorporated 
associations - that they may have been given the appearance 
of separate personality from their individual members, was 
more a consequence of their factual as opposed to legal 
status. Parliament endowed bodies with certain procedural 
rights and duties to give efficacy to their factual existence. 
But that is all they are - section 2(1) of the T.U.L.R.A. 
was a potent reminder for the judiciary to keep their place. 
150. Ibid. at p. 43. 
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( III) Corporation 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 
conferred corporate status on unions registering under the 
provisions of the Act. That Act has had several incarnations 
till its present form in the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
Registration under the 1973 Act is open to 
"any society of person , s lawfully associated 
for the purpose of protecting or furthering 
the interests of ... workers engaged in any 
specific industry or related industries in 
New Zealand." 151 
The word "society" is a neutral term, one reason being that it 
applies to employer as well as employee bodies which may 
register and obtain a corporate character. It is also 
arguable that the word is illustrative of~ legislative 
intent to mark off registered bodies as occupying a special 
place under the ambit of the legislation. 
By registering, the body becomes an "industrial union" 
(though this paper will continue to use the Trade Union 
nomenclature) and is "a body corporate by the registered name 
having perpetual succession and a common seal." 152 . 
153 Interestingly, as has been pointed out by Mathieson 
"If the legislature had merely said that a 
registered industrial union was to have 
'perpetual succession and a common seal' 
this would still have effected the 
incorporation of the union, for the attribute 
of perpetual succession (i.e. the retention of 
identity despite the continual changes in human 
membership) and the possession of a common seal 
are the clearest identifying marks of a 
corporation." 
151. s. 163(1). 
152. s. 166 ibid. 
New Zealand (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington 
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Perhaps then, the mere words "perpetual succession and 
common seal" act as the concession of personality. Note 
that Blackstone only saw these two features as incidents 
of a corporation, yet there is no logical reason why they 
should not act in a dual capacity if such is the common 
154 acceptance. 
The power to sue and be sued in its registered name 
is confered by section 190 and the power to purchase or 
lease land, lend or borrow money, or give guarantees is 
conferred by section 189. The opening words of subs (1) 
of this section are informative - "without further authority 
than this section .... " implying that it is only through this 
Act that the State, and no other body confers incidents of 
corporateness. 
In sum, the incorporated trade union is a· body separate 
from that of its individual members. It is like a company 
155 registered under the Companies Act 1955, a legal person. 
154. These words "perpetual success·ion and a common seal" were 
considered th.e "accepted for.mu la for creating a corporation". 
Jumbunna Coal Mine etc v Victorian Coal Miners Association 
(.1908) 6 C.L.R., 309, 336 per Griffith. C.J. Note, however, 
that the formula "be a body corporate ... and having 
perpetual succession and a common seal" describes the 
position of a New Zealand company upon registration: s. 27(3) 
Companies Act 1955. 
155. In addition corporate status can be attained by unions 
registering under the provisions of the Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908. This Act h.as been infrequently 
utilized in the past by Trade Unions. Ths reader is asked 
to note this fac ~ but because of their numerical insig-
nificance and for reasons that w~ll emerge later in the 
paper, Trade Unions who attain corporate status by these 
means will be ignored. See generally White D. Ths Law 
Relating to Associations Registered Under the Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908 (Unpublished LL.M Thesis V1JW, 19.721. 
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RECAPITULATION 
It is time to pause and take stock of the preceding 
jurisprudence. What has emerged is that groups of persons 
differ functionally from each other in terms of the legal ., 
relationships with which they involve or are able to involve 
themselves in. These legal relationships are determined 
by the bundle of rights, each category possesses e.g. 
to sue and be sued, borrow money etc. What the law does 
is to transform social policy into legal rules by an endless 
process of manipu1ating and permuting such possible legal 
elements, switching them on and off, aligning them in this 
direction or thnt. From this it finally becomes clear that 
at the stage before policy becomes law, there isan ideological 
struggle to 
recognize a group as fit to be abstracted into 
legal person, subject or object of a given bundle 
of rights;. 
recognize a given place, thing, or activity in 
which a group is interested as fit to be abstracted 
into the material legal base of a legal relation; 
recognize an interest of a group as fit to be 
abstracted into the primary legal objective of a 
legal relation, consecrated as a right or protected 
by a duty. 
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The layering of legal relations refers to the fact that 
the State may superimpose legal relations on each other, 
so that the same area, the same interest, the same activity 
may be the focus of any number of overlapping legal relations. 
The complicating aspect is that often these legal relations 
are interwoven with, or even substituted by social fact, and 
at this level we enter the realm of judicial interpretation. 
So, on the implications of the quasi-corporation case law 
it would appear that if the following factual criteria were 
established, namely: 
(1) Identifiability by collective name; 
(2) The existence of some formal structure, e.g. 
paid staff; 
(3) The association having an office; 
(4) Continuation as an entity notwithstanding changes 
of membership (i.e., perpetual succession); · 
(.5) Property held distinct from member. The fact that 
trustees are appointed to hold the property does 
not necessarily mean that they hold the property 
of the members (which they may do). There must be 
an intention to surrender the property to the 
entity; 
then the courts have been persuaded to impart a certain 
quantum of legal status to create a creature akin to the 
universitas personarum of Roman-Dutch law. 
156 
This would 
156. See Bamford B .. R. Bamford on the Law of Partnerships and 
Voluntarv Associations in South Africa (2nd ed. Juta, 
Cape Town, 1971) Chapt. 20. 
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of course be routine if the enabling Act specifically 
conferred such powers but the courts have demonstrated a 
willingness to grapple with the enabling statute to try 
to prise loose, even tanger.tial evidence of an "intention" 
to confer status for a particular purpose; and in this respect 
Willis is undoubtedly on the boundary that would involve 
creating judge-made corporations. Tak~n to its logical 
extreme, the Willis decision would be a striking evocation 
of Maine's dictum that 
"substance law has at first the look 
of being gradually secreted in the 
interstices of procedure." 157 
Once a group is recognized as a legal unit for one purpose, 
there is a tendency to attach to it by a gradual process of 
"entification", many or all of the legal attributes of 
corporate personality which are consistent with the factual 
nature of the group. 
That this may pass unnoticed may be due to what are 
perceived as "just" results obtained from judicial innovations. 
For example, in Bailey if the Federation was not held to be 
anemployer the widow of a referee who died whilst "employed" 
by it would not have been eligible to compensation from the 
Workers Compensation Board. 
l58 approval of Ford: 
Such a result would have had the 
157. Ancient Law (Oxford University Press, London, 1959). 
158. Unincorporated Non Profit Associations (Clarendon Press, 
O.x f o r d , 1 9 5 9 ) x.x i. 
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"To assert that what may be called 'legal 
entification' is not primarily predicated 
upon human personality does not involve 
denial of the preposition that law is primarily 
concerned with regulating the affairs of 
human beings. The selection of legal units 
which are not human beings is simply part 
of a technique whereby that end may be 
attained. Legal systems are theoretically 
free to ascribe significance as legal units 
to things or ideas as required." 
Legal systems, Ford would maintain, includes the 
judiciary, and it is perhaps these sentiments which lay 
behind Mocatta J's reasoning in Knight and Searle v Dove 
p 
(supra, page 80). 
Nevertheless, the essential fact remains, either an 
entity is a corporation or it is not. The fact that various 
social entities have put pressure on the legal system to 
pr6vide these special rules 
"indicates that a legal system cannot be 
neutral in regard to them: it must either 
prohibit them or accommodate them." 159 
It can accommodate them by providing specific attributes, 
vehicles as it were toward policy ends. It means that, in 
legal theory, a corporation has a closer affinity with an 
unincorporated association than with a human individual. 
Perhaps the courts have strayed too far into Parliament's 
domain. An unmistakable "Realist" flavour permeates the 
quasi-corporation case law. Lord Shaw in Osborne said that 
159. Ibid. 145. 
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"[s]tatute did not set [trade unions] up, and 
speaking for myself I have some hesitation in 
so construing language of statutory recognition as a definition imposing such hard and fast 
restrictive limits as would cramp the 
developments and energies and destroy the 
natural movements of the living organism." 160 
Implicit within this quotation is the belief that social 
organization and institutions are transitory and in the 
midst of change - if the State is tardy or non-reactive to 
this flux, then the judiciary can legitimately step in. 
But even, as we look at the larger perspective, we 
would probably find that forms which seem to emerge are 
not completely new - they are merely refinements, both in 
size and nature of earlier group forms. As they evolve 
their desires for rights and dutie~ necessarily changes -
and these have right to .be determined as ·a matter of policy. 
But as long as the primacy (sovereignty) of the Sate e~ists, 
it is for the State - those who frame the laws, to ultimately 
resolve these issues. 
160. Op cit., 107. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CORPORATE STATUS 
The unincorporated trade union is a fact. The trade 
union registered under the Trade Unions Act 1908 is a fact. 
And,atrade union registered under the IndustriaJ Relations Act 
1973 is also a fact. They all exist, and their existence 
modifies political, economic, and legal relationships in 
countless ways. One of the only conunents we can make in 
advance is that the effect of these different legal stat·, es 
substantially depends on how they are perceived - both by 
those who frame the laws, and by those who are affected by 
them. 
The problem of determining the significance of both 
facts of social behaviour and those of acts of law is at 
least as old as western philosophy itself. Broadly, 
traditional theory has it that social facts participate in 
two worlds, the natural or physical world of cause and 
effect and the mental worldof ideas. Ideas have a peculiar 
characteristic in that they are non-observable - ideas about 
ideas are still ... ideas. 
In contrast there has been a continuing tradition to 
the contrary that has evolved from rnai.ny different directions: 
93. 
from Kant and Hegel 
161 
and the idea of autonomy of mental 
structures, to Marx's concept of ideology 162 . Within this 
tradition, every perceived social or legal fact - for 
instance a trade union with a specific legal status - acts 
through a mental complex that rests as a superstructure on a 
real-world basis. In that mentalized form the social fact 
participates in the mental processes of the members of the 
trade union and it is through modification of the mental 
complex, among other means, that the real-world facts may be 
modified in their turn. Both these phenomenon interact with 
each other, but each is autonomous and exclusive. As between 
the power of the idea of the thing and the power of the 
thing itself, neither is necessarily the master of the 
other. 
Positive law seems to fit uncomfortably within such a 
notion - it is separate from the real-world substratum 
that underlies it and from the mental complexes through which 
it is perceived. As a mental fact, it seems nevertheless 
not to have any actual thinking subject, whilst as a social 
fact it nevertheless seems to be abstracted from every actual 
and particular real-life situation, to be beyond the real. 
161. Kan~ and Hegel both considered that the process of thoug~t 
is not merely a product of the world outside the mind. 
Either thought creates the world as we know it (Kant) 
or thought and the world are not essentially different (Hegel). 
162. Marx K., Engels F. The German Ideology 
Moscow, 19641. 
(Progress Publishers, 
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And yet for all its disembodied objectivity, positive law 
is one of the most powerful manifestations of real-world 
forces and one of the most powerful determinants of social 
behaviour. 
To grasp its significance is to examine the social fact 
not simply in terms of the empirical observer looking in from 
the outside nor from the view of the insider for whom 
participation in the social fact is part of his life. We 
have to combine these aspects and to do this we must assume 
that each social fact is surrounded by a richly interwoven 
contextual layer with interlocking relationships outside 
its own narrow form. 
It is thus possible to view the legal status of a 
Trade Union as a specific phenomenon, the center of its own 
structure of significance. It happens to take the form of 
words in a statute book or the words of a judge. It is 
different from its meaning - for that we must look back 
to Chapter IL The important point is 
"that the form does not suppress the meaning, 
it only impoverishes it, it puts it at a distance, 
it holds it at one's disposal. One believes that 
the meaning is going to die, but it is a death with 
reprieve; the meaning loses its value but keeps its 
life ... The meaning will be for the form like an 
instantaneous reserve of history, a tamed richness, 
which it is possible to call and dismiss in a sort of 
rapid alteration; the form must constantly be able to 
be rooted again in the meaning and to get there what 
nature it needs for its nutrient; above all, it must be 
able to hide there."163. 
1 6 3 . Bart he s R . " Myth T o day " in My 1; ho ! o g i 1~ s ( ,Jon at ho n C 3 . p e , 
London, 1972) 118. 
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We must move through the surrounding fabric of 
significance of the fact - this necessarily meaning the legal/ 
ideological framework from which it is situated, and then 
move out of the law to resituate it in the structural 
phenomena of the social context. It is in this way that the 
purpose and the effect of a phenomenon of law can be 
distilled. 
As a preliminary to discussing the corporate status of 
trade unions within a New Zealand context, it is necessary 
both to achieve a historical perspective, as well as to 
outline the significance of the non-incorporated trade 
union, to briefly investigate the English context. 
ENGLAND 
In 1824 the repressive regime of the Combination Acts 
of 1799 and 1800 which made it a statutory crime for workmen 
to combine for industrial purposes was repealed. An Act 164 
passed a year later permitted workmen to come together and 
agree as to wages and hours that would be acceptable to them. 
This meant that certain union conduct was no longer criminal. 
Other kinds of criminal behaviour, both statutory or under 
common law remained untouched. For instance this statute 
did not permit unions to use violence or threats, or to 
molest or to obstruct in any other way a person in order 
to attain their ends, such behaviour still remaining a crime. 
164. 6 Geo 4C 170. 
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One of the consequences was that trusts set up by 
trade unions for the holding of propertywer~ subject 
to special rules applicable to "illegal trusts", not protected 
by law. Thus, it was not possible for a union to recover 
165 property stolen or damaged by a trustee of the property . 
Similarly, it was not possible to launch a criminal prose-
cution against trustees who embe.zzled union moneys because 
at common law it was not possible for a joint owner to 
commit embezzlement. 
Nevertheless, despite this hostile social, legislative 
and judicial climate the fledgling labour movement agitated 
for the right to combine in order to improve working conditions, 
and the result was an inquiry· held by the Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions in 1867 
166 
which led to the enactment of 
the Trade Union Act of 1871. 
The Act, apart from the provisions dealt with, specifically 
made unenforceable agreements between members of trade unions 
as to how· they were to be employed or how they were to 
transact business. Similarly unenforceable were agreements 
prescribing particular uses for union funds (e.g. payments of 
benefits to certain members), and agreements to pay a sub-
scription or a penalty to a trade· union. But as Sy kes and 
165. 
166. 
Hornby v Close (1867) 2 Q.B. 153. 
See Webb S. & B. History of Trade UnioP.iSITl op cit. 247££ 
97. 
167 Glasbeek note, 
"what was once the shadow cast by restraint 
of trade rules had become a protective 
umbrella:" 
the State had decriminalized certain conduct, property could 
be adequately protected, and at the same time the unions 
would not be forced to make themselves subject to rules which, 
in the future, could prove embarrassing to their financial, 
organizational, and ideological structure. 
The greatest significance of the Act lay in the fact 
that such combinations of workmen created for the purpose 
of attaining industrial goals, were, by their very nature, 
in restraint of trade. As a general rule 168 restraint of 
trade was illegal unles~ it could be justified by the special 
circumstances of the case, primarily reasonableness in view 
of the interests of the public. Now, it seems at that time 
the climate of judicial opinion considered the very existence 
of a trade union as being of dubious value to a society, with 
its objects and agreement unlikely to be viewed as being in 
accordance with the public interest. 
Such views were reflected by Sir William Erle, who had 
been a member of the 1867-1869 Royal Conunission. He reflected 
the laissez-faire mood of the time when he wrote, in 1869: 
167. Labour Law in Australia tButterworths, Sydney, 1972) 
706. 
168. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns Co. v Nordenfelt [1894] A.C. 536. 
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"Every person has a right under the law 
as between himself and his fellow subject, 
to full freedom in disposing of his own 
labour or his own capital according to his 
own will. It follows that every other person 
is subject to the co-relative duty arising 
therefrom, and is prohibited f~om any 
obstruction to the fullest exercise of this 
right which can be made compatible with the 
exercise of this right by others." 169 
The caurts would not enforce either contractual 
provisions restricting an individual's freedom to trade or 
labour according to an absolute free chqice or the agreements 
and trusts of associations, such as unions, which had rules 
or objects restricting individual freedom in this context. 
But Erle and others did not stop at that doctrine. More 
than mere non-enforceability of provisions in restraint of 
trade might be the concern of the law. The infringement of 
an individual's ,. right' to dispose of his capital or labour 
as he chose constituted a wrong. 
As a consequence, the protection given against criminal 
prosecution soon proved inadequate as it was held in R v Bunn170 
that the same conduct in restraint of trade protected by the 
Act could still give rise to criminal liability because it 
might involve wrongs such as inducing a breach of contract and 
a combination to do such a wrong was a criminal conspiracy. 
In addition the intentional interference or molestation of 
anyone's business was still a crime per se. So, to counter 
these weaknesses in the 1871 Act the Conspiracy and Protection 
169. Cited by Hawkins J. in Allen v Flood [1898] A.C. 1, 14. 
170. (1872) 12 Cox 316. 
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of Property Act was passed in 1875 and this Act simply 
provided that the crime of conspiracy was not to apply to 
trade unions if the relevant co~duct was engaged in during 
a trade dispute. It also defined circumstances in which 
watching and besetting was an excusable practice. 
Nevertheless, trade unionists were still subject,as 
171 Quinn v Leathern indicated) to the vague and amorphous 
tort of conspiracy. The restraint was made even more grave 
in the same year by holding that union funds were liable 
for torts cormnitted in the course of disputes, 172 and by the 
173 holding that, it being a tort under Lumley ~Gye for 
. 1 t . d b h f t t 174 . i' t even a sing e pers·on o in uce a reac o con rac .. , 
was a civil conspiracy for striking workmen to induce those 
who displaced them to break their contracts by j oin·ing in 
h . k 175 t e stri e. 
It was only after another Royal Conunission and, more 
irnportantl1} highly successful union support of Labour . 
candidates at the 1906 election that the gap between legis-
lative and judicial evaluations of the interests involved in 
industrial relations was narrowed. 
171. I1901] A.C. 495. 
172. Taff Vale, op cit. 
173. (1853) 2 E & B, 216. 
174. S. Wales Miners Fed. v Glamorgan Coal Co. (..1905) A.C. 238. 
175. Denaby Collieries Co. v Yorks Miners Assoc. (1906) A.C., 
384. 
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This was done by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 (U.K.) 
which extended legal protection in four major respects. First, 
it excluded acts done in contemplation and furtherance of 
trade disputes from civil conspiracy, up to the point when 
they would be actionable even if done by one person alone. 176 
Second, it excluded acts done in contemplation or furtherance 
of a trade dispute from the liability for procuring a breach 
of contract. 
177 
Third, it forbad civil actions against trade 
unions for tortious acts alleged to have been committed by 
them or on their behalf. Fourth, it explicitly described 
and declared lawful, ordinary peaceful picketing. 178 
The 1906 Act declared 
"the right of industrial combatants to push 
their struggle to the limits of the justification 
of 'se;J..f interest"'. ], 79 
d · d · · d · d' tm. t 180 War an economic epression occasione maJor rea JUS en s 
but by 1946 the polity was re-established. 
Julius Stone 
181 could state as a truism that in 1906 
"once a fair balance in bargaining power between 
labour and capital was reached, there appeared 
in England a kind of consensus between them, hostile 
to legal intervention on either side." 
They then appeared to shared a policy which Kahn-Freund has 
expressed ir. the paradoxical phrase "collective laissez-faire". 
176. S. 5(31. 
177. s. 3. 
178. See Delaney T.H. "Immunity in Tort and the Trade Disputes 
Act ... " (1955) 18 M.L.R. 338. 
179. Stone J. Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1966) 409. 
180. Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927 
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This policy was to insist that the law should keep its hands 
off the process of industrial struggle between organized 
employers and organised workers. 
So, despite elaborate machinery (e.g. "Whitney Councils") 
and elaborate codes of procedure, all the actors in the 
system have contrived together to keep them out of the 
domain of the ordinary law. English protective legislation 
in the industrial relations field has the appearance of being 
ancillary to the terms reached through collective bargaining, 
rather than as a foundation for some form of compulsory 
arbitration. 
The peculiar status of English trade unions was a 
result of marrying economics with political power - potentially 
an explosiwe mixture. The trade union movement grew despite 
the law because they were power residuums enervated by the 
strength of combination. 
ment of the "Pure Union". 
They were the apotheosis of the develop-
182 As Graveson comments: 
"The creators of the trade union movement were 
far more conscious of economics than law, for 
economics describe (sic) a situation of fact, 
whereas law is only a means to an end." 
The English trade union movement was sufficiently vigorous 
and powerful to oppose the imposition of corporate status 
prior to the 1871 Act; and this was no less the case when it 
overthrew its short lived, outside imposed, legal personality 
in 1974. Their desire to live outside the law has been met 
182. "The Status of Trade Unions" (1963) 7 Jo. S.P.T.L. (NS) 
121, 125. 
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by a fierce resistance to bring them inside it. Ultimately 
the twilight status, or "~uasi-corporateness'' of the English 
trade union is the heterodoxical result of opposing tentions 
- apparently factually neither one nor the other. A 
situation which appeals to the unionists who can have some 
of the advantages of corporate status, while providing the 
State with similar machinery to exercise their will, if they 
so wish. 
This notion of power, shaping the context of legal 
status has obviously pushed the English trade unions to 
the fringe of the law. It will be investigated more deeply 
when we analyze the New Zealand context. 
NEW ZEALAFD 
The famous trilogy of cases concerning economic 
1 h . G 183 . L th 184 association - Moga Steams ip v Mc regor , Quinn v ea em , 
185 and Allen v Flood gave the English trade unionsts an 
unequivocal feel for how the judiciary perceived the lnbour 
movement, undoubtedly contributing to their distinct distrust 
of legal institutions. 
183. (1880). 23 Q.B.O. 598. 
184. I1901] A.C. 495. 
185. [1898] A.C. 1. 
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The same philosophy imbued the neophytic New Zealand 
Labour movement which was beginning to establish itself along 
British lines. In 1889 it was represented by the Maritime 
Council; a combination of the key industrial unions of seamen, 
watersiders, miners and railwaymen. But in 1890, a fifty-six 
day confrontation with employers bodies, known as the 
Maritime Strike, ended in defeat for the unions. 
that unionsm in New Zealand 
"stood revealed as a fragile house of cards, 
which collapsed even more suddenly than it 
had appeared." 186 
It meant 
Perhaps, somewhat fortuitously for the union movement 
this particular period in New Zealand history was one of 
great social reform, prompted by the Liberal Party's avowed 
aim of turnj_ng New Zealand into some sort of South Pacific 
. . . h . d hl8 7 utopia. Describing t e perio, Nas commented: 
"The legislation of this period was to 
correct the manifest injustices of the 
laissez-faire system. Depression, 
discontent, and a growing labour force 
formed an economic background favourable 
to social legislation." 
He added: 
"there has e.merged side by side with a 
deep faith in the value of individual 
freedom an equally firm belief in the 
value of collective organization for the 
purpose of providing security for the 
in di v id u a 1 as w·e 11 a s f o r the n at i o n . " 1 8 8 
186. Howells J.M., Woods N.S., Young F.L.J. (.eds) Labour and 
Industrial Relations in New Zealand (Pitman, Carlton, 1974) 6. 
187. New Zealand: A Working Democracy (Dent and Sons, Melbourne, 
1943). 33. 
188. Ibid, 227. 
104 . 
The unique environmental, social and ideological 
circumstances of the young colony made it ripe for experi-
mentation in the industrial field. It was an experiment that 
the State, through the law, could instigate, observe and 
189 control. To again quote Nash: 
"New Zealand's long tradition of State activity, 
the recognition that the community as a whole 
through its organised government must be 
collectively responsible for the welfare of its 
members, the emphasis that has always been given 
to individual rights and freedom - these facts 
have enabled necessary political and economic 
adjustment to be ~ade sEoothly and as the need 
has arisen." 
The result was the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act 1894 (hereafter referred to as "the 1894 Act"). It was 
passed explicitly to encourage the formation of industrial 
unions and associations and to facilitate the settlement of 
industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration. 190 
The .crux of the legislation however was compulsory arbitration. 
This involved a situation where 
" parties are in one form or another bound by a 
regulation which is not of their own ch.oosing, 
a regulation of conditions of employment or a 
regulation of the nachinery for settling disputes 
and for determining conditions of employment." 191 
This subjection of the parties to regulation imposed from 
outside is compulsory in the sense that arbitration does not 
depend on the consent of both. sides and that the award is 
binding on them, whether they accept it or reject it. 
189. Ibid. 32. 
190. See the Long Title. 
191. Kahn-Freund 0. Labour and the Law (Stevens and Sons, 
London, 1972) 116. 
105. 
As opposed to the Weimar Republic in Germany where the 
Minister of Labour was chief arbitrator, the award-making 
body was not an arm of the State, insofar as it coveted 
the ideal of neutrality between capital and labour. However 
the system was more than a mere procedural forum for the 
voluntary settling of disputes and the bargaining between 
parties - it was a means by which the State could force 
the parties to come together. Alfred Deakin, in introducing 
the first Australian federal Arbitration Bill in 1903 which 
was based entirely on the New Zealand legislation stated: 192 
"We now substitute a new regime for the reign 
of violence by endowing the State - which itself 
possesses a strength greater than that of either 
or both of the contestants - with power to impose, 
within the limits of reason, justice ·and constituti6nal 
government, its deliberate will upon the parties to 
industrial disputes." 
William Pember Reeves, the Fabian lawyer who almost 
single handedly framed and cha@pioned the 1894 Act made it 
clear that the arbitration system could work only through 
"responsible" organi--sations, emphasizing that the system 
was designed for the well-being of the nation as a whole, 
and not jsut that of the unions. He was wary that "nebulous 
193 clusters" and "mere shifting groups" of employees by which 
he meant voluntary associations could not provide the 
k 
194 . t th . t h h desired effect. Clar reitera es e poin w en e 
comments: 
192. C.P.D. 15: 2862. 
193. Drummond J. The Life and Ti~es of Richard John Seddon 
(Whitcombe and Tombs, Christchurch 1906) 240. 
194. Labour Conditions in New Zealand (Govt. Print. Off. 
Washington, 1903) 1222. 
106. 
" ... the law constituting that tribunal is based 
upon the assumptions of unionism, and its 
machinery can be set in action only by those 
organisations. Without them the Act itself 
becomes inoperative. Anything that justifies 
the Act justifies ~he existence of the unions 
and forms a valid argument for their encouragement. 
The Court is not empowered to deal with workers 
as individuals, and the very life of its jurisdiction 
depends upon the organization of employees. The 
whole scheme for the arbitration of industrial disputes 
set up in New Zealand must stand or fall with the 
form of unionism that it creates." 
The premise being that if the Award system was to 
operate and be effectively binding amongst the actors in 
the system, bodies powerful and clearly defined would be 
needed to ensure enforceability. 
But, this "new province" envisaged unions not only as 
a creation of the State, but as subordinated to the State, 
the public, and their own interests. Consider the following 
statement of the Australian Isaacs J. (as he then was) 
in a case concerning registered organizations of both employers 
and employees. Such an organization was 
195. 
"the creation of the Act and simply an 
incidental to its great purposes. It is 
permitted to come into existence for the 
very purpose, not of making the policy of 
the Statute under the Constitution more 
difficult of attainment, but of assisting 
to carry that policy into effect." 195 
Aust. Commonwealth Shipping Board v Fed. Seamens 
Union of Australasia (1925) 35 C.L.R., 475. 
107· 
POWER AND AUTONOMY 
Underlying the public duty of unions is the State's 
duty to ensure their existence. An Act to encourage the 
organization of unions was more than a socially desirable 
"experiment". By providing that registered unions became 
corporations the Act made the State responsible for their 
very existence, as Isaacs J. pointed out (supra). In other 
words, although behind the rhetoric of neutrality (or even 
hostility) towards particular unions, the State could not 
escape being "pro-union" at least in the formal sense. 
The State could not be neutral as to whether unions should 
exist, and be strong enough to represent effectively a large 
section of the workforce. 
Nestled within this protective cocoon unions would grow 
into strong and viable organizations; strong enough to 
achieve their social purpose but also strong enough to disrupt 
the fragile New Zealand social system. Therein lay the 
dilemma. Kahn-Freund articulates in a modern context what 
would have been uppermost in the minds of politicians those 
. 196 ninety years ago: 
"Psychological and sociological theory have 
conspired with the world shattering events of our 
time to teach us a lesson abo~t the strength 
of irrational forces in the shaping of society 
and especially of political action, about the 
pursuit of power, the force of prejudice, 
irrational and discontented and craving for change 
and irrational satisfication with things as they are 
and resistance to change." 
196. Labour Relations: Heritage and Adjustment (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 1979) 22. 
108. 
Even the Webbs wrote about the 'joy of the fight' 
as a relief from the monotony of manual labour' and about 
a temporary exchange of a 'position of active leadership' for 
, l 19'7 
one of 'passive obediance' The fear was of Trade 
Union POWER. 
For Parsons "power" is a 
"generalized capacity to secure the performance 
of binding obligations by units in a system of 
collective organization when the obligations 
are legitimized with reference to their bearing 
on collective qoals and wherein case of recal-
citrance there isa presumptio~ of enforcement by 
negative situational sanctions" 198 
Power is backed by complex organizations. It is dependent 
on the willingness of people to a~cept that others are able 
to make binding decisions on their own behalf, which is in 
turn founded on an actual capacity to achieve collective goals 
through central direction. Again, this capacity depends 
upon complex and effective organization. 
To achieve their goals (and the passageofthe Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 (U.K.) is an example), unions need some 
dynamic substratum to make their power effective. The irony 
lies in that the conciliation and arbitration system, would 
tend to create such power residuums that would, like Hobbes's 
"worms in the entrails of a natural won", gnaw away at the 
existing social order. 
197. Industrial Democracy (Longmans, London, 1902) 180. 
198. "On the Concept of Political Power" in Sociological Theory 
and Modern Society (Free Press, New York, 1967) 308. 
109. 
But order had to be maintained in the colony - Durkheim199 
has shown that under conditions of economic expansion, 
breeding rapid change and social dislocation societies tend 
towards deregulation, or, as he termed it, anomie. 
The consequences of anomie in such a small colony 
had problems that were not only social pr economic, but 
moral as well, in that dissident behaviour could be perceived 
as a threat to the normative system of society. In such 
. t t. M. h. 2 00. . d · si ua ions, as .izruc 1 nas pointe out, certain structures 
have to emerge to contain such "surpluses" of people as those 
numerous workers who were existing, unorganized and resentful 
after 1890. Mizruchi considered it immaterial if such 
structures, which include formal institutional arrangerr,en ts 
emerged by design o.r: by "spontaneous social-processes". · 
In fact, the question of legal entification, as a means of 
control is aided in this context, precisely because we have 
such stark contrasts as between law created (i.e. corporations) 
and law tolerated (i.e. voluntary associations) institutions. 
As Lustig 201 summarizes: 
"Forced to acknowledge the inescapability of 
political power, it declined to set priorities 
for choice and to fashion new institutions, 
and instead fell back on a group model of 
competition. Forced to acknowledge hnman 
interdependence, it moved only so far as to 
admit the impersonal co-ordination of 
administrative relations." 
199. See (Spaulding J. and Simpson G. transl) Suicide: A Study 
in Sociology (Free Press, New York, 1951). 
200. Regulating Society: Marginality and Social Control in 
Historical Perspective (Free Press, New York, 1983) 
201 Corporate Liberalism (U. Cal. Press. Berkely, 1983) 257. 
110.. 
Corporate personality was not simply a procedural device 
to create and enable previously non-existent unions to 
develop; it was not simply a means by which the conciliation 
and arbitration system could efficiently operate. It was, 
it is suggested, primarily a means by which a mobile, young, 
potentially dissident section (a large section) of the populace 
could be channelled into a controlled situation. 
The difference between corporations and humans is 
black and white: in the former case, they act as permitted 
by the law; in the latter case, they act unless forbidden 
by the law. What the law creates, it controls. But, like 
Count Frankenstein's monster, there is the danger that the 
new creation will turn on its creat0r, andeventually 
usurp it. There must be limitations built in to ensure that 
such a situation does not occur. Corporate personality 
both provides a reason, and the means for this in-built 
stultification to occur. 
The essential strength of the process is that it is 
on-going - once established it can be bolstered, dismantled or 
otherwise modified as deemed necessary and expedient. But 
all changes emanate from the c ontro l fact of corporate 
personality. Let us now consider the aspects of the process. 
111. 
(a) State Observation and Review 
The imposition of corporate status for unions 
necessarily involves the keeping of a register. This is so 
all who have or wish to have dealings with a union may 
discover from the register particulars of the union's objects, 
constitution, rules, chief officers, and address of its 
headquarters. In addition, registration is a convenient 
means by which unions are able to prove their status. 
The requirement of registration may well be seen as 
ancillary to incorporation rather than as possessing a special 
significance of its own. Alternatively the system of regis-
tration may be viewed l~ss as an instrument by which legal 
status is conferred as a means of recognition that such 
separate identity has been achieved in practice. However, 
the common element is that the State must confer or recognize 
the separate identity. 
The precise words the State functionary - the Registrar 
has to interpret are whether there are existent unions to 
which members of an applicant union could ''conveniently 
belong." 202 If the Registrar was to give a wide interpretation 
to these words, that is, if his discretion was always exercised, 
202. s. 168(2) Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
112. 
against the applicant for registration, the effect would 
be to preserve indefinitely the grouping of trade unions 
established in the past. New developments in trade union 
organization would be nipped in the bud. 
The main coercion to register is the realistic fact 
that unless there is perfect solidarity within the society, 
with no personality rivalry or factions a small group can 
break away and if they contain sufficient members to attain 
th R . r f, t 203 h . . d e egistrar s ia t ey can register as a union, an 
with it the whole gamut of blanket clauses, penal clauses 
to protect the union and so on are imposed on the whole 
society's total membership which may nUI".lber thousands. 
The corollary is that, since 1939, the Minster of Labour 
has been empowered to deregister unions 204 from under - the 
Act and has been used in the past in times of political 
and industrial unrest to admonish recalcitrant unions. The 
Minister had used this power against the Auckland Carpenter's 
Union in 1949, several unions during the Waterfront Strike 
in 1951, the Seamen's Union in 1971, and the Wellington 
Boilermakers Union in 1977. 
205 
203. 
204. 
205. 
s. 163(3) ibid. Also see the Second Schedule to the Act. 
s. 130 ibid. 
Indeed, one is left with the impression that although the 
Act legitimizes a range of penalties, their chief value 
lies in their 'being' rather than their 'shooting' -
Kahn-Freund o. Labour and the Law (Stevens and Sons, 
London, 1972) 81. 
113. 
All assets of the deregistered union may be vested 
in the Public Trustee until a union is registered under 
the Act and the Minister may direct the assets to be held 
indefinitely until a new union is permitted to be registered. 206 
Registration is only approved if the proposed rules 
of the union are consonant with the Act's requirements. 
The 1894 Act contained a simple set of rP.quirements for the 
internal government of organizations registered under it. 
To be eligible for registration "associations" were required 
to be covered by rules which provided for inter alia, the 
appo~ntment of a committee . of management, a chairman or 
president - and a secretary, the. powers, duties and removal of 
the committee and of the chairman or president and secretary; 
the control of the committee by meetings of members; the 
requirements governing admission to membership and resignation; 
the control of property, periodic audit of accounts and 
procedures for the disbursement of funds; and the keeping 
. . 207 of a membership register. 
By section 10 of the 1894 Act the effect of 
registration was to render the industrial union, and all persons 
206. See ss. 131-134 Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
207. s. 3 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. 
)'..; 
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who may be members of any society or trade union registered 
as an industrial union at the time of registration, or who 
after such registration may become members of any society 
or trade union so registered, subject to the jurisdiction 
by this Act given to a Board and the Court respectively 
and liable to all the provisions of this Act, and all such 
persons shall be bound by the rules of the individual union 
during the continuance of their membership. That is 
"the rules of the registered union were indirectly incorp-
orated into the juridical." 208 
Certain guarantees are accorded the members. For 
example, the Registrar can refuse to record an organizations 
209 rules if they were "in any way unreasonable or oppressive." 
Failure of an organization to have its accounts aud1ted 
or to disclose the true financial position of the organization 
210 are penalised. The power to interpret and enforce 
the provisions of the Act is vested in the Arbitration 
211 Court. This court in its many forms has had a 
considerable influence on the internal affairs of unions 
in the course of deciding many matters before them. The 
relationship is best expressed by Dunphy J. in the 
k . 212 Australian case of Cameron v Aust. Wor ers Union. 
208. Atkins L.H. Legal Theory and Industrial Conflict (Unpub. 
LL.M Thesis, vuw, 1975) 401 . 
209. s. 179(1) Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
210. s. 48, ibid. 
211. s. 47, ibid. 
212. (1959) •2 F.L.R. 45, 69-70 
115. 
"I~ is clear that the legislature which gave 
union members the statutory right to govern 
themselves in their own organisations by their 
home~ade rules, appointed the Court as the final 
authority to decide whether or not those rules 
imposed oppressive, unreasonable or unjust 
conditions on members." 
And 
" ... the legislature has made the ,decision of the 
Court paramount over the decision of the rule-
making body no matter how democraticall y 
and representatively constituted". 
Perhaps the most overtly intrusive area has been that 
of union elections. Successively, rank and file unionsts 
have been enabled to bring charges of impropriety in the 
conduct of electionsto the point when union leaders could 
themselves ask the court to administer an election, even 
when there was no impropriety (or possibility of) charged. 
The State now involves itself in every level of an election -
it prescribes: 
1. How the leaders must be chosen (election rather 
than appointment). 
2. The type of electoral system. 
3. how members are to vote. 
4. Detailed procedures for investigation and rectification 
. . 2T3 of irregularities. 
213. See SS 199-212, Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
The apparent motives for such legislation, which has 
been taken many steps further with the provision for ballots 
on the behest of the Minister of Labour to gauge rank and 
file support for industrial stoppages, has ostensibly been 
to seek a "democratic" outcome. But such motives, as 
D. k 214 . ic enson points out, are not so simple 
"In the regulation of national elections a 
government will not usually completely 
disregard its own interests, even if it 
eschews · the coarser forms of gerrymander 
and manipulation." 
That is, it is assumed that radical leadership, which 
ostensibly thrives on member apathy, would not be able to 
take root. Moreover, the rhetoric of aiming for "union 
democracy" could be powerfully used by the State to intervene 
more overtly in union affairs. 215 
214. Democracy in Trade Unions (University of Queensland Press, 
St Lucia, 1982) 225. 
215. A more recent example of this rhetoric is given b y Andrew 
Schonfield, a member of the Donovan Commission: 
"I start from the proposition that th.e de 1 ibera te 
abstention of the law from the activities of mighty 
subjects tends to diminish the liberty of the ordinary 
citizen and to place his welfare at risk. If organizations 
are powerful enough to act the bully then very special 
grounds are necessary to justify the decision not to 
subject their behaviour to legal rules. The legal rules 
need not be much brought into play in practice; if such 
organizations anforce their own systems of r~les and 
these work in the public interest there will be little 
actual labour for the law to do. But the content of 
the rules and the way that they operate in particular 
cases must not be allowed to escape from close public 
surveillance." 
- "Note of Reservation". Report of the Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68 
( Cmn d 3 6 2 3 , H. M. S . 0. 19 6 8) 2 9 0. 
117. 
An example is provided by Cameron 216 In 1948 the 
Australian High Court proved reluctant to intervene in a 
dispute in the Australian Workers Union in 1948 when a left-
wing faction alleged improper conduct of the union's affairs. 
On that occasion Latham C.J. referred to the union, which 
had been incorporated under the Federal Act for decades as 
217 'a voluntary association'. Cameron says: 
"It was not until th.e officials of the 
communist-dominated Fe~erated Ironworkers 
Association began to emulate their right 
wing rivals that the courts saw the 
necessity to act." 218 
The implications of court review inevitably means 
a projection of "legalism" into the internal administration 
of the union. Theunion, to be sure its decision will stand 
up review by the courts, must itself adopt the modes of 
thought and action characteristic of courts of law. It 
must formalize its standards of decision, emphasizing the 
outward act and it3 conformity to the legislation instead 
of look~ng to the essential meaning and consequences of the 
act itself, and the compatibility of that meaning with the 
basic objectives of the union. So, if a union wishes to 
expel a member it necessarily has to take account of . the 
216. "Industrial Labour and Political Labour: the Experience 
of 1972-75" in Evans G., Reeves J., Malbon J. (.eds) 
Labour E'ss·ays (Drummond, Richmond, 1981}_ 16. 
217. Australian Workers Union v Bowen (.1948) 77 C.L.R. 6Ql, 
608. 
218. Op cit, at p. 20. 
118. 
quasi-judicial content of its rules, and how a Court would 
view not only the unions interpretation of the rules, but 
all actions surrounding the expulsion decision. All this 
means inevitably some loss in the sense of commitment to the 
unions aim and some diversion of energy toward procedural 
matters. 
(.b} Company Law Analogies 
The functions of unions were further limited to the 
purposes deemed necessary and useful to the State by the 
application of a device originally developed to deal with 
combinations of capital - the ultra vires doctrine. Students 
of company law would be well aware of the demise of this 
doctrine. Originally concei~ed as a means of protecting 
investors, creditors and the general public the case of 
219 Cotman v Brougham where the Court reluctantly held that 
a clause stipulating that all of the company's multitudinous 
objects were to - be read independently of one another effect-
ively enables companies to have such widely drawn objects 
clauses as to render the effect of the doctrine nu~atory. It 
was found that in spite of such wide drafting, levels of 
capital investment were not in any way affected. 
Further judicial inroads rendered the doctrine all but 
useless, and finally it was statutorily abolished by the 
Companies Amendment Act 1983, which inter alia gave companies, 
if they so chose, the powers of natural persons. 
219. [1918] A.C. 514. 
119. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine was applied in the trade 
union area with vigour. The House of Lords applied it in 
the case of Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v 
Osborne. 220 Th' h is case as been analysed earlier in the 
paper but, to repeat the reasoning, the C8urt held that the 
definition of "trade unions" in the Trade Unions Act of 
1871 and 1876 was an exhaustive and limiting definition; 
since the definition referred chiefly to industrial objects 
any activity outside industrial matters was ultra vires 
a trade union. 
The Webbs, in an oft-quoted passage described the 
. 1 . . f th d . . 2 21 imp 1cat1ons o e ec1s1on: 
"Not political action alone, not municipal 
action alone, but any mark of general 
education of their members or others; the 
formation of a library; the establishment or 
management of "University Extension" or 
"Workers' Educational Association" classes; 
the subscription to circulating book-boxes; 
the provisions of public lectures; the 
establishment of scholarships at Ruskin 
College, Oxford or any other college - al ~ of 
which things were at the time actually being 
done by trade unions - were all henceforth 
to be ultra vires and illegal." 
As the quote indicates, prior to this decision, - trade 
unions had been carrying out activities wh~ch were perfectly 
lawful if carried out by voluntary associations. Th.e case 
decided however that they were not lawful for trade unions. 
220. Supra, footnote 122. 
221. History of Trade Unionism, op cit, at p. 260. 
120. 
The application of the ultra vires doctrine was made 
all the easier in the New Zealand context because of the 
similarities between companies and industrial unions with 
respect to registration and incorporation. In McDougall v 
W 11 . t T h' 1 222 . e 1ng on ypograp 1ca I.U.W. the incorporated 
industrial union was prevented from giving some of its 
funds to assist strikers in another industry on the grounds 
that the union had been formed for the purpose of furthering 
the interests of workers in the printing industry, not 
for aiding workers in other industries. 
The doctrine _has prevented a union from acting as a 
b f · · 233 f · t mb d f ~f · 1 · t. ene it society or is me ers, an rom ar 1 ia ing 
with an association of unions having purposes extending 
beyond the industry covered by the union and beyond the 
224 definition of "industrial matters" Until legislation 
225 b. h was enacted in 1936, the Os orne case waste reason 
for the consistent refusal of the Registrar to register 
rules containing a political objects clause. Moreover, even 
the rules of a union have been interpreted strictly. 
222. (1913) 16 G.L.R. 309.. 
223. Ohinemuri Mines and Batteries Employees' I.U.W. v Registrar 
of Industrial Unions [1917J N.Z.L.R. 829. 
224. Auckland Freezing Works etc I.U.W. v N.Z. Freezing Works 
I.A.W. [1951] N.Z.L.R. 341. 
225. The descendant of which is the Political Disabilities 
Removal Act 1960. With respect to Welfare Funds see 
s. 176 Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
121. 
The result is that: 
"The objects of a registered union must be 
limited to furthering the interests of their 
members in their status as workers in the 
industry covered." 226 
It is doubtful whether Cotman v Brougham (supra) type 
clauses would evade the eye of the Registrar. 
The restrictive judicial interpretation of the doctrine 
can also possibly explain the curious dropping from the 
incorporation provisions in 1954 of the words "for the purposes 
of the Act". Shortland J. in Progress Advertising Ltd v 
Licensed Victuallers I.U.W. 
227 
remarked on this omission, 
that the registration of a union constituted a body corporate 
without restriction as to the purposes for which it is in 
law a body corp_orate. 
Of . · 1 A t 1 · . . F 11 J held 228 a simi ar us ra ian provision, u ager . 
that the words did no more than explain the reason for granting 
incorporation but did not limit the capacity of a registered 
union. This reasoning was criti\:ised by Sykes and Glasbeek 229 
who said that if correct, it would be theoretically possible 
that a union, once registered, could enter into binding 
agreements aimed at avoiding the operation of the Act, and 
without any interference from any State machi~ery. 
226. Roth M. Trade Unions in New Zealand; Past and Present (2ed, 
Reed, Wellington, 1973) 98 - emphasis added. 
227. [1957] N.Z.L.R. 1207, 1209. 
2 2 8 . W i 11 i am s v Hurse y ( 1 9 5 9 )_ 1 0 3 C . L . R . 3 0 , 5 2 . The p ro vis i on 
in qu es t i on was th.e s. 1 46 Co nciliation an d Arbitration Act 
1904 (Aust.) It ha s n ow bee n amen de d an d follows the New 
Zealand form. 
122,. 
Sykes and Glasbeek argued that the provision meant that 
a union would hav.e legal personality insofar as its conduct 
would have been related to the arbitration and conciliation 
system. But then, this would have meant that a union was,in 
effect a double entity; a corporate body, yet simultaneously 
reverting back to its skeletal state as an unincorporated 
association. If such was the case then a union could have 
the best of both worlds: freedom to pursue any object 
it desired under its unincorporated ego, and possessed with 
procedural capabilities with its incorporated ego. 
The role of unions within the conciliation and arbitration 
system is too far entrenched to permit of such an interpretation. 
Clearly even the ultra vires case law in the company law 
·field does not permit a union to escape liability for 
criminal conduct. 
It also impinges on the auestion of whether the liability 
of union members is limited, as it is in registered companies, 
or unlimited~ Under the 1896 Act, if there was a breach of 
an award, a penalty not to exceed £soo in the case of any 
individual employer or trade union was to be exacted. Should 
a union's funds be insufficient, each member was liable to the 
. /10 230 extent of not more tnan { . Section 119(4) Commerce Act 
230. s. 22(1). 
123. 
1975 is another example of a statutory lifting of the veil, 
where members of a union - which by that section includes any 
"union or association or body corporate 11231 , thus contemplating 
unregistered unions - are jointly and generally liable for 
damages and costs awarded against their union that are unpaid 
after two months of judgment, up to a limit of $200 per 
member. 
No case is directly on point.Shortland J. in the Progress 
Advertising case opined: 
"As a corporate body [an industrial union] 
possesses a legal entity, separate and 
distinct from its members. It is the 
property and assets of . the corporate entity 
as distinct from the property and assets of 
its members which are liable on its contracts. 
The liability of its members is confined to 
subscriptions and levies fixed by its rules." 232 
Dicta however, in a couple of Australian cases, Burwood 
Cinema Ltd v Aust. Theatrical etc Assoc.
233 
and Fed. Iron-
234 workers v Cmmwlth suggest that it is legitimate to go 
behind the registered organization and look at the membership 
in order to distinguish between a real and an illusory 
industrial dispute. 
2 31. s. 119A (1) Commerce Act 1975. 
2 32. Op ci t., at p. 1212. 
233. (.1925) 35 C.L.R. 528, 548-551. 
234. (1951) 84 C. L. R. 265, 2 79. 
124· 
Undoubtedly, in opportune circumstances the Court 
will be able to draw an analogy as it has with the ultra vires 
doctrir..e with, the rule in Foss v Harbottle, 2 35 and the rule 
236 in Turauands case. As Ryan wryly comments: 
"The bulk of the case law on the topic suggests 
that there has occurred some sort of polarisation 
whereby the company law rules which restrict 
union activity appear to have been applied 
readily while this cannot be said of those 
rule which facilitate union action." 
_, ' 
Though companies, as incarnations of capital, and 
unions, that of labour, are at opposite ends of the socio-
economic spectrum, their juridical form admits of analogy. 
Company law is a well-developed branch of jurisprudence and 
thus provides an invaluable source to be tapped by the 
. d' . h. 23s JU 1c1ary. As Mat 1eson notes: 
"When a legal problem arises to which the 
statute and authoritative case law affords 
no guidance, a company law analogy may be 
fruitful or even compelling. If the Court 
applies a principle of company law by 
analogy, this lends respectability to what 
might otherwise seem to be naked judicial 
legislation." 
Despite being of different species, both types of bodies 
are under the one "corporate" genus. Familiar doctrines in 
one area can therefore be legitimately used if the enabling 
Act's language so permits it, in another. 
235. (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
236. (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 327. 
237. "Law and Industrial Relations: The Influence of the Courts" 
(1971) 2 O.L.R. 298, 305. 
238. Op cit., at p. 112. 
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(c) Size and Number of Unions 
The 1894 Act provided that: 
"a society of any number of persons not be.:.na 
less than seven, residing within the colonv,-
lawfully associated for the purpose o= orotecti~c 
or furthering the interests of employer; or -
workmen in or in connection with anv indus~r 
in the colony, and whether formed b~fore or 
after this Act, may be registered as an 
industrial union ... " 239 
There was nothing to restrict the coverage of industria_ 
unions geographically. Yet it was not till 1936 240 that -L~e 
Act was amended to specifically enable the registration o: 
industrial unions covering the whole of New Zealand, or 
covering the North or South Islands, or covering more than 
one industrial district. 
Until the 1936 amendment there was a strong presumption 
(though no specific prohibition) against multi-district 
unions. This presumption was buttressed by the following 
factors: A 1905 Amending Act provided that in the case of 
every trade union registered under the Trade Union ~et and 
also registering under the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, every branch of that trade union would 
be a distinct industrial union; the provisions for a separate 
permanent Board of Conciliation for each industrial district; 
and when in 1903 the Court of Arbitration was given power 
to extend an award to another industrial district, it could 
only deem the extended area to be one district. In addition 
239. s. 3(1). 
240. Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 
1936 SS. 5-9. 
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there was, what Woods 
241 
describes as the "perpetuating 
clause" - section 11 of the 1905 Amendment which provided that 
the Registrar of Industrial unions could refuse (subject 
to appeal) to register an industrial union if there was 
already an existent industrial union in the same locality or 
industrial district to which members might conveniently belong. 
In a colony not long emerged from the stage of fairly isolated 
settlements, unions of workers were predominantly local or 
district unions, so section 11 (which exists, more or less in 
today's legislation) encouraged and perpetuated small unions by 
ensuring a rival free existence. As Woods concludes: 
"In 1894 an Act to encourage the formation of 
industrial unions was inescapably an Act to 
encourage mainly the formation of small loc_g_]_ised 
unions." 242 
Conglomeration of union strenqth was inhibited in that 
the 1894 Act contained no provision for the amalgamatio~ of 
unions and not until the amending Act of 1905 was such. a 
possibility envisaged. The 1905 amendment provided for 
the amalgamation of industrial unions in the same industrial 
district and connected with the same industry. Not until the 
1937 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 
did amalgamation beyond the confines of a single district 
become possible. 
241. "Law and Industrial Relations: The Influence of Parliament" 
(1971) 2 O.L.R. 262, 264-265. 
242. Op cit, 265. The long title of the 1894 Act was dropped in 
the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 
1900. Commenting on this the Hon. Mr Rigg said: 
"The Act was originally an Act to encourage the formation of 
i~dustrial unions and associations, and a careful reading of 
that Act will show that the main inducement given to form 
industrial associations was the power given them to elect the 
Court. That is now taken away, and there does not seem to be 
left in the law the same inducement as existed previously for 
the Formation of industrial associations." (N.Z.P.D. Vol. 1715 
(1900), 22). The honorable member, it is submitted, somewhat 
lacked a grasp of the philosophy of conciliation and arbi-
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The present procedure for amalgamation is contained 
in section 192 Industrial Relations Act 1973. The two methods 
by which an amalgamation can take place (either one union 
absorbing the other, or two unions merging members and 
funds to create a new entityl are hamstrung by procedure. 
Moreover, the Registrar must be satisfied that the majority 
of those in the amalgamating unions desire it. The proviso 
to section 192(61 gives the Registrar the discretion to accept 
that the amalgamation is desired b y the union if a majority 
of valid ·votes cast in a ballot (where each member has sufficient 
notice) are in favour of it. 
Although at first blush the Registrar appears to have 
few powers under the amalgamation provisions, he does 
have control pri9r to the proce~s - that ·is in his role of 
registering rules that may or may not provide for such· 
contingencies. Of course, the rules of the new amalgalm 
are also under his scrutiny . 
The resulting ebb and flow, as new unions are formed, 
or amalgamate, and whilst defunct unions slip into 
oblivion, has led to the following pattern of union size: 
Year 0-499 1.00-1.99 200-299 300-499 500-999 1000- 2000- 3000- 5000- lOOO TOTAL 
1999 2999 4999 9999 and 
over 
1901 142(24.3) 30(17) 19 (20. 3) 5 (8. 7) 4(10.6) 1(6.9) 1(12.2) 202 
1911 182(13.5) 53(13.8) 26(11.4) 23(16.0) 14(17.4) 8(16.9) 1(11.0) 307 
1921 239(11.5) 70(9.9) 36(9.4) 28(11.3) 28(19.0) 11(14.9) 3(7.6) 2(7.6) 1 (9. 7) 418 
1931 239(11.1) 58(8.8) 31(8.4) 30(12.4) 29(22.8) 14(2.05) 3(7.4) 1(8.6) 405 
1941 184(3.5) 70(4.2) 38(4.0) 38(6.5) 32(9.4) 27(15.3) 13(13.4) 10(17.8) 5(12.6) 2(12.8)419 
1951 165(2.9) 69 (3. 7) 44(3.8) 38(5.4) 39(10.0) 28(14.5) 11 (10. 0) 11(15.8) 7(14.8) 3(19.1)415 
1961 147(2.0) 58(2.4) 39(2.9) 39(4.5) 46(10.0) 25(10.9) 15(10.7) 11(14.2) 11(22.3) 4(20.1)395 
1971 127(1.3) 39(1.4) 29(1.9) 37(3.8) 39(7.0) 29(11.0) 13(8.1) 13(12.8) 14(25.4) 6(27.3)346 
1977 86(0.9) 28(0.8) 23(1.2) 29(2.3) 43(6.2) 31( 9. 3) 16(7.9) 12( 9.5) 13(20.0) 11(42.0) 292 
1979 78(0.7) 26(0.7) 24(1.1) 23(1.7) 41(5.3) 34( 9. 4) 12(5.5) 13(10.0) 13(18.9) 13(46.6)277 
1981 70(0.6) 25(0.6) 20(0.9) 22(1.6) 40(5.5) 32( 9.1) 11(5.2) 7( 4.7) 16(21.7) 15(54.6)258 
(Bracketed figures represent % of total membership) 
Source: New Zealand Official Year Books 
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In terms of size., in 1981 the registered unions ranged from the 
Engineers Union which has 51,400 members, down to 10 members. 
Ave rage numbers of ~2mbership number 118 to 1901, 234 in 
19 21 , 55 in 1941, 772 in 1951, 882 in 1961, in 1971, and 
in 1 981. Quite clearly there is a trend towards bigger 
un ions, and a corresponding dimunition in the number of 
unions. But one can still discern the small-scale nature of 
NewZealand trade unionism. Well-over a quarter of the 
regi stered unions in 1981 contain less than one hundred 
members, all told, over one half (137) have under 500 members. 
It i s significant to note as a comparison, West Germany, 
whic h of course has a much larger workforce has only eighteen 
un ions. 
It seems, however, that quite apart from direct controls 
t he conciliation and arbitration system itself, mainta~ns 
control over union size. Examine Riches' 
243 
comment on the 
deve lopment of unionism during the period of abolition of 
compulsory arbitration (1932-1936 ) : 
243. 
nThere was little change in the total number of 
unions registered. Although the abolition of 
compulsory arbitration left the smaller unions 
virtually powerless and increased correspondingl y 
the incentive to amalgamation, the proportion of 
total membership in the larger unions actuall y 
declined and the number of small unions remained 
practically constant. Where small unions had 
been long established a variety of factors 
combined to ensure their survival. Real 
differences of interest, personal factors and 
The Restoration of Compul s or y Arbitration in New Zealand 
( 19 3 6) In t. Lab. Rev. 7 5 3 r 7 61. 
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a belief that compulsory arbitration would 
be restored as soon as a change of govern-
ment occured, combined to delay the expected 
movement towards co-operation on a large~ 
scale. In the long run, if the curtailment 
of the Court's powers had continued, the 
advantage of larger unions in free collective 
bargaining might have proved decisive, but up 
to the end of 1935 the situation remained 
substantially unchanged." 
The conciliation and arbitration sys·tem may thus have 
in-built mechanisms to ensure that too many large unions 
do not emerge. A quick perusal at the amount and nature 
of demarcation disputes reported both in New Zealand and 
overseas, bears witness to the sharp ideological, social 
and economic differences between unions, which ultimately 
hinder their joining, even, as seen, in times of economic 
depression. 
(.dl_ Commi trnent 
Any organization varies in the degree of commitment 
244 
required of its members. Coser has demonstrated in a 
study of "greedy institutions" how the Roman Catholic 
priesthood requires celibacy in order to remove any alter-
native potential for the priest's loyalty, thus tying him 
to the Church for life. Alternatively, an organization 
244. Greedy Institutions CFree Press, New York, 1974L 
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marked by undercomrnitrnent is apathetic, difficult to motivate, 
and malleable by those in power. This latter state can 
be achieved By the following means: 
(i) Finance 
'I'he State ensures that unionists pay minimal fees, 
which apart from minimizing their financial commitment, 
also has the effect of keeping their union's poor. There 
was no legislative mention on the matter of union fees till 
1922 when a one shilling per week limitation for the first 
month of membership was placed, after which the union could 
charge what it liked. At first sight this appears to be only 
245 a temporary fetter but as Woods submits, the figure for 
the first month was a psychological barrier that few unions 
could break out of; the rank and file member inclining_to 
the view "that if the law specifies an amount, it must be 
because that amount is regarded as enough."' 
In 1936, a ceiling of one shilling per week without time 
limit was imposed, though a higher rate could be imposed if 
the majority of votes cast in~ameeting (given with seven days 
446 notice) so agreed. In 1936 one shilling a week amounted 
to approximately 1.3% of the minimum adult male wage rate 
in unskilled occupations. 
245. Op cit, at p. 208. 
246. s. 28(2) Industrial Conciliation and ~rbitration Amend-
ment Act 1936. 
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Section 182 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 now 
provides a ceiling for weekly subscriptions of 1% of the 
minimum adult wage rate and repeats the tightening up of 
the procedure for above-the-ceiling rates by requiring 
an adoption by a majority of the valid votes cast at a 
secret Ballot of financial members of the union, being either 
a postal ballot or a ballot approved by the registrar. 
(_ii) Compulsory Unionism 
The introduction of compulsory unionism in 1936 
247 
248 
necessarily led to bigger unions but, ones that, as Rosenberg 
describes were the same as the srna_ll arbitration unions .:.. 
"part of the arbitration machinery of the State but having 
little active existence outside it .. " To further illustrate 
his claim, Rosenb erg compared the membership of all unions 
containing more than 3000 members as at 31.2.1949, with 
their numerical strength as at 31.12.1935. Whilst there are 
some methodological inadequacies in such a simplistic 
comparison (notably it does not take into account changing 
patterns of industrial development} it is significant to 
note that of the twenty four unions comprised in the 1949 
figure, only three had membership of over 30QO members prior 
to compulsory unionism. Such unions were t ypified by the 
indifference of their membership. 
247. Ibid., s. 18. 
248. comp ulsor y Arbitration; B.ar_r ier to Progr es s ? (M od e r n 
Books, Wellington, 1 9 52). 
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Compulsory unionism has gone through several incarnations 
in form though the unqualified preference clause retained 
compulsory unionism in substance. New sections 99-100 were 
substituted by the Industrial Relations Act Amendment 1983 and 
abolished unqualified preference clauses instituting a regime 
of voluntary unionism. 
(iii) Ideological Cleavage 
International experience demonstrates that unions can 
attain ends by supra-legal political means, either by creating 
some representational interest in political parties, or, by 
attempting to create a particular climate of opinion which 
will influence rublic opinion and State policy. 
We have seen how the Osborne decision was accepted in 
New Zealand. That decision was overruled in England by ·the 
Trade Union Act 1913 (U.K.) which declared that a trade union 
might include in its rule book any lawful objects, including 
political objects, providing that its principal object~ 
were those set out in the Trade Union Acts of 1871 and 1876. 
It was not until 1936 that the New Zealand Parliament enacted 
the Political Disabilities Removal Act which allowed the funds 
of any society to be applied in furtherance of political 
objects if a majority of the members so desired. The voting 
procedure was amended in 1948 to cover the total of those 
voting. In 1950 when the National Government was elected the 
voting procedures reverted back to those of 1936, but, upon 
Labour being elected in 1960, the procedures changed again to 
those of 1948. They have since remained unchanged. Obviously, 
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both parties were aware of where the union's sympathy would 
lie and ensured that they would maximise any benefit (or 
discourage donations in the case of National) by manipulating 
the voting procedures. 
Since the Waterfront dispute of 1951 when the Labour 
Party was "neither for nor against" the strikers, union 
financial support for the Labour Party has never approached 
that of their English counterparts. Indeed, in the late 
1970's there was a strong movement within the Labour Party 
ranks to formally dissociate the Party from the union movement. 
Nevertheless, the 1984 Labour Party victory was on part 
built upon a platform of co-operation with the unions. 
Unions have thus had to rely on their own political 
muscle. Increasing militancy led to the passage of Part IV A 
of the Commerce Act 1975 which deals with "strikes and lockouts 
f 
contrary to the public interest." Section llB of the ·. J.ct makes ...__.,,, 
it an offence for anybody to take part in, or to incite or 
aid, a strike or lockout concerning a matter which is: (a) not 
an "industrial matter" (.though. this tennis undefined in the 
Act) or (.bJ not a matter employers and workers or their 
respective unions do not have the power to settle. It is 
also an offence to take part in, or to incite or aid, a strike 
or lockout that is intended to coerce the New Zealand Government 
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other than in its capacity as an employer, either directly 
or by inflicting inconvenience, upon any section of the 
corrununity. 
Section 119C of the Act deals with failures to resume work 
where the public interest is affected. Although not formally 
defined »public interestff is effectively defined by the 
section. The section gives the Arbitration Court sweeping 
powers to order a resumption of work in the case of a strike 
or a lockout if it is satisfied that the economic well-being 
of an industry or New Zealand is threatened. Any order for 
resumption of work in such cases can be applied for by 
any Minister of the Crown, or any person (or his represe~tative) 
who is directly affected by the strike or lockout. 
A union is liable to a large fine upon summary conviction 
for advocating, suggesting or conniving with non-compliance 
with a resumption of work order by the Arbitration Court, or 
wilfully failing to inform any worker of such an .order, or in 
any other way inciting, instigating, aiding or abetting a 
corrunission of an offence against the section. In addition, 
however, an individual union official is individually liable 
to a fine upon summary conviction if it can be proved he was 
responsible for committi~g any of the above mentioned acts. 
Where a union is liable for damages under section 119B 
and has not paid the full amount within two months after 
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the date of judgment, each individual member of the union 
at the time of the strike is personally liable, up to 
$200, for the arrears. 
Therefore, individuals cannot cloak themselves within 
the anonymity of the body and be immune from financial 
penalty. 
That such legislation in fact exists may b e seen as 
striking at the very fundamentals for which incorporation 
of the unions were sought. To quote W. P. Ree ves: 250 
"English trade union critics have seen 
danger in that part of the statute . w-!l i .c h 
makes trade unions, when register e d as 
industrial unions, corporate bodies wi th 
the right to sue and be sued. The y fear 
lest resolute and wealthy employers ma y 
harrass these unions by costly litigation 
in the ordinary law courts. But when 
strikes and lockouts are abolished the 
main reasons for such litigation cease to 
exist." 
The Commerce Act may then be an admission of failure 
of the 1894 Act's philosophy. Nevertheless, it reaffirms 
the rhetoric that workers are free to think and so as they 
choose - but the unions cannot be used as vehicles for 
this freedom. 
250. S t o t e Ex p erimen t s in Austra l ia a nd New Zeala n d Vo l. II 
(M ac Millan, Mel b ourne, 1 969) 1 70 . 
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(e) Institutionalization 
Legal entities, just like human individuals, are · 
shaped and moulded by their environment. It has been said 
that if a Negro was brought up from birth in Buckingham 
Palace, by a very young age she/he would display the 
mannerisms, in speech and bearing of a member of the Royal 
family. At least, one would expect so, and it was an 
expectation of Reeves that registered unions would become 
"responsible'' bodies in his scheme. For instance, by making 
the union the avenue for manifesting individual workers 
problems, it was anticipated that unions would not waste 
valuable · time or effort by vetting complaints brought before 
them. The underlying ~otion is, that an unincorporated 
association maintains an informal, club-like atmosphere -
where social activities are almost important as everyday 
logistics. It is thought that if a body is incorporated, 
with all the attendant consequences, a more professional, 
and hence "responsible" attitude will occur. 
Some unions have disproved this premise. The Wellington 
Boilermakers union exists and functions quite satisfactorily 
as an unincorporated association. Other examples include 
pulp and paper workers, and chemical fertilizer workers. 
However, these are the exceptions rather than the rule. 
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Such unions are employed by only a very small number of 
employers, and the workers are especially cohesive -
factors which assist in their survival. The majority of 
unions however, are not of these types. 
The process grafts onto and accelerates the drive 
to bureaucratization of the post-union transformation phase 
that was depicted in Chapter II. Lester 251describes it 
thus: 
(1) With union development comes psychological ageing, and 
the greater the extent of a union's membership the 
greater the extent of ageing; 
(2) central control within a union engulfs democracy at 
the local level, 
(3) Union leaders become administrators and the result is a 
decrease in the dif ference,s between management's and 
the union's top officers; 
(4) Unions lose their dynanism and their innovative tendencies 
as they succeed in their programmes; 
(5) there is a decrease in the differences between white-
collar and blue-collar unions and the areas of worker 
protest are reduced; 
(6) differences between unions and other societal organizations 
decrease;and 
251. As Unions Mature (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1958). 
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(7) conditions productive of militancy tend to decrease 
as union leaders assimilate into society, and the leaders 
act as moderating influences. 
Perpetual succession, one of the cornerstones of a 
corporation is essential in this organizational evolution, 
not so much because the law ensures that a corporate body 
enures - one can look to the field of Partnership law to 
easily see that firms can exist in fact for perpetuity 
without formal incorporation. Rather, it deprives an 
organization of the paramount sense of urgency needed to 
ensure day to day administrative survival. For any organization, 
as for any organism, the goal or obje~tive that has a 
natural pre-eminence is its own survival. Once a union is 
registered there is a routine aspect to its continuing in 
existence - the collection or deduction of subscriptions, the 
enrolment of new members, the holding of general meetings, 
and the designation of officers. 
This drive to bureaucratization is aided by a process 
perhaps unforseen by the 1894 Act's creators. Although the 
Arbitration Court was provided as a backstop where conciliation 
proceedings failed to provide an agreement, in practice the 
conciliation proceedings were not taken seriously and the 
Court became the main vehicle for the settling of wages and 
14 0. 
conditions. A ready accession to law - 'creeping legalism' -
has meant that much of the union's resources are concentrated 
at the Arbitration Court level. Negotiations, rules, and 
other forms of union action have to be analysed, not so much 
for their social, economic or political implications, but 
rather for their legal consequences. 
* * * * * * * * * 
The cumulative impact of the policy discussed in this 
chapter is to encouraoe the dissolution of the rule of law, 
at least insofar as that form of legality is defined by its 
commitment to the generality and autonomy of law. Obviously 
autonomy and generality are no more than ideals which our 
liberal ideology makes necessary to achieve, though probably 
impossible to fully achieve. What distinguishes this s~all 
area of New Zealand jurisprudence is primarily the ~urning 
away from these ideals. That such could happen at sue& an 
early point in the country's historical development indicates 
distinctive break in human belief and social order, from its 
traditional, liberal Anglo-Saxon antecedents. 
The spearhead of the trend is the blurring both . in 
organization and in the stylized consciousness of the 
individual, of the boundary between the State and society; 
Unger 
252 describes·. between public and private. 
252_ Law in Modern Society ~ree Press, New York, 19761 
201. 
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"As.the ~tate reaches into society, 
society itself generates institutions 
that rival the State in their oower 
and take on many attributes fo~merly 
associated with public bodies." 
It is probably true that historically much of the earlier 
separation of gowernment and society may have been more 
a matter of rhetoric than of reality. In pre-Industrial 
Revolution England, the State had regulated conditions of 
work. Indeed, until the publication of Adam Smith's 
Wealth of Nations in 1776, Stone 
253 notes that 
"the matrix of rights and obligations was 
conceived as fixed by custom or legal 
regulation in the public interest, not by 
private individual bargaining. Rates, quality, 
prices and wages up to the eighteenth century 
were fixed and in principle enforced by or 
under public authority." 
It was for this very reason that the Realist/Pluralist 
strands of thought developed. Couched within romantic liberal 
views such as those of Locke and Mill; preoccupied with an 
individualist ethos, in which the natural and inalienable 
right of a person to associate was reified as an essential 
prerequisite to ensure a democratic system of government; 
these intellectual movements attempted to project an . ideal-
type descriptive norm of the State - individual relationship. 
2 53 • Op C it. 3 3 8. 
142. 
The images people hold of their social and political 
situation are an integral part of those situations and 
the individual's social meaning. Thus, the form of 
organization, and the belief in its underlying ideology 
is essential for the State's purpose to cloak the control 
and transformations of power that simmered beneath the 
social perspex. 
But a change in emphasis in forms of organization is 
only really important if it is accompanied by a transformation 
of belief. Although the occasional political rhetoric 
stylising industrial relations as the construct of the ruling 
classes and the State has been reiterated ad nauseum through-
out labour history, the important fact that it remains 
rhetoric ensures the process of control enures. It p~rmits 
the restructuring of society and its institutions, while 
maintaining the ideological facade of the neutrality of 
law. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ABSORBENT STATE 
GROUPS AND THE LAW 
(1) Private Organisations - Public Law 
The measure of State control over groups within 
society, as posited in the previous Chapter has had the 
effect of breaking down the traditional separation of 
private and public law. The distinction between these two 
25J 
types of law was put by Kelsen in this way: 
"On the commonest view it is a question of 
classifying legal relationships. Private_law 
is a relation between equal subjects of the 
same legal standing. Public law is a relation 
between a superior and an inferior subject, 
between two subjects, that is, of whom one has 
legally a higher value. The typical public law 
relationship is that between State and subject. 
Private law relationships are characterized simply 
as legal relationships, as relationships of 'rights', 
in order to bring out the distinction between 
them and public law relationships, which are 
relationships of 'power' or 'sovereignty' . 
. . . [TJ he general distinction between public and 
private law has a tendency to merge into a 
distinction between ... State and law." 
Thus, our industrial and labour laws merge into a body 
of social law that is more applicable to the structure 
of private-public organizations than to official conduct or 
private transactions. But though this development undermines 
the conventional contrast between the two types of law, 
25 4. "The Pure Theory of Law" (1935) 51 L.Q.R. 517, 532. 
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it does not necessarily destroy the broader difference 
between the law of the State and the internal, privately 
determined regulations of private associations. Insofar 
as private law is laid down by the State, it too, is in 
this sense public. 
Nevertheless, the interface is especially thin. There 
are few truly voluntary unincorporated associations in 
New Zealand. For administrative convenience most sporting 
clubs and other societies have tended to register and gain 
corporate status under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. 
By so doing they are subject to the same State scrutiny of 
rules and behaviours, that have become familiar to us through 
this paper. Those that re~ain outside the purview, for 
· 1 · · b 2 55 . d . . 1 b th 1 examp -e, Maori .tr1 es o so pr1mar1 y ecause e aw 
is unable to subsume the particular body under a definite 
legal form, and moreover there are no compelling reasons for 
the State to create such a form. 
In actuality then, many voluntary unincorporated 
associations today no longer meet the criteria for being 
truly voluntary, to such a degree have they become profess-
ionalised and bureaucratised, or so much has their raison 
d'etre become one of responding to State needs. Such 
2 55 . s e e B r O O k s B . " Leg a l S tat us o f P r iv ate A s s o c i at ions in 
New Zealand" (19 6 9) 4 N.Z. Recent Law, 119. 
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organizations no longer exist primarily to strengthen 
the voluntary aspects of democrary. 'Voluntary' organizations 
such as these are, in a sense, severed heads no longer 
related to a body. They are answerable not primarily to 
their membership, but to a paid professional staff or at 
least self-perpetuating boards of trustees. Organizations 
are legitimized in society by the social utility of their 
function rather than by their status as the representative 
organs of defined bodies of individuals. 
This becomes a basis of intelligent social engineering 
where active, piecemeal interference with the working of 
society, each case interrelated, leads to an overall, 
coherent and evolving conception of what is happening to the 
society. It is as Clegg 
256 has described, a "continuous 
process of concession and compromise." As new groups, with 
resources that can affect others and the State emerge, the State 
enmeshes them within its purview. It confers certain 
attributes (notably legal personality) even if it means 
being at the expense of other established groups, so long as 
these new organizations are controllable. 
2 5 6. "Pluralism in Industrial Relations" (1973) 23 Brit. 
J O • I n d . Re 1 s . 3 O 9 . Se e a 1 s o E t z i o ni A . : The 
Active Society (Free Press, New York, 1968). 
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(2) Group Autonomy and the Wa chful State 
Wi. thi' n thi' s scheme of " · d · d · · d · 2 c.. 7 organize in ivi ualism" -
the formal agencies of the State are therefore mainly 
channels and facilities through which the community operates 
in terms of its composite interests and goals; but realist-
ically, the State is composed of the foci of decision-
making and the flow of communications between groups or 
individuals who are involved. The bulk of this State 
intervention results from function rather than structure 
and form. Obviously, to fully realize its potential, would 
require massive State resources. A mega-bureaucracy as 
created would tend to be self-defeating as ideologically 
aware people would become awake to the social reality. 
In any case, most voluntary organizations, as they 
become formalized institutions simply do not require 
manipulation. As previously mentioned, the import of 
legislation into their structures tends to create conser-
vative, quiescent bodies. Even those that may investigate 
radical ideologies, such as say a Philosophy Society, would, 
in common sense terms, pose little threat to socio-political 
stability. A radical political group, on the other hand, 
may. 
2 57 • Lustig op cit. 246. 
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The real value to the State occurs in maintaining the 
image of autonomy. As Becker 258 puts it: 
"The extent to which we have maintained 
democratic institutions in our society is 
largely a result of the successful 
administration of group interests without 
losing sight of what they mean for the 
individual personality." 
The State can thus go about its tasks when and if required, 
individual groups can go about theirs so long as they are 
consistent _with the State's goals, "status quo" and "public 
interest" are thus inextricable in the majo~ity of group 
contexts. 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF TRADE UNIONS IN LATE CAPITALIST 
SOCIETY 
(1) The Economic Background 
Crises tend to cause the State to draw aside that veil 
of autonomy. The "late capitalist" phase that New Zealand 
has entered into, is typified by a crisis of economics. In 
the 1950's and 1960's New Zealand's economic situation was 
one of rosy prosperity. Economic growth paralleled that 
of developed market economies, and per capita G.D.P. 
consistently figured in the top ten in the world. Unemployment 
was virtually non existent. 
2 5 8. "Social Reality and Planning Illusions: Some Observations 
on the Need for a Legal Philosophy of Group Interests" 
(1959) 13 Rutgers L.J. 588. 
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However, from the late l960's onwards, steadily 
worsening terms of trade and oil shocks (in the mid 1970's) 
contributed to an almost zero growth rate, record balance 
of payments deficits, with inflation and unemployment also 
soaring to intolerable levels. The influence of such economic 
factors on trade unions was described by the New Zealand 'l'ask 
Force on Economic and Social Planning in this way: 259 
"Any country which has to pass through a 
phase of development which involves 
retrogression from levels previously 
achieved is bound to experience tensions 
as different groups struggle to hold their 
gains and defend the interests of their 
members .... Trade unions are reactive as 
rapidly rising prices outdistance the 
restricted growth of wages." 
The result was that the period after 1968 was characterized 
by the declining . role of the conciliation and arbitration 
system as a mechanism for establishing wages and conditions 
of work, and in its general role as stabilizer of industrial 
relations. Since their rejection of the Arbitration Court 
following the Nil Wage Order of 1968, trade unions had 
increasingly assumed a more independent posture, becoming 
increasingly restive over the stratifications imposed by 
the industrial relations system. 
The gradual decline in the significance of the concil-
iation and arbitration system meant a corresponding reduction 
in the State's capacity to direct events within the industrial 
relations system. 
259. New Zealand at the Turning Point (~ellington, 14761 4. 
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(2) The Union and the Planning System 
Trade unions are central to the pursuit of full 
e~ployment policies. They have ~o reason, when making 
wage demands, to take any account of the effect on 
unemployment their wage demands may have caused. Until 
late capitalism, the role of unions as a means of economic 
planning were generally otiose. There have been few 
periods in New Zealand history when wage demands could not 
be related to the general economic performance. 
However, certain large units are capable, by their 
bargaining strengths, to obtain what can be considered 
by the State,to be excessive wage demands. Because of the 
intricate system of wage pa_rities this .can fil1:er through 
the onward system to create a wage spiral. The means by 
which this could be avoided, noted by Keynes nearl y sixty 
260 
years ago, was 
"the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies 
within the State - bodies whose criterion 
of action within their own field is solely 
the public good as they understand it .... 
bodies which in the ordinary course of affairs 
are mainly autonomous within their prescribed 
limitations, but are subject in the last 
resort to the sovereignty of the democracy 
expressed through parliament." 
Keynes was concerned to describe a system where organizations 
had their activities and relations co-ordinated and planned 
2 6.0 .• · 
The End of LaisserFaire (London, 1926) 41-42. 
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rather than being determined by competition in the market 
or by conflict. Latterly, this system which has been 
261 
called "corporatism" has emphasized how the State 
through institutionalized frameworks regulates all aspects 
of the work relationship. The State does not just attempt 
to influence decisons, it prescribes or limits the range 
of choice open to corporate bodies. It is this directive -
as opposed to supportive or facilitative activity which is 
crucial in the theory. The substantive character of 
State intervention is guided by four principles, which not 
only provide for the legitimation of the State's action but 
also clearly indicate why the State is likely , empirically, 
to be authoritarian if not coercive. These principles 9f 
unity, order, nationalism and success lay fundamental 
stress on the need for socio-economic co-operation rather 
than interest group competition in the effort that all must 
make in the 'national enterprise' of preserving society 
from economic ruin. 
so, in response to the curtailment of their influence, 
in the period 1971-77 the State through incomes policies 
aimed at controlling the wage fixing process. There was 
26.l . For the meaning of 'corporatism' see Winkler J.T., 
"Law, state and Economy" ( 1975) 2 Brit Jo. of Law 
and society 103; Panitch L. "Mod~ls of Intere~t 
-ntermediation and Models of Societal Change in 
~estern Europe" (1977) 10 Cornpar. Pol. Studies 7. 
UngerR. Law in Modern Society , op cit 200-202. 
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a return to a general wage order system and freer bargaining 
after 1977 but this was abandoned in favour of a brief 
flirtation with selective intervention enshrined in the 
Remuneration Act 1979. This Act was passed because it 
was thought that previous State forays into altering 
awards, for example the Economic Stabilisation (Meat 
Processors' and Preservers Award) Regulations 1978, may 
have been ultra vires the enabling Act, the Economic 
Stabilization Act 1948. The 1979 Act was repealed in 
1980 in return for the Federation of Labour agreeing to 
take part in tripartite wage talks, with State assurances 
of "reasonable" wage settlements and a hearing by the 
Arbitration Court for a general cost-of-living adjustment 
to wages. 
Up to the present day tripartite wage talks have been 
tried and although initially successful with a 'wages 
accord' on 6 August 1980 have failed to achieve agreement 
on broader wage policy issues. In 1983 the Government 
enacted Wage and Price Freeze regulations which paralyzed 
the dispute of · interest procedure and froze any increase in 
wages. 
This directive philosophy is best encapsulated by the 
Hon. J. Bolger, who, when describing the operation of the 
. 2 F. 2 
Remuneration Act 1979 said: 
262. N.Z.P. D.: 16 October 1979. 
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"The Government would (spel] J out the economic 
circumstances in the country from time to time ... 
givin? a general indication as to the scope of 
wage increases that are possible without further 
fuelling inflation." 
"In the absence of broad agreement on a sustainable 
level of settlement, the Government cannot abrogate 
its responsibility for the managing of the economy." 
"In the event that settlements are made that are 
in itsview out of line with the sustainable level, 
the Government must intervene." 
In other words, any factual autonomy in the wage 
bargaining area that unions may have possessed, as a 
residuary of the process of control outlined in the previous 
Chapter, is eroded by legal prohibition. The fact that wages 
are controlled is not important - wage controls have been 
used during wartime; and, in any case they may be temporary 
with free wage bargaining eventually restored. Its 
importance li~s as within the general theme of this paper 
that what the State gives it can also take away. Thus, 
unions are given bargaining rights, and the ability to 
determine wages, within a conciliation and arbitration frame-
work. But when they start bargaining outside that framework, 
or attain wage levels not conducive to the overall good of 
the economy, the State as arbiter of the public interest, 
h . h 263 can move in and take away sue rig ts. 
Significantly, the judiciary, by a series of decisions 
in cases involving trade unions from the 1960's in England 
263. With flagrant disregard for traditions of Parliamentary 
democracy according to Black T. "Who will Arbitrate 
Now?" (1979) N.Z.L.J. 313. 
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and the early 1970' s in t-ew Zealand 264 began to reverse 
the right to strike and · k t h pie e , t ereby undermining previous 
juridical acceptance of such actions and hence the legal 
immunities granted to unions. This escalation in the legal 
coercion and control of trade unionism has been more 
comparable to the similar phase of the English judicial 
opposition to trade unions in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. 
Benediction is provided by bolstering the facade of the 
old principles of "freedom of association" that held sway 
in the United Kingdom courts and is given statutory form 
in voluntary unionism legislation. The act of faith is 
completed by fostering an ideology of "free but responsible" 
groups. The right to strike exists - but it is heavily 
circumscribed and cannot be used for political and non-
employment related issues. Workers' unions are their own 
and not State created - unless you fall under the ambit of 
the Fishing Industry (Union Coverage) Act 1979 which permits 
only one, ministerially approved union in the Fishing 
industry to the exclusion of all others. Industrial relations 
was to be improved by co-operation and dialogue between 
the State, capital and labour, and to this end the Industrial 
Relations Council was established by the 1973 Act, for 
the representatives from the FOL and the New Zealand Employers 
2,: 4 . See Wedderburn K.W. The Worker and the Law (2ed, 
Penguin, HaEmondsworth, 1971) 324 - 84; O'Higgins R., 
Partington M. "Industrial Conflict: Judicial Attitudes" 
(1969) 13 M.L.R. l; Northern Drivers Union v Kawau Island 
Ferries [1974) N.Z.L.R., 617; Harder v New Zealand Tram-
ways Employees r.u.w. [1977) N.Z.L.R. 162. 
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Federation to: 
(a) Consult together on matters - 1 · or po icy relating 
to industrial matters. 
(b) Consider and make recommendations to the Government 
on the formulations and implementations of manpower 
policies. 
(c) Formulate codes of practice relating to industrial 
relations. 
(d) Recommend to Government on improving industrial 
relations, amending legislation. 
- the Council discussed a wide range of issues, from 
absenteeism, .Polynesian workers, . to the Industrial Law 
Reform Bill (1977) before it broke down due to the State's 
lack of inclination to accept any erosion of its own 
decision making powers. 
Such rhetoric enables the State to maintain the image 
of separateness from unions. Unions are depicted as scape-
goats for the country's economic ills, and can thus distract 
public attention away from state economic ineptitude. 
Unions are then caught in a 'catch-22" situation. Whilst not 
oblivious to the transmutation occu~ring, any frictional 
outbursts - such as the General strike in 197 9 which was a 
. 1 . 265· . h d 
pent-up reaction to Statist manipu ation is t us turne 
265. see Walsh P. , McMaster F. "Crisis and Confrontat
ion -
The origins of the 1979 General Str i ke" (1980) 1 
rndus:trial Relations Review, (No. 5) 33; (No. 6) 34; 
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around and used as J·ust'f' t· f i ica ion or further and more obvious 
State control. In this respect it will be unlikely that 
the State will totally prohibit the right to strike. The 
"Kiwis Care" march in 1980 showed just how convincing 
"union-bashing" is to the public. 
OUAGOS 
1. Definition 
Modern unions, as described, appear tobe a genus of what 
have been termed "Quasi-autonomous-government organizations" 
or QUAGOS. Pifer described such creatures in this way,: 
2 E6 
"Lodged, through the normal process of legal 
incorporation, in the private sector of 
society, this new entity has in many respects 
the countenance of the private, non-profit 
enterprise and even some of the characteristics 
of the true voluntary association. Yet it is 
... created as the result of legislation or 
other governmental initiative, and it serves 
important public purposes as an instrument of 
'government by contract'." 
The most commonly accepted examples of a QUAGO in a 
New Zealand context are the producer and marketing boards 
established under the Primary Products Marketing Act .1953. These 
boards are bodies corporate which: 
(i) are constituted by statute and serve private 
enterprise; 
266. "The Quasi-Non-Governmental Organisation" in Hague D.C., 
McKenzie W.J.M., Barker A. Public Polic y and Private 
Interests (MacMillan, London, 1975) 380. 
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( ii) f' inance for their operations comes from fees, 
levies on the industry and trading surpluses; 
(iii) the majority of members on the controlling body 
represent producers; 
(iv) are given the power to carry out their functions 
but the government may intervene on policy matters; 
(v) possess monopoly power granted by the government. 
To summarize attributes of these and other overseas 
QUAGOS it would be that they are legally incorporated as 
private institutions; they have trustees or a board of 
governors who govern it and are ultimately responsible for 
its affairs; its staff members are private employees; it 
theoretically determines its own programme though the 
enabling statute directs and restricts activities; and they 
are financially accountable to the Executive. 
(2) Unions as QUAGOS 
-< 
The thesis that unions are bodies more akin to QUAGOS 
than voluntary associations will be found difficult to 
accept by many. They will point to the fact that unions do 
not receive direct financial support from the State, that 
they do not provide tangible goods and services. Such 
157. 
criticisms ignore the fact that the State financially 
supports the conciliation and arbitration system, mediation 
facilities and provides financial assistance for activities 
such as union elections. 
In any case, what is more important is the motives 
for the perpetuation of the organization rather than by 
institutional form. The pure trade union exists primarily 
to serve the individual providing him with a means of 
expression and collective action outside the aegis of the 
State; In carrying out its mission, the incorporated 
trade union often does serve the needs of its individual 
members - ·simply see the unjustifiable dismissal and 
grievance procedures. But in the final test it must serve 
public purposes, and if these do not coincide with the 
individual's purposes, the State's interest must prevail. 
Power and responsibility are shared uneasily between the 
directorate of the union and the State. While in a showdown 
the union side could threaten to voluntarily deregister the 
union, the State, on the other hand, can use its legislative 
power to shape the union in a plethora of ways; from simply 
deregistering it, to creating, by legislative means, a 
new union. It can use its power and influence, in 
conjunction with employer bodies, to starve the union 
financially, or otherwise break its 'spirit'. 
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That is why unions are an "exogenous growth" within 
the social infrastructure. However much they have the 
appearance of the typical private voluntary organization, 
they will remain at bottom something essentially different. 
They are founded on the notion of 'maximum' feasible 
participation of the private citizen in their governance, 
but, when the test comes, 'maximum' must, of course, fall 
somewhere short of the absolute power possessed by the State. 
The chimera of autonomy gives the State the appearance 
of sharing power - of consulting on desirable courses of 
action. It negates any requirements for public or political 
accountability - so crucial in ~eynes's original formulation 
(supra). Decision-making power is delegated but the central 
decision-makers and managers · pull the strings, frame the 
laws, and ultimately decide what happens and where. 
C.ONCLUSION 
What we are witnessing is a splendid reification of the 
absolute sovereignty of the State. Throughout New Zealand's 
history there has been two ways of getting things done -
by voluntary action or by direct State action. The dividing 
line between these two spheres has always been indistinct. 
But gradually, in response to powerful new forces especially 
the changing nature of the economy, the area of State 
responsibility has, perforce, greatly expanded. 
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Perhaps it is the inevitable historical tendency of all 
State structures to move towards totalitarianism, as has 
been argued by Diamond 
2
F 7 : the State via the law cannibalises 
the very institutions that it apparently reinforces. But 
in this process of ingestion concepts such as that of 
the "trade union" retain their efficacy. In law, theory 
structures perception, and whatever is said of a concept 
reflects not so much what really happens as what we 
choose to see as having happened. Concepts have a tendency 
to displace reality, to set themselves up in its place. 
And they remain because those affected refuse to believe 
otherwise. Or are too afraid to believe. 
26 7. 
"The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom" in Wolff 
R. (ed). The Rule of Law (Simon and Schuster, New York, 
1971). 
160. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CITY OF PIGS 
THE ADMINISTERED SOCIETY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
The jurisprudence analys2d in this paper suggests that New 
:ealand society is increasingly becoming an administered society. 
The ascendance of what Follett described in thP. American 
268 
corporate context as "group particularism" has meant 
the creation of arrangements of hierarchy, privilege and 
dependence that, in fact, are more reminiscent of the structure 
of mediaeval society. 
A G . k 
269 · d t . d' 1 h h s 1.er e po1.nte ou, genuine me 1.aeva t oug t 
started "from the Whole". But he also noted ·that its idea 
was of a composite whole - a body articulated into different 
ranks, professions, and estates rather than into arithmetically 
equal units. 
"The whole only lives and comes to light 
in the Members .... Every Member is of value 
to the whole, and ... even a justifiable amputation 
of a Member is always a regrettable operation." 270 
This is essentially similar to Talcott Parsons who maintained 
that the ultimate units of modern society were institutions 
composed of status role bundles. He made explicit the view 
268. In smith P. (ed) The New State (Gloucester, Massachusetts, 
1965). 
269. Political Theories of the Middle Ages,op cit, 7. 
270. Ibid. 27. 
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that the status-role is the property not of the individual 
but of the group. 
This differentiated society is composed then of groups 
which perform differ8nt functions, but whose members are 
at the same time integrated through common ties of loyalty 
to the society and to each other as fellow citizens. 
So, as recognized by Dicey 
2 71 
in 1898 and reiterated 
272 
by Reeves, Maine's theory that progress ive societies 
2 73 
have developed from status to contract has been turned 
up on its head. Collective group agreements drawn out by 
trade unions within the collective bargaining arena defines 
the rights of a worker but, more importRntly, catches him in 
a·system that circumscribes both his mobility and his 
opportunities. 
2 74 
2 71. Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opi
nion in 
;;.:naland (2nd ed., MacMillan, London, 196 2 ) 
272 -. State Experiments Vol II, op cit. 
273. Ancient Law, op cit. 141. 
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The agreement has a time limit. 
It has a previous body of minimum conditions, both legal 
and customary. 
It is universalized so as to cover more than one person, 
more than any one group, shop, or factory. 
It has objectives not immediately connected with the 
job, such as equalization of opportunities for union 
members. 
It limits the rights and opportunities of others not 
embraced in the agreement. 
It describes the expectancies for all members worki~g in 
the shop and for all who will work in it. 
It accepts the union as a going concern, and recognizes 
it as an agent of the workers, possessed of power to 
interfere in the industry. 
It accepts the internal rules of the union as part of the 
contract. 
It recognizes the "right" of the worker to his job. 
It makes that right in some sense negotiable: displacement 
wage and retirement wage, depending upon the years 
employed. 
It defines and universalizes priv i leges ~uch as vacations 
with pay. 
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12. It regulates the future career of the individual 
within the industry by seniority. 
13. It stratifies the relationships among individuals 
within the union as to pay, promotion, retirement. 
14. It provides for "legal" redress through shop committees, 
arbitration, impartial chairmen. 
15. It ties the wage contract to some outside standard, 
such as price changes, productivity, profits, higher 
standard of living. 
16. It sets rules for admission into the industry: age, 
apprenticeship, membership in the union. 
17. It staggers work .during slack periods, and increasingly 
imposes other such limitations upon management. 
18. It contains provisions for penalizing employer, 
employee, and the union. 
19. It provides for an internal judiciary system. 
20. It establishes an increasing body of rights that go 
with the job, not with the worker." 
"These principles were implicit in the very first 
labor-management agreement. The specific items that 
creep into the agreements as they are renewed are a 
matter of precedent, convenience, and relative power. 
These rights and immunities are not interchangeable 
between one trade-union and another trade-union. 
Once a worker's lot is cast in one union and one 
industry, it becomes increasingly difficult for him 
either to alter his relative status in his own new 
"society", or to move from the union that had defined 
his role for him into another union where perchance 
he might discover a more congenial ·place for himself." 
Tannenbaum F~ A Philosophy of Labour op cit. 
pp. 152-1,54. 
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Once a worker's lot is cast in one uni'on and one industry, 
it becomes increasingly difficult for him either to alter 
his relative status in his own new "society" or to move 
from the union that has defined his role for him into another 
union where perchance he might discover a more congenial 
place for himself. 
Membership of a union is thus an item of wealth - it is 
just like a share certificate representing a relationship 
to an organization. 
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However, unlike other forms of wealth, 
this item devolves from the State - it is a form of State 
largesse via the Trade Union body. The "franchise" dispersed 
to the union ~o participate in the conciliation and 
arbitration process and its existence at the largesse of the 
State gives the individual member a sense of solidarity with 
his fellows; a sense of security knowing his economic well-
being is "safe" in the hands of a responsible body that had 
the fiatof the State. To be called a "union member" would 
not invoke fear of physical or legal reprisal against a worker 
2 75. "' our forefathers', said the Emperor Sigismund in 1434, 
'have not been fools. The crafts have been devised for 
this purpose that everbody by them should earn his daily 
bread, and nobody shall interfere with the craft of 
another. By this the world gets rid of its misery , and 
everyone may find his livelihood.' 'The first rule of 
justice', said the Parliament of ?aris three hundred and 
fifty years later, 'is to preserve to every one what 
belongs to him: this rule consists not only in preserving 
the rights of property, but still more in preserving those 
belonging to the person which arise from the prerogative 
of birth and of position.' 'To give to all subjects 
indiscriminately,' argued on that occasion the eminent 
Advocate-General Seguier, 'the right to hold a store or to 
open a shop is to violate the property of those who form 
the incorporated crafts.'" 
Webbs. and B. Industrial Democracy , op cit, 565-566. 
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rather it would to him, be an accurate reflection of what he 
is. The fact that he had certain skills would not assure him 
(until recently, though see later) of continued emplo~ent 
where a registered award was operating unless he was, or 
within two weeks of being asked would become, a member of 
the union. (Section 98 Industrial Relations Act 1973 - pre 
Amendment. ) 
B t R . h 276 . u as eic describes them, they are a "substitute 
self". The State is empowered to confer and take away rights 
and duties and not the organization concerned. A union cannot 
refuse admission to a person unless he is of "bad character 11 •
277 
Similarly, modes of expulsion in the union rule book are . 
subject to the Registrar's surveillance. 
278 
Until the 1983 
amendments the Arbitration Court emphasized the unjustifiable 
dismissal procedures were within the prerogative of the 
union concerned and not the individual. 
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If the union 
considered a particular case and rejected a member's application, 
the alternative procedure could not be invoked. If the union 
failed to consider the facts, or was mala fides, only then 
could the individual member invoke the alternative procedure. 
But he would be faced with considerable expense with difficulties 
of proof and advocacy because the union could not be compelled 
to assist him. (Section 117 Industrial Relations Act 1973 - pre 
Amendment.1 
276. The Greening of America (Random House, New York, 1970) 
Chapt. 5. 
277. s. 104 Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
278. s. 177(1) ibid. permits the Registrar to recuire a union 
to amend its rules to bring them into conformity with 
matters to be provided for ins. 175, in this case paras-
(i) - (k). 
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Inevitably, the result is a change in the degree of 
independent sovereignty enjoyed by the individual, for there 
are conditions to be met for acqui·ri'ng a t t · · s a us, maintaining 
it, advancing it, or avoiding its loss. The conditions are 
set by the State via the organization. And except as enacted 
in law-, any conditions may be placed on status - the 
280 recent dicta :in the JVII case that" a good unionist 
will and should go along with the decisions of his union 
democratically made" contained not only a statement of ideological 
fact, but of functional necessity. Rewards are there for 
conformity. Opportunities to associate to overthrow such 
strictures are frustrated by the sheer knowledge that to 
lose one's status is tantamount to economic and social 
extinction~ 
The process is however more insidious than mere 
conformity to protects one's own interests. It conditions 
human behaviour. It has irnbedded, over a period of ninety 
years, the belief that the union is the alpha and omega of 
industrial reality. A worker confronted with joining either a 
registered union or a rebellious splinter association would 
usually opt for the former because he knows that the ·law 
guarantees its existence; it can engage in activities that 
the other body cannot. It has the fiat of the State and so 
will continue long after the other has evaporated. Nobody 
beats the system. Reich has described this as "Consciousness 
280. (1982) A.C.J., 597, 606. 
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II", the ethos that laid the foundat1· ons f or the corporate 
State. Its central aspects are 
"an acceptance of the priority of institutions, 
organizations, and society and a belief that 
the i~dividual must be his destiny to something 
of this sort, larger than himself and subordinate 
his will to it."221 
Private man becomes "public interest" man. If the 
law creates something, provides a person with a particular 
status, then there is a moral duty to fulfill that particular 
purpose. A union member is to act "responsibly" even though 
this may mean committing violence to his own beliefs and 
ideals. 
"[I]f his place in the corporate group calls 
for [speaking up in the interests of the group on 
matters which vitally affect its welfare], it 
is his obligation to speak up. He is only 
partially serving his function if he fails to 
perform this activity fairly, judiciously, and 
appropriately - if he fails to show how his 
group's functions and the objectives of society 
are interrelated." 2~ 
A premium is placed on personal success to the extent that 
a particular organization's objectives will zealously be 
pursued. However, he realizes that he is enmeshed in an 
impersonal system which can at any time victimize him or 
impose its power on him. He is in favour of reforms, but he 
will not jeopardize his own status to fight for them. 
--·-- -------------------------------
281 Reich, op cit, 67. 
282, Blough R. M. Free Man and the Corporation (McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 1959, 106) . 
167. 
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Toffler wrote that the inevitable result of this 
process was to compartmentalize an individual's personality 
into modules - a separate identity for each social situation 
that an individual finds himself in. It is basely utilitarian 
in that the individual is not psychically capable of 
exhibiting his whole personality in every situation. Within 
a social paradigm he merely projects, and other actors 
within the paradigm lock into, a particular module. When 
a unionist is asked to vote on a ballot he is not wanting to 
reveal any notions of his personal problem, his loves, his 
sense of humour - solely to perform his function in the 
union/work module of his personality. 
The Toffler thesis explains why ultimately a policy of 
voluntary unionism is functionally redundant. An individual 
may not want to join or to remain a member of the union simply 
as a rebellion against its coercive aspect; on principle; 
through sheer apathy; or simply to do something different. 
Every aspect of his personality is in harmony with the idea 
of "freedom of association" - except his worker identity. 
This module realizes that both material livelihood, and social 
well-being are contingent on becoming, or remaining "part of 
the union". To be sure the law may protect him from being 
coerced, physically or emotionally man-handled, being "sent to 
Coventry", if he does not join a union, but the worker knows 
the law can only go so far; that his life would become system-
atically intolerable. 
2
c3 F t Sh k (Bodley Head, London, 1971). See especially 
c • u ure oc 
Chapter 6. 
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Again, the law protects his dismissal, victimization, 
or indirectly preference in employment due to not belonging 
to a union. He can bring proceedings before the Arbitration 
Court without the vehicle of a union. But how realistic 
is this? How can he afford the expenses, how can he collect 
vital information when it is obvious that union sources 
will conspire to ensure that he does not succeed in his 
quest? And how is he to have any chance to overcome this? 
The answer, to combine with any other like minded individuals. 
But, then he would run the risk of finding himself in the 
type of organization which he decided not to join or to leave, 
so what would appear to be the point? 
LIFE, LOVE AND ORDER 
Consider this statement from V. C. Clark, an American 
reporting on labour conditions in New Zealand and Australia. 
He had this to say about the New Zealand workman at the turn 
284 
of the present century: 
2 8 4. 
"Politically the New Zealand workman is much more 
aggressive than the American. His new-born social 
institutions pulsate with nascent energy and 
it requires his whole attention to direct them. 
His leaders claim that he is meantime losing the 
militant spirit of the English unionist. But he . 
is becoming instructed in political affairs and is 
a firm believer in social experiments which have 
the intense interest to him of things just within 
the possibility of realization. Yet he is not a 
social dreamer. The leaders are practical and 
matter-of-fact enough in their discussions of 
proposed reforms to be secured through legislation ... " 
Op cit., 1175. 
169. 
with the following passage from an international 
Management Consultant's fi'rst · · f impression o modern New Zealand 
workers": 
2 t1 5 
"Nearly every large scale plant I have visited 
seems to be populated by people wandering 
around in a dream. They are rarely told anything 
by management about what they are supposed to 
be doing, and seem totally disinterested anyway. 
Additionally, there is this underlying feeling 
of hostility and ill humour which can surface 
in service situations as out-and-out rudeness. 
The climate of industrial relations underlines 
this with parties in most disputes seeming to 
adopt intransigent positions and both sides 
acting out stock caricatures." 
New Zealand's great experiment in social and economic 
control is starting to ripen into successful fruition. It 
has created a work force reduced to animal contentment where 
a sense of incompletness and moral torpor reigns. 
brief passage of his Republic Plato evoked such a society, 
which he called the City of Pigs. 
Unions usually do not form as posited in the "Pure 
Theory of Unions" nowadays. Workers may have friendships 
ext~nding within their workplaces, but there is no longer the 
impetus for such primary groups to forge into a secondary 
organization. It almost always already exists. New work 
situations involve a process of registration (with a sufficient 
number of workers) first, and the formation of a group 
ideology second. The bureaucracy that develops provides the 
unionists primary needs. As Drucker describes: 
2 85 • Twinn w. The New Zealand Worker (1977) 2 N.Z.J.I.R. 97, 
99. 
170. 
"The individual union member is like the 
individual stockholder; he neither wants to 
exercise his individual rights, nor would 
he know how to do it and for what purpose. 
Just as the stockholder buys a share in a 
modern big-business corporation because he 
thereby escapes the decisions and responsibilities 
of ownership, so the individual union rnernbe= 
joins the union in order to escape decisions 
and to transfer the burden of responsibility to 
the union leader." 286 
The modern unionist evades commitment. He refers all 
queries, complaints, and all other aspects of his work 
to his shop steward or job delegate. He sees little 
difference between the union bureaucracy and the bureaucratic 
organization who employs him. A bright young unionist who 
would have, in times past, been one of the leaders of the 
union movement can just as easily go to University or night 
classes at the Polytechnic, and in no time have a job as · 
a management trainee or industrial engineer. In a few years 
he will have forgotten he ever was a union member. "He 
thinks like a manager, lives like a manager, behaves like 
a manager". 
287 288 As Weber laments: 
"It is as if ... we were deliberately to secure 
men who need 'order' and nothing but order, 
who beco~e nervous and cowardly if for one 
moment the order wavers, and helpless if they 
are torn away from their total incorporation 
in it. That the world should know no men but 
these: it is in such an evolution that we 
are already caught up, and the greatest question 
is therefore not how we can promote and hasten it, 
but what we can oppose to this machinery in 
order to keep a portion of mankind free from this 
supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life." 
286. ThB Future of Industrial Man (John Day, New York, 1924) 128. 
287. Drucker P. Landmarks of Tomorrow (Harper Bros., New York, 
1959) 102. 
288. In Mayer J.P., Ma~ Weber and German Politics (Faber and 
Faber, London, 19431 77. 
171. 
The real nightmare of 1984 comes not from Orwell's 
Big Brother watching over the individual to see that he 
believes right and thinks right, but is a world where no-one 
cares what you think or believe, except insofar as whether 
union dues were paid on time, your work is not encroaching 
into another union's jurisdiction. Abowe all, the regime 
crushes the spirit. It institutionalizes thinking to the 
point where radical or any non-statist thinking is seen as 
hopeless. 
"The impersonality of these constraints in 
industrial society leads to a great extent 
to a feeling of powerlessness. If the sole 
source of oppressive control is a totalitarian 
leader, one can attack him. If the source is an 
entire way of life, revolution is a less eff-
icacious response. The idea that 'you can't 
bea~ the system' expresses the impotence of . 
people against a rationalized and impersonal 
system of control." 2E9 
And so the spiral continues. To break it one can only 
balk at the source of authority - the State. To question its 
legitimacy, or more practically, to persuade it to exercise 
its function in a way that more accurately typifies the ideals 
of democrary. 
But all such "revolutions" start from the consciousness 
of the polity: the center of legal significance. A re-
emphasis on the dignity of the individual and rights to 
2£9 • Faunce w. R. Problems of Industrial Society (McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 1968) 70. 
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associate into groups, and with that group power to 
restructure society. Thus a brave new world. 
But as employment increases, and the disparity between 
the rich and the poor increases, the State pushes its 
tentacles more firmly into the gaps. Those well educated 
and well-off are impervious, at least consciously, to the 
manipulation of their livelihood, by bureaucrats. They do 
not understand, and for the most part, do not care. White 
collar unionism may prove an exception as it exposes those 
on the fringe of the middle class to the control of state 
licensed unions. But as long as the "working man" is 
concerned with earning his wages to feed him and his family, 
abstract ideologies take a second place to the everyday · 
struggle for survival. 
173. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has proceeded at a level of considerable 
abstraction and generality because it has been concerned 
as much with illustrating an entire social situation as 
with particular groups. It has insisted on the complex 
textural interlayering of organization and consciousness, 
of the State and the individual, of law and human endeavour. 
The effort was to define a basic code of "meaning" at 
work in a particular legal situation. 
It will be obvious that "meaning" does not entail 
merely interpreting the content of ~tatutes; rather it 
is the relation between legal norms and social reality. It 
follows that the meaning of law, and hence its real effect 
could change over time while the content of statutes 
29.0. 
remained unaltered. As Kahn-Freund remarked: 
29.JL 
"The appearance and disappearance of legal 
norms is a continuous process which takes 
place through and outside the corpus of 
written law. Society is working ceaselessly 
on the sum total of legal norms. It creates 
new norms, .... It causes existing norms to 
disappear by refusing to apply them. It 
alters the content of existing legal rules 
though changes in 'interpretation'. The 
statement that the law is a product of the 
social relations of power must not only 
be understood in political terms. Social 
forces not only shape the law through 
political institutions, but also by their 
influence on judicial, administrative, and 
contractual practice, and by their involvement 
in the resolution of conflict." 
Quoted in Clark J. "Towards a Sociology of Labour Law" 
in Wedderburn K., Lewis R., Clark J. (Eds) Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund 
(Clarendon, Oxford, 1983) 93. 
174. 
The root of change lies then within the consciousness 
of man. "Man is consciousness capable of intentionality" 2 9 
wrote Unger, but he is also a member of the physical world. 
Though his intentions permeate some of the aspects of his 
situation, they never reach all of them. This i.s the 
achilles heel the State aims at - as argued they compart-
mentalize consciousness and force it into behaviourism. 
One can of course break free of such shackles, but when a 
society has such a predilection for these very shackles, 
d . 292 . d h' . an Sie~fried sense t ~sin New Zealand as far back 
as 1904, then the prospect of combatting the total absorption 
of groups into the State is limited. 
If the thesis presented in this paper is correct then 
New Zealand society has an uncomfortable resemblance to some 
of the totalitarian regimes that we tend to vilify. Or, 
perhaps more correctly, it illustrates that the ordering of 
societies has world-wide common traits. In this case the 
differences between modern New Zealand and Nazi Germany, 
feudal England, and Soviet Russia are simply ones of de.gree 
and ideological illusion. 
291. 
29 2. 
Op c it., 2 5 6 
"What distinguishes one country from another is t h e degree 
of resistance to power, either from individuals or companies 
or groupings and institutions. In New Zealand there is 
almost no resistance and, as a wave sweeps easily up a 
sandy beach, State influence makes itself felt, right 
up to the front door of private life." 
- Democracy in New Zealand (Bell, London, 1914) 48. 
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